817.1051/454

The Minister in Nicaragua ( Hanna ) to the Secretary of State

No. 222

Sir: With reference to the Department’s telegram No. 111 of October 31, 11 A.M.,29 transmitting a message from the Secretary of State concerning the proposed reduction in the Guardia Nacional for delivery by this Legation to President Moncada and to the subsequent exchange of telegrams on this subject,30 I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the message as it was delivered to President Moncada.

I will not fail to keep the Department advised of developments in this important matter.

Respectfully yours,

Matthew E. Hanna
[Enclosure]

The Secretary of State to the President of Nicaragua ( Moncada )

In conjunction with the Secretary of the Navy and other Navy officials I have most carefully considered the present situation in Nicaragua with a view to doing anything possible to be of help in the two acute situations now confronting Your Excellency’s Government namely, the disturbances and brigandage in the border departments and the financial and economic difficulties.

You will I feel sure readily agree with me that the primary duty of any Government is to maintain law and order. Unless this is done no Government can stand. The situation in Nueva Segovia, Jinotega and Estelí is the big problem now facing the Nicaraguan Government. This situation must be met by the Nicaraguan Government and all possible resources of the Government devoted to its solution. This is the first and paramount duty and obligation of the Government.

Nicaragua’s present economic and financial problem is fully appreciated by us. The whole world is passing through a period of great depression and practically all governments are suffering from a shrinkage of income. The question before Nicaragua is how can the duty [Page 676] of suppressing banditry and the maintenance of order elsewhere in the Republic be met by Nicaragua’s resources.

After very careful consideration and deliberation on our part I feel that the best suggestion that can be made at this time and which indicates the utmost that my Government can do in the matter is as follows.

While all estimates indicate that the preservation of law and order under existing conditions requires an effective and efficient Guardia of a minimum strength of 2,000 at an annual cost of $1,000,000 exclusive of maintenance of penal establishments, my Government would nevertheless be willing in view of the present financial depression to consent to continue to cooperate in the Guardia at a less strength if and after an auxiliary force of the nature of a local police hereinafter mentioned has been created and has proved effective. In this connection I beg to refer to the penultimate paragraph of your letter of October 3, 1930, to General McDougal in which you promise to introduce into the next Congress a measure providing for contribution by the municipalities to the cost of maintenance of municipal police. Such a measure would appear to be fair and reasonable and would in itself, if it proved effective in operation, materially decrease the cost of the Guardia to the National Government.

I am sure that as a military man you will appreciate fully, Mr. President, how essential it is that funds be provided regularly and promptly for the maintenance of the Guardia. If troops are not regularly paid there is a possibility of mutiny and other disorders and this Government cannot assume the responsibility for exposing its officers to such danger more especially in the exposed and isolated sections of the disturbed departments. I feel that Your Excellency having those considerations in mind will readily agree with me that I am making a perfectly reasonable request when I ask you to give explicit and irrevocable instructions to the Collector General of Customs to segregate during each month as a first charge on the customs revenues after paying the expenses of the collectorship and the service of the debt sufficient funds so that he can pay directly to the Chief of the Guardia on the first of each month the full amount necessary for the expenses during the ensuing month of the Guardia at a strength of 2,000 men. This amount to be reduced as and when the two Governments consent to a reduction in the strength of the Guardia.

I contemplate that the reductions in the Guardia will be made from detachments stationed in the peaceful districts so that not only will there be no reduction in the Guardia forces operating in the bandit infested area but even if possible that those forces may be augmented by a greater concentration there of the Guardia forces. This would in a certain measure leave certain municipalities and areas without police protection and I contemplate that this deficiency should be [Page 677] supplied by the municipalities themselves through the establishment of local police which will be a branch of the Guardia Nacional to be known as the Guardia Municipal or some other appropriate title indicating that it constitutes an integral part of the Guardia Nacional.

Your Excellency will recall that at Tipitapa we agreed that one of the outstanding needs of Nicaragua was a nonpartisan police force or Guardia to be trained up by the United States Marines and which would be the sole military and police force in the country. I feel confident that you will concur with me that our view then was sound and is still sound as regards the requirements of Nicaragua, both for military protection and for the preservation of law and order. The Guardia Municipal would be under Nicaraguan officers to carry on police duties in each locality; its officers and enlisted personnel would be recruited by the Guardia Nacional and it would have the same relationship to the Guardia Nacional as has the local police recently created in Managua which is an integral part of the Guardia Nacional but is paid for from municipal funds.

What I have outlined above covers merely the day to day hand to mouth necessity of preventing the spread of banditry in Nicaragua. It does not cure the cancer. To bring about a permanent betterment in conditions not only in the bandit infested area but throughout the Republic as a whole I feel very strongly, Mr. President, that you should divert all possible funds from other public works for road building in the affected area. I would suggest that $50,000 per month or as much thereof as may possibly be provided be set aside for this work. I realize that to do this may mean cutting down the public works in other localities and that this in itself may create in such localities a problem of law and order preservation for the Guardia. I feel that the retrenchment of public works should first be done in areas where there is the least likelihood of disturbances. The building of roads in the affected area will, by providing work for the inhabitants of these bandit ridden provinces, tend to stabilize men who might otherwise be tempted or driven into banditry. At the same time it will provide means for opening up this very sparsely settled area, making it possible to establish farms and other productive enterprises which will add to the general economic prosperity of the country and it will provide the means of communication necessary to patrol the country and hence keep it in a permanent state of law and order. This now seems to me to be the best and surest way of solving definitely the problem which has been acute in Nicaragua for three years and which is no nearer solution now than it was when you and I met at Tipitapa. This proposal I think opens the way for a definite solution of the problem and if you will carry it out will be one of the most statesmanlike acts of your administration and one for [Page 678] which I feel you will receive the gratitude and recognition of your country in years to come. I am not minimizing the necessity of development in the more densely settled portions of Nicaragua but this is something which I feel must be postponed until more prosperous times in order that the threat of banditry which is now upsetting the whole structure in Nicaragua may be removed.

I know it will be difficult to find funds for this work but the suggestion that occurs to me is that the profits from the operation of the Pacific Railway might very appropriately be used to this end. The construction of these roads will open up new territory and will act as feeders for the railroad; furthermore, the revenue from the railroad is a comparatively new source of revenue to the Government as most of the profits in the past when the railroad was hypothecated to the bankers as security for their advances was used in paying interest and amortization charges on these advances. Now that the railroad has reverted to the Government the profits from the railroad could most profitably be used in further productive enterprises. This Government will be glad to loan the services of its officers and engineers in supervising the road construction work and any Marine equipment such as trucks, et cetera, that may be available.

I have gone into this matter at great length with Your Excellency because after mature deliberation the above offers the best chance I see for meeting the situation the seriousness of which is fully appreciated and in no wise minimized by me. Your Excellency will appreciate, however, that the preservation of law and order is as I have said the first obligation of a country. This Government would hesitate to continue to cooperate with the Guardia unless its expenses are met and even so it would feel that the work, money and effort expended would be wasted unless the fundamental problem of banditry is solved. I therefore feel that this Government is going as far as it can in a helpful attitude to Nicaragua in saying that it is willing to continue to cooperate with the Guardia eventually reduced as set forth above if first the arrangement as above outlined is made for the prompt and regular payment of the Guardia and secondly, if funds for road building in the disturbed sections are provided in order to solve this basic problem.

Orderly procedure requires that the reduction of the Guardia be made as indicated above and I sincerely hope that after considering this matter you will agree with me that the reduction cannot be made drastically by November 15th as contemplated in your recent letter to General McDougal. I therefore earnestly request you, Mr. President, to agree to modify that order in the manner outlined above or at least to hold it in abeyance pending the final solution of the present problem.

  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed. After the receipt of telegram No. 111 the Minister in Nicaragua initiated a series of discussions with the Secretary and as a result of these the message to be delivered to the President was modified and in its final form was delivered on November 6 (817.1051/442, 444, 446, 447A).