862.00/2530
The Chargé in Germany ( Gordon ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 4.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that on the morning after the elections an individual called at the Embassy stating that he was a member of the National Socialist Party—which for the sake of brevity will henceforth be referred to by its local appellation of “Nazi”—and that as the aims and objects of this party were so evidently and persistently misrepresented and misunderstood abroad, he wished to know whether a delegation from this party might call at the Embassy and explain what these aims and objects really were. I replied that if some such representative wished to call upon me informally I would receive him and listen to what he had to say. In consequence, this afternoon Herr Schickedanz, the Berlin representative of the Voelkische Beobachter, the official Nazi organ published in Munich, came to see me.
Mr. Schickedanz began by saying he regretted that almost without exception the foreign press, as far as it had come to his attention, [Page 80] had been propagating erroneous impressions concerning the Nazis. It seemed to be commonly assumed abroad that his party was hand in glove with the communists or that it represented a danger of a very similar nature. On the contrary, he was convinced that, had it not been for the campaign waged by his party, the communists would have had some 30 or 40 seats more in the Reichstag than they did secure. Far from his party having appropriated catchwords and political arguments from the communists, it was the latter who, alarmed by the success of the Nazi campaign, had tried towards the end of the campaign to do just the converse. To express his idea another way, it was only the fact that his party had gone before the mass of voters suffering from the prevalent economic misery and distress and had presented to them in a convincing manner its ideas as to how to remedy the situation, that had prevented a tremendous wave of communistic sentiment from sweeping the country.
The fundamental element in the situation, which had recently come to a head with last Sunday’s elections, was the tremendous economic depression and distress prevailing in Germany. He felt that this distress was likewise far from truly appreciated in foreign countries—in some cases perhaps deliberately, and in others on account of misinformation.
It was starting from this point of view that the Nazi Party had been conceived and organized and it was along lines growing out of this original conception that its campaign had up to now been conducted. In its opinion, this deep-seated distress and misery could be traced back directly to the enforced “tribute” with which Germany had been burdened by the Treaty of Versailles. In the view of the Nazis the treaty was intolerably unfair, not only as to the imposition of tribute—a word which my interlocutor repeatedly used—but also as regards the declaration of German war-guilt. With such a false basis it was inevitable that economic trouble would develop, and the present situation was only a logical result of this treaty. He admitted that economic depression at present was worldwide, but thought that it bore more specifically and more hardly on Germany for the reasons stated.
The present Brüning government, in its effort to ameliorate the financial situation, which was part and parcel of the iniquitous chain of events above referred to, had tried to resort to measures which imposed further financial sacrifices and burdens. But unemployment was constantly increasing; it was far greater than was indicated by the present official figures of about three million because it was a conservative estimate that for every two individuals receiving unemployment aid there was one who, while not in constant and active employment, was trying to struggle along without any official unemployment dole; so that this coming winter one could certainly count [Page 81] on there being at least five rather than three million unemployed, not to speak of the dependent families of these individuals. As long as this unemployment continued to increase, whatever government might be in power would have to raise new revenue to be applied to additional unemployment relief.
The only escape from this vicious circle that his party could see was a change in the fundamental conditions causing the same, that is to say, in an eventual general recognition—which would have to be given practical shape—that the provisions imposing on Germany the added burden of paying foreign tribute, must be altered; again in other words, revision both of the treaties and of the Young Plan. He could not say, of course, how soon such a change in world opinion might be hoped for, but he did believe that when the real facts as to the desperateness of the situation in Germany were known, such a change of opinion, with its consequent results, would be bound to come about. He did not hope this as far as France was concerned, but he did hope that, as America had only had the role of an onlooker in this whole European situation, it might be moved to give its moral support to the desired end.
Speaking of France, he said he felt that a large part of the misrepresentations concerning Germany which found their way into the rest of the world, was disseminated from French sources; as a shining example he referred to the question of Germany’s armament and the possibility of her attempting to impose her views by force. This, according to him, was so absurd as scarcely to need refutation: the reduction in the size of the army imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, the restriction to small calibre artillery, the lack of military aviation, etc., made any such thoughts impossible. However, Germany was further accused of having all sorts of disguised semi-military organizations, such as the Stahlhelm and others. The militant formations of his own party were included in this charge and it was further asserted that important elements in the Reichswehr were hand in glove with these formations; he wished to state most emphatically that nothing of the kind was true. Concluding his remarks in this field he said it was unthinkable that Germany could attempt to cope with the combined armed forces of France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that at any rate, as far as his party was concerned, it entirely realized the complete impossiblity at the present time of attaining its objects by force.
Reverting to the political field, he stated that the present success of the Nazis was by no means a flash in the pan as their opponents asserted; very much to the contrary, they felt convinced that their strength was on the increase and that the pressure of fundamental conditions, combined with their views as to the remedy therefor, would [Page 82] inevitably contribute to further gains in their favor. If the Reichstag were again to be dissolved (and I felt that he was trying clearly to imply that this would shortly be the case) his party had every reason to hope that it would be returned as the strongest party in the country.
The party’s program could not be more definitely defined than as hereinbefore set forth, because the application of its fundamental ideas would necessarily depend upon the development of both the economic and general political situation. Finally he emphasized, in this connection, that his party fully realized that it could not bring about a final accomplishment of its aims and ambitions, even in their present state, except with time and patience; it was quite conscious that any attempt to achieve these aims precipitately would not only be doomed to failure but would accentuate the very conditions it was trying to alleviate.
It is of some incidental interest to note that Mr. Schickedanz by no means fitted the description of a hot-headed “wild man” as the Nazis are often depicted in the local press. A man apparently only about 35 years old, he was noticeably well mannered and although the views he was attempting to explain were those of a partisan and a fanatic, his method of presentation had none of the latter quality and he expressed himself throughout in moderate and restrained terms. The case he was trying to set forth was presented by him perhaps as well as it could be, but it obviously cannot stand up under the slightest analysis.
When trying to expound his party’s program of “freedom and bread” Mr. Schickedanz could get no further than to repeat that the payment of tribute by Germany must cease and that as a corollary the theory of German war guilt, as embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, must be formally repudiated. The “fundamental ideas” referred to by him in conclusion mean, when his statements are examined, no more than that. Just how his party proposes to achieve this “freedom”, however, and in what manner it envisages converting this achievement, if accomplished, into such a remedy for the fundamental economic ills with which Germany is beset, as to fulfill the promise of “bread”, he made no attempt to indicate.
As the Department will have noted, he made it evident that his party had no clear idea of just how it might be able eventually to accomplish its aims—in other words, on his own showing, its policy is one of sheer opportunism.
The main interest in the interview seemed to me to reside in the fact that it could well be interpreted as one instance of the application of what appears to be the new order of the day of the National Socialist Party, viz. an effort to dispel the impression that their course [Page 83] of conduct will be marked by violent and illegal measures. In this connection I venture to request the Department to refer to my despatch No. 496 of September 23, 1930, going forward in the same pouch, which deals further with this latter development.
Respectfully yours,