711.4112Anti-War/121
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton)
Sir: The British Ambassador called at the Department on May 24, 1928 and asked if I had anything to say to him about the multilateral treaty before he departed for London, and I told him that I did not at that time but that I would try to talk with him about it prior to his departure. On May 29 I had a long interview with him on the subject.
Sir Esme said in substance that it seemed to him that the proposed treaty was not exactly a treaty so much as a declaration of principle by the various countries. I said that, of course, this appears to be so from the statements contained in the first article but that, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a treaty which must be submitted to the Senate. The Ambassador said that, since I had stated my understanding as to the meaning of the treaty, he did not see any reason why the other countries could not state their understanding of its meaning which would be made a part of the treaty. I replied that the trouble about that was if each country began tacking on to this treaty [Page 81] understandings which would be in the form of reservations or provisos or stipulations as to what it means, each country might have a different construction and different reservations and provisos and that in the end there might be so many that the treaty would be a joke. I said that I was not prepared to do it and that I could not agree to any such proceeding; that if my construction of the treaty was correct, the other countries could say that that was their understanding outside of the treaty entirely.
Sir Esme then said that he had received a letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain in which Sir Austen said that he was not sure that we on this side fully understood his attitude. Sir Austen stated that he was willing to sign the treaty in the form I had presented; that, however, what Great Britain wanted was to get France into the treaty as they feared that if France did not come in, it would probably prevent any treaty being made. I replied that I understood this but that I had not yet had any suggestions from France other than their draft treaty with all their reservations and the provisions about war as an instrument of individual, spontaneous and independent policy. That draft, I said to him, could not be understood to mean much of anything. I said that the entire European press was in favor of the anti-war treaty idea, except the press in France, but that even in France there was some support of it. I added that Mr. Herrick had said to me that he did not believe that all the press reports in France represented the opinion of the Government. Sir Esme said that he was surprised that the French press was so hostile and I said that I was too. I gave the Ambassador clearly to understand that I did not propose to enter into a treaty with so many reservations as to destroy its efficacy.
The Ambassador then said that Sir Austen would like to have the Foreign Ministers meet in Washington to sign the treaty. I said that I should be delighted to have them do so but that I did not know whether they would care to come here; that so far as signing the treaty was concerned, as I had said before, I was willing to sign it anywhere the Foreign Ministers would meet and make a sort of ceremony of signing the treaty. In connection with this, Sir Esme wanted to know if we would invite all the world, should it be decided to sign the treaty at Washington. I replied in the negative, pointing out that there would be no use of inviting the States which have not been asked to participate in the treaty to come to the United States or to any other place as we would never accomplish anything that way. I said that only those which had accepted would sign it in the first instance and that undoubtedly they might want to meet and sign it together. That was a matter, I said, which I would consider but that I could not consider inviting all the world to come here [Page 82] and enter into a treaty which had not even been presented to many of the countries.
Sir Esme said that he would like, if possible, for me to give him some more specific message to Sir Austen as to what we would do. I replied that, while of course we will sign the present form of treaty, I was not prepared to say yet whether any acceptable modifications can be made, particularly since I have no assurance that any modifications would be acceptable to France. He talked quite awhile on this subject and emphasized the fact that Sir Austen was willing to sign the treaty in its present form.
The Ambassador then said that the New York World had made a suggestion in which he thought there was considerable merit. Suppose, he said, some country should wish to lease a naval station near the United States and Egypt should wish to lease Alexandria to Italy. I replied that if we were going to undertake to meet every possible contingency which might arise in the world, we might as well abandon the treaty; that so far as the United States is concerned, we have no fear that any country is going to lease a naval station near the United States; that if it did, we would have the right to protect ourselves on the ground of self-defense. I added that Great Britain has the same right to protect whatever Dominions or interests it has which are national in their character just the same as it would have the right to protect the British Isles. He said that he thought that was so. I said that so far as Egypt is concerned, he knew that it was as unlikely that Egypt would grant its territory to any foreign country as it was that any of the South American countries would grant their territory and, on the other hand, no country could take any South American or Central American territory without going to war since no country in this hemisphere would grant it; that time, I pointed out, has passed. I said that the chance is so remote that it is not worth while trying specifically to guard against it in a treaty because if we should, Japan would want to protect its Manchurian, Korean and Chinese interests as everyone knows and France would want to do the same, and we did not know where it would end. I added that it would certainly destroy the efficacy of any treaty. I told the Ambassador that he would understand that the position of the New York World is dictated largely by politics. I said that so far as the United States is concerned, it is willing to take its chances about other countries leasing naval stations near the Panama Canal or near the United States. I certainly gave him to understand that I was not going to enter into any treaty covered over with all sorts of reservations and understandings and exchanges of notes that would be made a part of the treaty.
[Page 83]I then brought up a question which the Ambassador had raised in one of our discussions recently in connection with the treaty as to whether the other countries could come to Belgium’s rescue if Germany should make war on Belgium. I said that if the parties are released as to the treaty-breaking state, as they are, I did not see why Belgium could not be protected. I said that, of course, a clause could be put into the treaty to the effect that if any of the participating nations became involved in war, the others would be automatically released, but that I understood that Great Britain would not want this as it would be putting the innocent and the guilty together. He said yes or something like that.
I told Sir Esme that I would see him before he went abroad and if I had anything concrete that I could give him I would do so, but that I understood that Sir Austen would be out of the country. Sir Esme was very much surprised and I read him that part of Mr. Houghton’s telegram which states that Sir Austen was leaving on the 26th of May for Geneva and would be absent until the last part of June, and that he planned to leave on his vacation the first week in September. The Ambassador was very much surprised and said that he did not know of any business which Sir Austen had in Geneva now.
I am [etc.]