711.5112 France/119
The French Ambassador ( Claudel ) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary of State: Your Excellency was pleased to inform me in your note of the 11th instant, of the considerations suggested to you by my letter of January 5 in answer to your communication of December 28, 1927. My Government has asked me to express to you its satisfaction at the harmonizing, thanks to your Excellency, of the views of the two Governments concerning the best method of accomplishing a project upon the essential principles of which they apparently are in agreement.
The original French proposal of June, 1927, contemplating an act confined to France and the United States, appeared to the French Government to be both desirable and feasible by reason of the historical relations between the two Republics.
The American Government was only willing, however, to embody the declaration proposed by the French Government in the preamble of the Franco-American Arbitration Convention now in process of renewal,6 and considered on the other hand, for reasons of its own which the French Government has not failed to take into account, that it would be opportune to broaden this manifestation against war and to make it the subject of a separate act in which the other Powers would be invited to participate.
The Government of the Republic was not opposed to this expansion of its original plan, but it could not but realize, and it felt bound to point out that the new negotiation as proposed would be more complex and likely to meet with various difficulties.
The question as to whether there would be any advantage in having such an instrument, of a multipartite nature, signed in the first place by France and the United States, or else first elaborated by certain of the principal Powers of the World and then presented to all for their signature, is essentially one of procedure.
The Government of the Republic offered a suggestion upon this point only because of its desire more speedily and more surely to achieve the result which it seeks in common with the United States. This is tantamount to saying that it is ready to concur in any method which may appear to be the most practicable.
There is, however, a situation of fact to which my Government has requested me to draw your particular attention.
The American Government cannot be unaware of the fact that the great majority of the Powers of the world, and among them most [Page 7] of the principal Powers, are making the organization and strengthening of peace the object of common efforts carried on within the framework of the League of Nations. They are already bound to one another by a covenant placing them under reciprocal obligations, as well as by agreements such as those signed at Locarno in October 1925,7 or by international conventions relative to guarantees of neutrality, all of which engagements impose upon them duties which they cannot contravene.
In particular, your Excellency knows that all States members of the League of Nations represented at Geneva in the month of September last, adopted, in a joint resolution tending to the condemnation of war,8 certain principles based on the respect for the reciprocal rights and duties of each. In that resolution the Powers were led to specify that the action to be condemned as an international crime is aggressive war and that all peaceful means must be employed for the settlement of differences, of any nature whatsoever, which might arise between the several States.
This is a condition of affairs which the United States, while a stranger thereto, cannot decline to take into consideration, just as must any other State called upon to take part in the negotiation.
Furthermore, the United States would not in any way be bound thereby to the provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations. The French proposal of June last looking to the conclusion of a bi-lateral compact, had been drawn up in the light of the century old relations between France and the United States; the French Government still stands ready to negotiate with the American Government on the same conditions and on the same basis. It has never altered its attitude in that respect. But when confronted by the initiative of the United States in proposing a multipartite covenant, it had to take into consideration the relations existing among the various Powers which would be called upon to participate therein. This it has done, with the object of assuring the success of the treaty contemplated by the United States. Its suggestions of January 5 as to the terms of the multipartite treaty are inspired by the formula which has already gained the unanimous adherence of all of the States members of the League of Nations, and which for that very reason might be accepted by them with regard to the United States, just as it has already been accepted among themselves.
This is the explanation of our proposal of January 5.
The Government of the Republic has always, under all circumstances, very clearly and without mental reservation declared its readiness to join in any declaration tending to denounce war as a [Page 8] crime and to set up international sanctions susceptible of preventing or repressing it. There has been no change in its sentiments in that respect: its position remains the same. Your Excellency may therefore be assured of its sincere desire to respond to the idea of the American Government and to second its efforts to the full extent compatible with the situation of fact created by its international obligations. It is this preoccupation which inspired the formula proposed on January 5, a formula which does indeed seem to be the most apt at this time to assure the accomplishment of the American project. The Government of the Republic accordingly cannot but hope that the American Government will share this view. Subject to these observations, the Government of the Republic would, moreover, very gladly welcome any suggestions offered by the American Government which would make it possible to reconcile an absolute condemnation of war with the engagements and obligations assumed by the several nations and the legitimate concern for their respective security.
Pray accept [etc.]
- See vol. ii, pp. 810 ff.↩
- League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, pp. 289–359.↩
- League of Nations, Official Journal, October 1927, p. 1444.↩