711.5112France/284: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Herrick )37
118. [Paraphrase.] Department’s No. 117, April 21, 6 p.m. Please repeat following telegram immediately to Embassy in Great Britain as Department’s No. 97, referring to Department’s No. 95, April 21, 6 p.m.; to Embassy in Germany as Department’s No. 43, referring to Department’s No. 42, April 21, 6 p.m.; and to Embassy in Italy as Department’s No. 49, referring to Department’s No. 48, April 21, 6 p.m.38 and let its contents guide you in any discussions you may have at Foreign Office. [End paraphrase.]
On April 13 you transmitted to the Government to which you are accredited a copy of M. Briand’s original draft treaty for the renunciation of war between France and the United States, a copy of the correspondence exchanged on that subject and a preliminary [Page 35] draft of a treaty representing in a general way the form of multilateral anti-war treaty which the United States is prepared to sign. In your note of transmittal you stated that the United States would be pleased to be informed whether the Government addressed was in a position to give favorable consideration to the conclusion of a treaty such as that suggested, and if not, what specific modifications would make it acceptable. No formal reply to this inquiry has been received from any Government but in formal comment has been made as follows:
The British Government has indicated a genuine interest in the proposal of the United States and attaches such importance thereto that its answer wall be prepared only after consideration by the entire Cabinet and consultation with the Self-Governing Dominions. The Japanese Government has given its approval in principle and promises carefully to consider the text of the draft treaty. The Italian Government has made no comment. The German Government has expressed the earnest hope that the proposal of the United States would be actually realized and has explicitly stated that there seems to be in the draft treaty suggested by the United States no contradiction to the League of Nations, adding that Germany is not hindered by any of her treaties from becoming a party to a multilateral treaty of the kind proposed by this Government. The French Government transmitted on April 20 to the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments and to the United States a draft anti-war treaty apparently intended as an alternative to the draft proposed by the United States.
A simple comparison of the two drafts discloses the extraordinary difference not only between the French and American concepts but also between the present French position and that illustrated by M. Briand’s original proposal, for, as you are aware, the first two articles of the American draft treaty are practically identical with the corresponding articles of M. Briand’s treaty of last June. In its present form the French draft treaty is wholly unacceptable to the United States since it cannot in any respect be regarded as an effective instrument for the promotion of world peace. It emphasizes war, not peace, and seems in effect to be a justification rather than a renunciation of the use of armed force. The United States will sign no treaty of the nature now under discussion which cannot reasonably be expected to lessen the danger of an outbreak of war and thus promote the cause of world peace.
In reserving the right to go to war in the many circumstances enumerated in the French draft, France goes even farther than was to be expected from the position taken in her correspondence with the United States during the past few months, and if the present draft [Page 36] represents the limit to which the French Government is prepared to go in renouncing war by treaty, it is idle for the United States to endeavor to seek an agreement with France, the respective positions of the two Governments in that event being totally irreconcilable. The United States does not believe that world peace and national security are best guaranteed by military alliances or by the threatened application of military sanctions in certain previously defined circumstances, and the United States will not become a party to any international agreement which, while ostensibly devised for the preservation of peace, finds its ultimate expression in a resort to arms and perpetuates a system of international alliances. No treaty is an absolute guarantee against war and the United States does not believe that the conclusion of a treaty such as it has proposed will preclude the possibility of another war. It does believe, however, that the danger of war would be greatly lessened were the Powers of the world to join in such an instrument as it has suggested.
I am, however, unable to believe that France intends rigidly to insist upon the form of treaty which she submitted on April 20. Neither can I believe that the French draft accurately represents the views of the other interested Powers. I am therefore still hopeful that a form of treaty may be agreed upon which records unmistakably the determination of the nations of the world not to go to war with one another. The United States would gladly sign such a treaty without qualification or reservation. It is prepared, however, to consider any modifications or qualifications of its draft which may be necessary by reason of the special position of any of the interested Governments provided the treaty is not vitiated thereby.
There seem to be six major considerations which the French Government has emphasized in its correspondence and in its draft treaty, namely, that the treaty must not (1) impair the right of legitimate self-defense; (2) violate the Covenant of the League of Nations; (3) violate the treaties of Locarno; (4) violate certain unspecified treaties guaranteeing neutrality; (5) bind the parties in respect of a state breaking the treaty; (6) come into effect until accepted by all or substantially all of the Powers of the world. The views of the United States on these six points are as follows:
- (1)
- Self-defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is [Page 37] the identical question approached from the other side. Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition.
- (2)
- The League Covenant. The Covenant imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war. The obligation, if any, is secondary and attaches only when deliberately accepted by a state. Article ten of the Covenant has, for example, been interpreted by a resolution submitted to the Fourth Assembly but not formally adopted owing to one adverse vote to mean that “it is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.” There is, in my opinion, no necessary inconsistency between the covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war. The covenant can, it is true, be construed as authorizing war in certain circumstances but it is an authorization and not a positive requirement. The German Government, moreover, which is a member of the League of Nations does not regard itself as barred thereby from becoming a party to the form of anti-war treaty which the United States has proposed.
- (3)
- The Treaties of Locarno. If the parties to the treaties of Locarno are under any positive obligation to go to war, such obligation certainly would not attach until one of the parties has resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledges thereunder. It is therefore obvious that if all the parties to the Locarno treaties become parties to the multilateral anti-war treaty proposed by the United States, there would be a double assurance that the Locarno treaties would not be violated by recourse to arms. In such event it would follow that resort to war by any state in violation of the Locarno treaties would also be a breach of the multilateral anti-war treaty and the other parties to the anti-war treaty would thus as a matter of law be automatically released from their obligations thereunder and free to fulfil their Locarno commitments. The United States is entirely willing that all parties to the Locarno treaties should become parties to its proposed anti-war treaty either through signature in the first instance or by immediate accession to the treaty as soon as it comes into force in the manner provided in Article III of the American draft, and it will offer no objection when and if such a suggestion is made.
- (4)
- Treaties of neutrality. The United States is not informed as to the precise treaties which France has in mind and cannot therefore discuss their provisions. It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that the relations between France and the states whose neutrality she has guaranteed are sufficiently close and intimate to make it possible for France to persuade such states to adhere seasonably to the anti-war treaty proposed by the United States. If this were done no party to the anti-war treaty could attack the neutralized states without violating the treaty and thereby automatically freeing France and the other Powers in respect of the treaty-breaking state from the obligations of the anti-war treaty. If the neutralized states were [Page 38] attacked by a state not a party to the anti-war treaty, the latter treaty would of course have no bearing and France would be as free to act under the treaties guaranteeing neutrality as if she were not a party to the anti-war treaty. It is difficult to perceive, therefore, how treaties guaranteeing neutrality can be regarded as necessarily preventing the conclusion by France or any other power of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.
- (5)
- Relations with a treaty-breaking state. As indicated above, there can be no question as a matter of law that violation of a multilateral anti-war treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the treaty-breaking state. Any express recognition of this principle of law is wholly unnecessary.
- (6)
- Universality. From the beginning it has been the hope of the United States that its proposed multilateral anti-war treaty should be world-wide in its application, and appropriate provision there for was made in the draft submitted to the other Governments on April 13. From a practical standpoint it is clearly preferable, however, not to postpone the coming into force of an anti-war treaty until all the nations of the world can agree upon the text of such a treaty and cause it to be ratified. For one reason or another a state so situated as to be no menace to the peace of the world might obstruct agreement or delay ratification in such manner as to render abortive the efforts of all the other Powers. It is highly improbable, moreover, that a form of treaty acceptable to the British, French, German, Italian and Japanese Governments as well as to the United States would not be equally acceptable to most, if not all, of the other Powers of the world. Even were this not the case, however, the coming into force among the above-named six Powers of an effective anti-war treaty and their observance thereof would be a practical guaranty against a second world war. This in itself would be a tremendous service to humanity and the United States is not willing to jeopardize the practical success of the proposal which it has made by conditioning the coming into force of the treaty upon prior universal or almost universal acceptance.
[Paraphrase]
In the foregoing paragraphs of this telegram the position of the Government of the United States is fully and clearly set forth; you are authorized to use any or all of the above exposition, at your discretion, in discussing at the Foreign Office the question of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war. You may even seek an opportunity, if you think it desirable, to present in the appropriate quarter views as outlined above. I earnestly hope that sooner or later there may develop out of the discussions which have been initiated among the six powers an acceptable and effective form of treaty for renunciation of war. The important thing is to get peoples and governments to thinking in terms of peace, and I cannot refrain from belief that once the initial inertia is overcome a rapid spread of the treaty’s sphere of influence will occur.
[Page 39]Of course I realize that the political problems of Europe are more difficult in some respects than are those of the Americas, and it may be that considerations put forward by France will find more general support than I expect. Under these circumstances and in order to prevent a complete failure of the negotiations—an outcome which in my opinion would be a tremendous disappointment to mankind—I would be willing to have included in treaty a provision recording express understanding that should any party to the treaty become involved in war, then the other parties shall be released, ipso facto, from their obligations under the treaty so far as regards the belligerent party. A provision of that nature would satisfy every legitimate requirement of the League of Nations, the treaties of Locarno and any normal treaty guaranteeing neutrality without compromising the fundamental purpose of the anti-war treaty, and would also satisfy any lingering doubts in any quarter on the question of self-defense. Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor the Locarno treaties, nor neutrality treaties or emergencies requiring belligerent acts of self-defense obligate any state to resort to war until a prior act of war has been committed by an offending state. The perpetration of that act would release automatically, under such a clause, the innocent parties to the anti-war treaty and would leave them free to carry out their commitments under the League or Locarno or any others.
At this time I do not wish you suggest inclusion of any such qualifying clause or to make any reference to it in your discussions in any way, but I should be pleased to have you feel out the general situation and to telegraph full report.