500.A15Franco–British/66: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France ( Armoury )49
329. Please prepare the following note on the subject of the Franco-British naval limitation agreement for delivery to the Foreign Office:
“The Government of the United States has received from the French Government a communication summarizing the understanding reached between the French and British Governments as to a basis of naval limitation, which agreement, it is stated, will be submitted to the next [Page 283] meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.
The Government of the United States, not knowing the full text of the agreement, finds it difficult to answer the French note, but is nevertheless willing to submit certain suggestions as to the basis of naval limitation as therein summarized. From the communication of the French Government it appears that:
The limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of men-of-war:
- (1)
- Capital ships, i. e., ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than eight inch calibre.
- (2)
- Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.
- (3)
- Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six inch and up to eight inch calibre.
- (4)
- Ocean going submarines over 600 tons.
As the Washington Treaty regulates the first two classes, that is, capital ships and aircraft carriers, the Preparatory Commission will have to consider only the last two categories so far as the signatories of that treaty are concerned.
From the foregoing summary of the agreement it appears that the only classes of naval vessels which it is proposed to limit under the Franco–British draft agreement are cruisers of or below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than six inch and up to eight inch calibre, and submarines of over 600 tons. The position of the Government of the United States has been and now is that any limitation of naval armament to be effective should apply to all classes of combatant vessels. The Franco-British agreement provides no limitation whatsoever on six inch gun cruisers, or destroyers, or submarines of 600 tons or less. It could not be claimed that the types of vessels thus left without limitation are not highly efficient fighting ships. No one would deny that modern cruisers armed with six inch guns, or destroyers similarly armed, have a very high offensive value, especially to any nation possessing well distributed bases in various parts of the world. In fact, such cruisers constitute the largest number of fighting ships now existing in the world. The limitation of only such surface vessels as are restricted in Class 3 of the draft agreement, that is, cruisers of or below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than six inch and up to eight inch calibre, would be the imposition of restrictions only on types peculiarly suited to the needs of the United States. The United States can not accept as a distinct class surface combatant vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six inch and up to eight inch calibre. It is further clearly apparent that limitation of this type only would add enormously to the comparative offensive power of a nation possessing a large merchant tonnage on which preparation may be made in times of peace for mounting six inch guns.
At the Three Power Conference at Geneva in 1927 the British Delegation proposed that cruisers be thus divided into two classes; those carrying eight inch guns and those carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre. They proposed further that eight inch gun cruisers be limited to a small number or to a small total tonnage limitation [Page 284] and that the smaller class of cruisers carrying six inch guns or less be permitted a much larger total tonnage, or, what amounts to the same thing, to a very large number of cruisers of this class. The limitation proposed by the British Delegation on this smaller class of cruisers was so high that the American Delegation considered it, in effect, no limitation at all. This same proposal is now presented in a new and even more objectionable form which still limits large cruisers which are suitable to American needs, but frankly places no limitation whatever on cruisers carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre. This proposal is obviously incompatible with the American position at the Three Power Conference. It is even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British Delegation at that Conference not only because it puts the United States at a decided disadvantage but also because it discards altogether the principle of limitation as applied to important combatant types of vessels.
Much of what has been said above as to vessels in Class 3 of the Franco–British agreement applies with equal or greater force to Class 4. The American Government can not accept as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons leaving unlimited all submarines of 600 tons or under. Six hundred ton submarines are formidable combatant vessels. They carry the same torpedoes as are carried by larger submarines and of equal destructive force within the radius of their operation. They can also be armed with guns of five inch calibre. The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nations of the world, abolish the submarine altogether. If, however, submarines must be continued as instruments of naval warfare, it is the belief of the American Government that they should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number.
If there is to be further limitation upon the construction of war vessels so that competition in this regard between nations may be stopped, it is the belief of the United States that it should include all classes of combatant vessels, submarines as well as surface vessels.
The Government of the United States has earnestly and consistently advocated real reduction and limitation of naval armament. It has given its best efforts towards finding acceptable methods of attaining this most desirable end. It would be happy to continue such efforts, but it can not consent to proposals which would leave the door wide open to unlimited building of certain types of ships of a highly efficient combatant value and would impose restrictions only on types peculiarly suitable to American needs.
The American Government seeks no special advantage on the sea, but clearly can not permit itself to be placed in a position of manifest disadvantage. The American Government feels, furthermore, that the terms of the Franco-British draft agreement, in leaving unlimited so large a tonnage and so many types of vessels, would actually tend to defeat the primary objective of any disarmament conference for the reduction or the limitation of armament in that it would not eliminate competition in naval armament and would not effect economy. For all these reasons the Government of the United States feels that no useful purpose would be served by accepting as a basis of discussion the Franco-British proposal.
The American Government has no objection to any agreement between France and Great Britain which those countries think will be [Page 285] to their advantage and in the interest of limitation of armament, but naturally can not consent that such an agreement should be applied to the United States.
In order to make quite clear that, in declining to adopt the Franco-British agreement as a basis for discussion of naval limitation, it seems appropriate briefly to review the attitude of the United States regarding the methods of limitation, in order to show that the American Government has consistently favored a drastic proportional limitation. The success of the Washington Conference is known to all. It strictly limited all combatant ships and aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons. In order to bring about such limitation the American Government made great sacrifices in the curtailment of plans of building and in the actual destruction of ships already built. At the first session of the Preparatory Conference, the American Government submitted proposals which were consistently adhered to at subsequent meetings:
- (1)
- That the total tonnage allowed in each class of combatant vessel be prescribed.
- (2)
- That the maximum tonnage of a unit and the maximum calibre of gun allowed for each class be prescribed.
- (3)
- That so long as the total tonnage allowed to each class is not exceeded, the actual number of units may be left to the discretion of each power concerned.
Within this general plan the American proposal at the Geneva Conference was, for the United States and the British Empire, a total tonnage limitation in the cruiser class of from 250,000 to 300,000 tons and for Japan from 150,000 to 180,000. For the destroyer class, for the United States and the British Empire, from 200,000 to 250,000 and for Japan from 120,000 to 150,000 tons. For the submarine class, for the United States and the British Empire, 60,000 to 90,000 tons and for Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons. It was further stated by the American Delegation that, if any power represented felt justified in proposing still lower tonnage levels for auxiliary craft, the American Government would welcome such proposal.
The purpose of these proposals was that there might be no competition between the three powers in the building of naval armament, that their respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should not be of the size and character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent and finally that a wise economy dictates that further naval construction be kept to a minimum.
The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval powers, including those not represented at the Three Power Conference in Geneva, and is willing to take into consideration in any conference the special needs of France, Italy or any other naval power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defense. This could be accomplished by permitting any of the powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes within the total tonnage; a certain percentage to be agreed upon. If there was an increase in one class of vessels it should be deducted from the tonnage to be used in other classes. A proposal along these lines made by [Page 286] France and discussed by the American and French representatives would be sympathetically considered by the United States. It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration for its own needs. Unfortunately the Franco-British agreement, so far as its purport can be ascertained from the summary given, appears to fulfill none of the conditions which, to the American Government, seem vital. It leaves unlimited a very large class of effective fighting ships and this very fact would inevitably lead to a recrudescence of naval competition disastrous to national economy.
In a letter of July 31, 1928, from the British Embassy and the letter of August 3, 1928, from the French Embassy the following practically identical statement occurs:
‘The final disarmament conference to fix the maximum tonnage applicable to all powers.’
The United States does not understand the precise meaning of this statement. Does it mean that the disarmament conference will fix a definite maximum tonnage applicable to all nations, or does it mean that the maximum tonnage will be fixed on some ratio basis having in view the principle of relative needs? The United States does not care to comment upon this in the absence of knowledge as to what the Franco–British agreement means.”
Please repeat to London as No. 215 for delivery mutatis mutandis to the British Government. I should like to have you deliver this note on Friday morning, stating that the Department plans to give it to the press for publication in the morning papers of Saturday, September 29.