500.A15Franco–British/41: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 12—3:30 p.m.]
201. The atmosphere is clearing in regard to the Franco–British naval understanding. We now see a molehill where we formerly [Page 279] saw a mountain. Apart from the value of the agreement, the awkward manner in which it was announced by Chamberlain in the House of Commons and the fact that it was not made public embarrassed the Foreign Office and caused the British public to think that without their knowledge an effort was being made to prepare an entente with France as in 1904 and 1906. Perhaps there may have been an ulterior purpose in Chamberlain’s mind. But, if so, such a possibility has been utterly destroyed by the sharp reaction here. Doubtless France would welcome another entente but Great Britain would have nothing to do with it.
The following seems to be the state of affairs. On all sides Chamberlain has been urged to prevent a failure of the Preparatory Commission. Last spring Fleuriau46 discussed the subject informally with him. In June Chamberlain stopped in Paris on his way to Geneva and discussed, without reaching a conclusion, disarmament prospects with the French President.
The present agreement was later submitted to him by the French. Chamberlain took this before the Cabinet and the Cabinet accepted it. Such is the origin of the present agreement as far as it concerns naval questions. It was not put forward as a binding agreement but merely as a compromise which both France and Great Britain might accept and submit to the Preparatory Commission. I understand that Italy has already stated to the Foreign Office that it cannot accept the agreement as it stands. I do not know the Japanese standpoint.
May I offer the following suggestions in regard to our answer? I believe that a sharp refusal to accept the agreement would simply allow the Foreign Office to escape from its present embarrassment and to state that we had killed a well meant effort aimed to save the Preparatory Commission from failure. If our reply on the other hand is delayed, the Foreign Office may drop the matter and never refer to it again. Should it do so, our reply will not lose its emphasis. But I would suggest that your answer whenever made should follow roughly your note in answer to the original proposal of M. Briand.47 In other words, state our sympathy with the object the agreement apparently strives to attain. Stress the desire of the President for reduction of naval armaments, and suggest that a discussion in which a useful result is anticipated should cover all classes not included in the Washington treaty instead of one or two selected types.
- French Ambassador in Great Britain.↩
- French Minister for Foreign Affairs. Apparently the reference is to Briand’s proposal for a treaty with the United States for renunciation of war, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. ii, pp. 611 ff.↩