Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1928, Volume I

711.6212Anti-War/18

The Ambassador in Germany ( Schurman ) to the Secretary of State

Berlin , April 17, 1928 .
[Received April 30.]

No. 3411

Sir: Confirming my telegram No. 72 of April 13, 7 p.m.,³⁴ I have the honor to transmit herewith, in copy and translation, Dr. Stresemann’s formal acknowledgment of the receipt together with his reply to the Note proposing a multilateral treaty to prevent war and its enclosures and the draft treaty presented by me on the 13th instant.

As stated in my telegram, Dr. Stresemann has requested that this communication from him be not given to the press.

I have [etc.]

Jacob Gould Schurman

[Enclosure—Translation]

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Stresemann ) to the American Ambassador ( Schurman )

Berlin , April 13, 1928 .

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: I beg to enclose herewith the text of the statement which I had the honor of making to you today when, in the name of the American Government, you handed me the text of the notes regarding the pact to renounce war.

May I request that you be so kind as not to give any of these statements to the press.

I avail myself [etc.]

Stresemann

[Subenclosure—Translation]

Statement Made by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Stresemann ) to the American Ambassador ( Schurman )

[ Berlin , April 13, 1928 .]

1. We have followed currently with the greatest interest the exchange of notes, the text of which has indeed already been known from the press and has also been placed unofficially at our disposal by the American Government, so that we are already informed as to the position of the matter in its essentials.

2. Since it was at the outset a question of Franco-American negotiations, we have refrained from publicly taking any position in order to avoid creating the impression that we wished to mix in any way in the negotiations. I nevertheless thought it appropriate to give expression in a general way in my last formal speech in the Reichstag to our great interest in the matter.

3. We have welcomed it in an extraordinary degree that the American Government has from the first been determined not to content itself with a treaty between America and France but has taken the initiative of M. Briand as an occasion to work out a fundamental structure of peace among the most important world powers. The exchange of notes seems indeed to have already achieved at least the result that France and America are agreed upon this point.

4. The two underlying thoughts of the original Briand proposal are completely identical with the underlying conceptions of German foreign policy. It is indeed one of the most essential foundations of German foreign policy to eliminate all armed conflicts and to create instead, so far as it is at all possible, a regulated pacific procedure for all kinds of State conflicts. For Germany it is a question of an ideal motive: to secure peace and on the other hand to establish regular processes for the settlement of conflicts. I therefore hope most assuredly that the plan so energetically furthered by the American Government will actually be realized.

5. I can candidly say that I do not understand in all points the difficulties which the French Government apparently finds and has set out in its numerous reservations. Without going into details, I believe that I can say even now that to my mind there seems to be in the American pact idea no contradiction to the League of Nations. Nor is Germany hindered by any of the treaties concluded by her from adhering to a general pact of this kind. Some of the French reservations, it seems to me, are self-explanatory. It is perfectly clear that it is not intended to deprive a State of the right of defense against attack. It is no doubt likewise clear that if a State violates the antiwar pact the other parties to the pact are no longer under obligation to the peace breaker. That the pact shall be open also to all States not included among those invited to participate at this time seems to me entirely reasonable. However, it will surely suffice if the states first concluding the treaty make it possible for the other countries to adhere later.

6. We will expedite our answer to the American note as much as possible. I take it for granted also that it will not be necessary to await the eventual formation of the new Cabinet. In these fundamental questions there can be no difference of opinion among the various German political parties.

34. Not printed.