711.6112Anti-War/72

The Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( Litvinoff ) to the French Ambassador in Russia ( Herbette )36

[Translation]

Mr. Ambassador: On August 27 you were good enough to advise me officially under instructions from your Government that on that same day the Governments of the German Republic, the United States of North America, Belgium, France, Great Britain and its Dominions, Italy, Japan, Poland and Czechoslovakia had signed at Paris a multilateral pact whereby they pledge themselves not to resort in their mutual relations to war as an instrument of national [Page 171] policy, but to solve the differences which might arise among them by exclusively pacific means. In handing me a copy of the said Pact and briefly stating its history, you were also good enough, Mr. Ambassador, to inform me:

(a)
that the limitation of the number of the original signatories of the Pact was prompted solely, according to the Government of the United States of North America, by purely practical considerations and was for the purpose of facilitating the effective application of the Pact in the shortest time possible, but that it had always been intended that as soon as the Pact should be finally made effective the immediate concurrence of all the nations in the world would be guaranteed on the same conditions and with the same advantages as those that are given to the original signatories of the Pact;
(b)
that in accordance with the foregoing, the Government of the United States of North America was charged with the duty of accepting the declarations of all States desiring to adhere to the Pact;
(c)
that the representatives of the Government of the United States of North America in all foreign States, with the exception of those whose representatives have already signed the Pact have been instructed to communicate to the governments to which they are accredited the text of the Pact signed in Paris;
(d)
that the Government of the United States of North America declared its readiness to receive from now on the instruments of adherence of those governments;
(e)
that the Government of the French Republic accepted the mission of advising the Government of the U. S. S. R., through you, Mr. Ambassador, of the text of the said Pact and to inquire whether it was willing to accede and
(f)
that, if so, you, Mr. Ambassador, were authorized to receive the instrument of adherence to the Pact for transmission to Washington.

In communicating to you, by the present note, the reply of the Government of the U. S. S. R. to your inquiry, I have the honor to beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to communicate the following to your Government with the request that it kindly transmit it to the Government of the United States of North America.

1.
The Soviet Government, which from the very beginning of its existence has based its foreign policy on the protection and guarantee of general peace, has always been a consistent supporter of peace and has always met half way any action taken in that direction. The Soviet Government, furthermore, has always believed, and still believes, that the one effective way of preventing armed conflict is to accomplish the program of general and total disarmament, as in the feverish atmosphere of general armament any rivalry between States unavoidably leads to war, which is the more murderous in proportion as the system of armament is perfected. A detailed plan of complete disarmament had been proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Preparatory Commission of [Page 172] the Conference on Disarmament at the League of Nations,37 but unfortunately did not win the support of a majority of that Commission, including the representatives of those very Powers which are the original signatories of the Pact of Paris. The plan was rejected although its acceptance and enforcement would have meant a genuine guarantee of peace.
2.
Unwilling to overlook any chance of contributing to the lessening the burden of armament which is a crushing one for the peoples, the Soviet Government, after the rejection of its proposals for total disarmament, not only did not decline to discuss the partial reduction of armaments but itself intervened through its delegation in the Preparatory Commission with a detailed draft of a plan of partial but substantial disarmament. Yet the Soviet Government, unfortunately, must point out that this plan also was not supported by the Preparatory Commission which thereby once more proved the total impotence of the League of Nations in the field of disarmament which, nevertheless, is the most substantial guarantee of peace and the most powerful means of abolishing war; this took place in the face of the obvious resistance offered to the Soviet proposals by nearly all the States which were the first to sign the Pact prohibiting war.
3.
Aiming to bring into effect its policy of peace, the Soviet Government, besides its systematic defense of the cause of disarmament, had also addressed the other governments, long before the idea of the Pact recently signed at Paris had arisen, with the proposal to renounce through bi-lateral pacts not only the wars foreseen in the Pact of Paris but any mutual aggression and any armed conflict whatsoever. Certain States such as Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia and Lithuania accepted this and concluded with the Soviet Government appropriate pacts. Other Governments ignored this proposal and avoided answering it, and again others rejected it, giving the strange reason that the unreserved renunciation of aggression would be incompatible with their obligations towards the League of Nations. That, however, did not prevent those same Powers from signing the Pact of Paris without mentioning in the text itself the sacredness of the above mentioned obligations.
4.
The facts hereinabove stated afford unquestionable proof that the idea of eliminating wars and armed conflicts from the field of international politics is the predominant idea of the foreign policy of the Soviets. Nevertheless, the originators of the Pact of Paris did not see fit to ask the Soviet Government either to join in the pourparlers which preceded this Pact or in the drawing up of the text of this Pact. Likewise, no invitation was sent to certain Powers really concerned in the maintenance of peace, because, either [Page 173] in the past (Turkey and Afghanistan), or in the present, (the Republic of the great Chinese people) they have been or are attacked. Neither does the invitation, transmitted by the French Government, contain conditions which would make it possible for the Soviet Government to exercise any influence on the text itself of the instrument signed at Paris. Yet, the Soviet Government lays down as a basis the axiom that under no condition whatsoever can it be deprived of the right which has accrued or may hereafter accrue to the governments that have signed the Pact, and standing on that right the Soviet Government must in particular first offer several remarks concerning its attitude towards the Pact.
5.
First of all the Soviet Government can not refrain from expressing its most profound regret that there is not in the Pact of Paris any obligation whatsoever concerning disarmament. The Soviet Delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference already has had occasion to declare that it is only by joining a pact prohibiting war with the accomplishment of total and general disarmament that the maintenance of universal peace could be effectively guaranteed and that, on the contrary, an international treaty prohibiting war, but not accompanied by even that elementary guarantee offered by the limitation of armaments that are continually increasing would be a dead letter without any real importance. The public declarations recently made by certain signatories of the Pact of Paris concerning the unavoidable continuation of armament even after the Pact is concluded are truly a confirmation of the foregoing. The new political international groups which have arisen in the meanwhile with especial regard to the question of naval armaments have added force to this position. That is why the present situation makes it more than ever imperative to take decided measures in the field of disarmament.
6.
In considering the text of the Pact the Soviet Government deems it necessary to call attention to the lack of definiteness and clearness in Article 1 of the very formula that prohibits war, this formula being open to divergent and arbitrary interpretations. For its part, the Soviet Government believes that all international warfare must be prohibited either as an instrument of what is styled “national policy” or as a means to promote other ends (for instance, the repression of movements for the liberation of peoples, etc.). According to the Soviet Government wars must be prohibited not only in the juridical and formal construction of the word (that is to say, implying a “declaration of war”, etc.) but also such military actions as, for instance, intervention, blockade, military occupation of foreign territories, of foreign ports, etc. The history of these last few years presents quite a number of military actions of this kind which have brought upon peoples terrible calamities. The Soviet Republics themselves have been the object of such aggressions and at the present time [Page 174] the immense population of China is suffering from such attacks. What is more, such military actions often assume the proportions of great wars which it becomes completely impossible to stop, and yet, the Pact makes no mention of these questions that are so grave from the standpoint of peace. Next, the same Article 1 (sic) of the Pact deals with the necessity of solving all disputes and all international disputes by exclusively pacific means. Taking this position as a point of departure, the Soviet Government believes that it is also necessary to include in the number of non-pacific means that are prohibited by the Pact such means as a refusal to resume normal pacific relations between nations or breaking such relations, for such acts, by eliminating the pacific means which might settle controversies, embitter relations and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere that is conducive to the unleashing of wars.
7.
Among the restrictions made in writing at the time of the diplomatic pourparlers among the original signatories of the Pact the Soviet Government noticed in particular the reservation of the British Government in paragraph 10 of its note of May 19 of this year. The British Government there reserves to itself absolute freedom of action as towards several regions which it does not even specially enumerate. If they are regions forming part of the British Empire or its dominions all of them are already included in the Pact and the case of any aggression against them is provided for in the Pact so that the reservation of the British Government in respect thereof might seem to be at least superfluous. But if other regions are referred to, the signatories of the Pact have a right to know exactly where the freedom of action of the British Government begins and where it ends.
But the British Government reserves to itself full freedom of action not only in case of armed aggression against those regions but even in case of any act whatsoever of enmity or of “interference” which would justify the British Government in opening hostilities. Recognition of such a right for that Government would amount to justifying war and might serve as a contagious example to other signatories of the Pact who, equality of rights being assumed, would also claim the same liberty with regard to other regions and the result would be that there would probably be no place left on the terrestrial globe where the Pact could be applied. Indeed, the restriction made by the British Government carries an invitation to another signatory of the Pact to withdraw from its operation still other regions. The Soviet Government is unable to regard this reservation as anything but an attempt to use the Pact itself as an instrument of imperialistic policy. But the said note of the British Government is not communicated to the Soviet Government as an [Page 175] integral part of the Pact or an annex thereto, therefore it can not be considered as binding on the Soviet Government, just as the other restrictions concerning the Pact mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence, are not binding on the Soviet Government. Neither can the Soviet Government agree to all of the restrictions that may justify war and particularly the restrictions made in the said correspondence in order to withdraw from the operation of the Pact decisions flowing from the constitution of the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreements.
8.
Summing up the foregoing, I have still to note the absence from the Pact of obligations concerning disarmament which stands as the one essential element by which peace can be guaranteed; the inadequacy and uncertainty of the very formula concerning the prohibition of war and finally the existence of several restrictions the purpose of which is to avoid any appearance of a promise with respect to the cause of peace. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Pact of Paris imposes on the Powers certain obligations as to public opinion and affords the Soviet Government a new possibility of placing before all those who are parties to the Pact the most important question for the cause of peace, that of disarmament, the solution of which remains the only guarantee capable of eliminating warfare, the Soviet Government expresses its consent to adhere to the Pact of Paris.

In accordance with the foregoing, I shall, Mr. Ambassador, have the honor shortly to forward to you the instrument of adherence of my Government as soon as the formalities connected with it shall have been accomplished.

I take [etc.]

M. Litvinoff
  1. Transmitted to the Department of State by the French Embassy in Washington on Sept. 27, 1928.
  2. See pp. 235 ff.