711.5112France/229
The French Ambassador (Claudel) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary of State: In reply to your note of February 27 last regarding the proposal for a multilateral treaty proscribing war, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that M. Briand has been pleased to find in the observations which you have submitted for his consideration a new and cordial affirmation of the common inspiration which animates our two Governments equally anxious to cooperate in an international movement toward the effective establishment of peace in the world. Assured of such a solidarity in the pursuit of an identical purpose, M. Briand remains convinced, as does Your Excellency, that a mutually acceptable formula may well result from the [Page 16] exchange of views which has taken place up to now between our two Governments, if on both sides there is a disposition to adhere to those essential realities which must be preserved in this discussion, by subordinating thereto those differences of form to which questions of terminology not affecting the substance of the discussion may upon analysis be reduced.
That is to say, that the French Government at this point of the discussion, when all the aspects of the problem have been examined, proposes to adopt as practical a point of view as possible and to facilitate as far as it can the effort of the American Government in the direction of an immediate decision.
The observations which M. Briand has ventured to offer in support of his last suggestion were inspired by a very sincere desire to facilitate in a practical manner the realization of the proposal for the contemplated multilateral treaty by pointing out the conditions best adapted to bring about the consent thereto of all the Governments whose agreement is necessary. The French wording, therefore, tending to limit to war of aggression the proscription proposed in the form of a multilateral rather than a bilateral treaty, was intended to obviate in so far as the American plan was concerned those serious difficulties which would assuredly be encountered in practice. In order to pay due regard to the international obligations of the signatories, it was not possible, as soon as it became a question of a multilateral treaty, to impart thereto the unconditional character desired by Your Excellency without facing the necessity of obtaining the unanimous adherence of all the existing States, or at least of all the interested States, that is to say, those which by reason of their situation are exposed to the possibility of a conflict with any one of the contracting States. In the relations between the States of the American Continent there are similar difficulties which led the American Government at the Pan American Conference at Habana to approve a resolution limited to the very terms “war of aggression” which the French Government felt compelled to use in characterizing the renunciation to which it was requested to bind itself by means of a multilateral treaty. To be sure, the same reservation does not appear in another resolution to which Your Excellency referred in your note of February 27, but it must be observed that this resolution in itself constituted only a kind of preliminary tending toward a treaty of arbitration with regard to which numerous reservations were formulated.
Your Excellency appears to have been surprised that France should not be able to conclude with all the Powers in the form of a multilateral treaty the same treaty which she offered to conclude separately with the United States in the form of a bilateral treaty. My Government believes that it has explained this point with sufficient clearness in [Page 17] recalling the fact that the project of a treaty of perpetual friendship between France and the United States proposed last June was drafted in such a way as to limit strictly the mutual undertakings which it contained to those relations in law resulting from intercourse between the two signatory States alone. Within such limits an absolutely unconditional agreement might be entered into, since that agreement would not expose the signatories, as would a multilateral treaty, to juridical difficulties resulting from the respective positions of various Powers with regard to one another, and since furthermore, as regards two countries like France and the United States morally united as they are by ties of time-honored friendship, other contractual engagements concluded by one or the other Power could never constitute in fact anything but purely theoretical obstacles.
In order to attain the result which Your Excellency has in view, you have considered it preferable to adhere to the conception of a multilateral treaty, and you have deemed it necessary to insist that even in the multilateral form the proposed treaty should include an unconditional pledge. If Your Excellency really believes that greater chances of success may be found in this formula in spite of the consequences which it involves, especially the necessity of attaining a treaty world-wide in its scope, the French Government would hesitate to discuss longer the question of its adherence to a plan which the American Government originated and for which it is responsible. Without in any way losing sight of its international obligations, both as a member of the League of Nations and as a party to the Treaties of Locarno or treaties guaranteeing neutrality, France, for the purpose of finding a common basis for initial negotiations, is wholly disposed, after a new examination of the proposals formulated by Your Excellency, to suggest immediately to the German, British, Italian and Japanese Governments that they join in seeking, in the spirit and in the letter of the last American note, any adjustments which in the last analysis may be forthcoming with respect to the possibility of reconciling previous obligations with the terms of the contemplated new treaty. The French Government notes at once with satisfaction that while advocating the conclusion among the Governments specifically mentioned of a treaty binding the signatories not to resort to war, the Government of the United States admits the participation in that treaty of all the other Governments of the world. This conception accords with a reservation actually necessary for obtaining a real instrument for the establishment of peace by means of a formal engagement among all Powers among whom political controversies may arise. Such an engagement would in fact involve the risk of exposing the signatories to dangers and misunderstandings unless based upon the complete equality in the application of the treaty among themselves of all the States with respect to other [Page 18] States and not only upon the equality of certain States among them. The treaty contemplated could not operate in respect of one Power which is a party thereto unless the other States exposed to the possibility of grave controversies with that party were also signatories thereof.
At the same time it is clear that in order not to turn an instrument of progress and peace into a means of oppression, if one of the Signatory States should fail to keep its word, the other Signatories should be released from their engagement with respect to the offending state. On this second point, as on the first, the French Government believes itself fully in accord with the Government of the United States.
My Government likewise gathers from the declarations which Your Excellency was good enough to make to me on the first of last March, the assurance that the renunciation of war, thus proclaimed, would not deprive the Signatories of the right of legitimate defense. Such an interpretation tends to dissipate apprehensions, and the French Government is happy to note it.
If such is the attitude of the American Government on these three fundamental points, and if it is clearly understood in a general way that the obligations of the new pact should not be substituted for, or prejudice in any way, previous obligations contained in international instruments such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Agreements or treaties guaranteeing neutrality whose character and scope can not be modified thereby, then the differences of opinion which have appeared in the course of previous phases of the negotiation have to do more with words than with the reality of the problem facing the two Governments today.
Hence, in accordance with the proposal contained in your note of January 11, which you kindly renewed in your note of the 27th of February, the French Government would be prepared forthwith to join with the Government of the United States in submitting for the consideration of the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, the correspondence exchanged between France and the United States since June, 1927, and in proposing at the same time for the assent of the four Governments, a draft agreement essentially corresponding in purpose to the original proposal of M. Briand, in the multipartite form desired by the United States with the changes of wording made necessary by the new concept; the Signatory Powers of such an instrument, while not prejudicing their rights of legitimate defense within the framework of existing treaties, should make a solemn declaration condemning recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, or in other words as a means of carrying out their own spontaneous, independent policy.
[Page 19]They would specifically undertake, among themselves to refrain from any attack or invasion, and never to seek the settlement of any difference or conflict of whatsoever nature or origin which might arise between them save by pacific means. It would, however, be clearly understood that an obligation could only exist for the Signatories in the event that the engagement were contracted by all States, that is to say, that the treaty, open to the accession of all powers, would only come into force after having received universal acceptance, unless the powers having signed this treaty or acceded thereto should agree upon its coming into force, despite certain abstentions. Finally, in case one of the contracting powers should happen to contravene the treaty, the other contracting powers would be automatically relieved, with respect to that power, of the obligations contained in the treaty.
It is in this form, it would seem, that the negotiation of a plan for a multilateral pact such as conceived by the American Government could be pursued with the greatest chances of success. Your Excellency may be assured, in any case, in the conduct of this negotiation of the most sincere and most complete collaboration of my Government which is always ready to associate itself without ambiguity or reservation, with any solemn and formal undertaking tending to ensure, strengthen or extend the effective solidarity of the Nations in the cause of peace.
In responding to these ideas, whose happy inspiration cannot be gainsaid, France would feel confident that she was continuing the work to which she has never ceased to apply herself in her foreign policy, and, faithful to her previous international engagements of that nature, that she was contributing nobly, as Your Excellency has said, in “promoting the great ideal of peace which the League itself has so closely at heart”.
Pray accept [etc.]