793.94/1194b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in China ( Schurman )53
No. 263. Ambassador Shidehara some weeks ago very confidentially approached me with the statement that the Japanese Government is extremely anxious to settle the Shantung affair prior to the Washington Conference and is ready to offer a liberal basis of settlement with that end in view. He declared, however, that China obstinately refuses to negotiate; and he expressed the hope that I could see my way to influence China to entertain negotiations. In reply I assured Baron Shidehara that I heartily agreed with him as to the desirability of making a satisfactory settlement at an early date which would make it unnecessary to bring before the Washington Conference an issue which had been so important a question between China and Japan and had been the subject of such strong sentiment and so much public discussion in the United States. I stated, however, that of course the possibility of my using any kind of good offices would be dependent on the nature of the specific terms which might be proposed by the Japanese Government.
Baron Shidehara on September 8 gave me a translation in English of the proposals which he told me Japan had made the previous day to the Government at Peking.54 The Ambassador then requested that I suggest to the Chinese Government that it should undertake negotiations on the basis of these proposals. I told him that I would study the Japanese offer to determine whether I would be justified in acceding to his request.
On September 15 Baron Shidehara and I had another conversation in which he asked me what decision I had reached. I told him that I found certain of the proposals obscure, especially the reference in the 2d paragraph to vested interests; the provision in paragraph 6 regarding Tsingtao customs; the qualification in paragraph 7 regarding the surrender of public property and the proviso for consultation as to operating public works in the future. However, I told the Ambassador that I assumed that these and other ambiguities [Page 620] in the Japanese proposals could be clarified prior to the undertaking of formal negotiations. I then told him that aside from these comparatively minor details there was an issue involved of a far more serious nature in the provision in paragraph 3 that the Shantung Railroad should be under joint ownership. I told the Ambassador that I had reason to feel that China would not find this provision acceptable as China naturally wishes to work toward a unified railway system and would not be inclined to accept a plan which would make it impossible to extend complete Chinese control to the Shantung Railroad. I added that I felt that I could not hopefully make any proposal to the Chinese Government that it should undertake to negotiate on this basis. I placed emphasis on the point that it was not consistent with the principle of making restoration to China to retain a half interest in the Shantung Railway. Baron Shidehara then assured me that the proposals made by Japan were not formal, to be taken or rejected as they stood, but were a suggested general plan offered with the purpose of inducing China to negotiate. I then expressed to the Ambassador my gratification that this was so, as in that case it might prove to be possible for the Japanese Government to propose some solution in the way of a plan by which China would be able to obtain complete control and ownership of the railway by making reasonable compensation. On that point Baron Shidehara did not definitely commit himself. He again stated, however, his feeling of hope that a way might be found for me to influence the Chinese Government to consider proposals for a speedy and satisfactory settlement. I reiterated my assurance that I desired to be of help in securing a settlement prior to the Washington Conference if it was possible for that to be accomplished on a basis which would seem to China to be just; for if the United States undertook good offices with China, the Chinese would attribute to us, of course, a moral responsibility, at least, for the nature of the adjustment. I also said that in case the proposals by Japan were really subject to possible changes, it would assist me to have Japan give an assurance to that effect. That would help me in deciding what additional action it might be possible to take. I added that such consideration would be made easier if the Ambassador could give me definite assurance that the Japanese Government would be willing to accept a plan for full control and ownership of the railway by the Chinese. This is the present state of the matter with Japan.
On September 8[9?] the Chinese Minister here gave me a translation of the Japanese proposals from the Chinese text.55 I did not, however, comment to him on the matter until September 15, Then [Page 621] I told him that I was not prepared to make to the Chinese Government any proposal on the subject. However I did tell the Minister that I had been a little disturbed by the rumors that China would refuse to negotiate with the Japanese Government regarding Shantung and would put off the issue for consideration at the Washington Conference. I told him that I did not wish him to understand me as barring the question from consideration at the Conference, but that he must see clearly that as a practical matter China would find in the Conference all the chief powers, with the exception of the United States, prevented by the Treaty of Versailles from giving support to the claim of China as opposed to Japan’s claims based on treaty rights. Furthermore I told the Minister that Japan would have a strong tactical position if her overtures were ignored or repulsed by the Chinese Government after she had made an offer of terms which to the average man would seem to be at least reasonable. For this reason I made the suggestion to the Minister that apparently the Chinese Government now had the chance to offer such counter-proposals as would make the issue clear. The Minister confidentially commented that perhaps the Government at Peking doesn’t dare to take any step on account of the suspicion, by the Chinese people as a whole and by the revolutionary factions, that the Peking Government secretly may compromise its position, a thing which was done in 1918. In reply I suggested that it would tend to dissipate suspicions of this nature if a public statement were made of the Chinese proposals in reply to those submitted by Japan. The Minister then mentioned the fact that Minister for Foreign Affairs Yen could hardly dispose of this issue prior to his departure from China to attend the Conference. I said that if the Chinese position were previously defined as a preliminary to discussions on the issue, it might be possible to have the actual negotiation of the terms continued in Washington collaterally but not as a part of the Conference.
I should also add confidentially for your own guidance that in a proper case I should be disposed to urge the Chinese Government to negotiate with Japan. I would do this in order to secure a settlement of the question which would be as nearly just as may be, considering the prejudice which has been suffered in the case through the Treaty of Versailles and also through the actions of the Government of China itself. It is necessary constantly to bear in mind, however, that the United States can not place itself, in any phase of the negotiations, in the position of either acting or appearing to act as an attorney for either China or Japan.
Repeat this cable as no. 157 to the Embassy in Japan for Ambassador Warren’s information.