The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency,
the Japanese Ambassador, and has the honor to transmit to him
herewith a memorandum representing the situation in Siberia.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum
The Government of the United States has given the most careful
consideration to the subject matter of the communication from
the Japanese Government which was read to the Secretary of State
by the Japanese Ambassador on the 8th day of December,29 and
[Page 488]
which concerns the
recent unfavorable developments of the military situation with
which Admiral Kolchak’s forces have been confronted, and which
proposes three alternative courses for the Allied and Associated
Powers to take.
The Government of the United States agrees that for it to send a
reinforcement of sufficient strength and to act on the offensive
in cooperation with anti-Bolshevik forces is impracticable.
The Government of the United States believes that for it to
continue to participate in guarding the districts now under
Allied military protection is also under present conditions
impracticable, for the reason that an agreement to send
reinforcements to such extent as may be required, with a view to
maintain the status quo, might involve
the Government of the United States in an undertaking of such
indefinite character as to be inadvisable. The amount of
reinforcement which might become necessary for the execution of
such an agreement might be so great that the Government of the
United States would not feel justified in carrying it out.
Consideration has been given, therefore, to the alternative
presented by the Government of Japan of entire or partial
withdrawal. It will be recalled that the purposes of the
expedition as originally conceived by the United States and
expressed in an Aide Memoire handed to the Japanese Ambassador
at Washington, July 17, 1918,29 were,
first, to help the Czecho-Slovak troops, which had, during their
retirement along the Siberian railway, been attacked by the
Bolsheviki and enemy prisoners of war in Siberia, to consolidate
their forces and effect their repatriation by way of
Vladivostok;30 and,
second, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense
in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept
assistance.
Not only are the Czecho-Slovak troops now successfully advancing
into Eastern Siberia, but an agreement has been effected between
the Governments of Great Britain and the United States providing
for their repatriation from Vladivostok. American vessels will
begin to arrive at that port by February tenth and a contingent
of more than 10,000 Czecho-Slovak troops can be immediately
embarked. It is expected that evacuation will proceed rapidly
thereafter and from that date the first purpose for which
American soldiers were sent to Siberia may be regarded as
accomplished.
With respect to the second purpose, namely, the steadying of
efforts at self-government or self-defense on the part of the
Russians, the Government of the United States is impressed with
the political instability and grave uncertainties of the present
situation in Eastern
[Page 489]
Siberia, as described in the Aide Memoire presented by the
Japanese Ambassador, December 8, and is disposed to the view
that further military effort to assist the Russians in the
struggle toward self-government may, in the present situation,
lead to complications which would have exactly the opposite
effect, prolonging possibly the period of readjustment and
involving Japan and the United States in ineffective and
needless sacrifices. It is felt accordingly to be unlikely that
the second purpose for which American troops were sent to
Siberia will be longer served by their presence there.
In view then of the fact that the main purposes for which
American troops were sent to Siberia are now at an end, and of
the considerations set forth in the communication of the
Japanese Government of December 8, which subsequent events in
Eastern Siberia have strengthened, the Government of the United
States has decided to begin at once arrangements for the
concentration of the American forces at Vladivostok, with a view
to their embarkation and departure immediately after the leaving
of the first important contingent of Czecho-Slovak troops, that
is to say, about February tenth.
Careful consideration, has also been given to the possibility of
continuing, after the departure of the American troops, the
assistance of American railway experts in the operation of the
Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. It will be recalled
that it is expressly stipulated in the plan for the supervision
of these railways which was submitted by the Japanese Ambassador
at Washington, January 15, 1919,31 that the arrangement should cease upon
the withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia and
that all foreign railway experts appointed under the arrangement
should then be recalled forthwith. The experience of recent
months in the operation of the railways under conditions of
unstable civil authority and frequent local military
interference furnishes a strong reason for abiding by the terms
of the original agreement. Arrangements will be made accordingly
for the withdrawal of the American railway experts under the
same conditions and simultaneously with the departure of the
American military forces.
The Government of the United States desires the Japanese
Government to know that it regrets the necessity for this
decision, because it seems to mark the end, for the time being
at least, of a cooperative effort by Japan and the United States
to assist the Russian people, which had of late begun to bear
important results and seemed to give promise for the future. The
Government of the United States is most appreciative of the
friendly spirit which has
[Page 490]
animated the Government of Japan in this
undertaking and is convinced that the basis of understanding
which has been established will serve in the future to
facilitate the common efforts of the two countries to deal with
the problems which confront them in Siberia. The Government of
the United States does not in the least relinquish the deep
interest which it feels in the political and economic fate of
the people of Siberia nor its purpose to cooperate with Japan in
the most frank and friendly way in all practical plans which may
be worked out for the political and economic rehabilitation of
that region.
It is suggested that the Government of Japan may desire to
communicate to the other principal Allied and Associated
Governments the substance of the Aide Memoire of December 8.
This Government will likewise make known to them the substance
of the present communication.
Washington, January 9, 1920.
