760c.61/90: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain ( Davis )

[Paraphrase]

821. For your information and guidance and for confidential repetition to Warsaw, Paris, and Rome, The Department considers it advisable to give you some of its views on Russian matters, upon which events in Poland render a decision imminent. You should keep in mind that on many important aspects of the situation the information of the Department is conflicting and fragmentary, but it is one purpose of this instruction to afford you, at a time when [Page 462] the outlook is confused, such help as may be had from an expression of the views of the Department, which, of course, may be corrected and amended as the realities of conditions are revealed. You should be discreet and guarded in making such use of the Department’s views here given as you may consider wise. As this Government desires that the integrity of Poland be maintained, it sympathizes with arrangements for a Polish-Russian armistice,12 but for the present at least it does not see its way clear to take part in plans to extend the armistice negotiations so as to bring about a general European conference involving the recognition of the Bolshevik Government and a settlement of the Russian problem in a way that would almost inevitably be based on a partition of Russia. The Department sympathizes with the wish of the Allied Powers to solve peacefully the difficulties now existing in Europe, and with any justifiable steps which may be taken by them, but it has not been able to see how recognizing the Bolshevik Government can possibly promote, much less bring about, this object. For that reason the Department is opposed to any relations with the Bolshevik Government in excess of the narrowest limits within which the arranging of an armistice can be kept. This Department has consistently refused to deal at all with the Bolsheviki, a refusal which as late as the 8th of last July was repeated.13 As the Department thinks that a real solution of the actual problem will be delayed and complicated by the dismemberment of Russia, it has been persistent in refusing to recognize the Baltic States as independent states apart from Russia.

It is the feeling of the American Government that recognition of the Soviet regime or negotiations with it involves sacrificing moral strength for the sake of material gains, advantages which will prove to be temporary and bought at a very high price. This Government feels that no permanent and just settlement of Eastern European affairs can be thus attained. The revulsion felt by the civilized world against the tyranny now holding Russia in its power is shared by this Government. This tyranny disregards all principles upon which dealings and relations between nations are founded and is not freely chosen by any considerable part of the people of Russia. A permanent and wise solution of the problem of Russia, it would seem, cannot be reached until there is put into effect a plan whereby all elements of the Russian people will be represented effectively for the consideration of the reciprocal needs, political and economic, of the different regions which made up Imperial Russia. [Page 463] Such a solution is vitally important to both Europe and Asia. In spite of the fact that the American Government does not see any immediate prospect of achieving such a result, it thinks that a decision arrived at in any international conference to recognize as independent governments the factions which now exercise some degree of control over territory which was part of Imperial Russia, and to establish their relationships and boundaries, is not advisable and will seriously prejudice the future of Russia and an enduring peace.

Dispositions of this sort must prove to be temporary and without doubt would fall when faced by a restored Russia resolved to vindicate its territorial integrity and unity.

The fact that Soviet leaders show indifference to certain losses of territory is without doubt explained by zeal for propaganda to spread their economic and social views, and by the feeling that peace, even though it be at the cost of Russian territory, provides the best medium for propaganda and intrigue, weapons which they would rather use than armed force. There is no doubt that their own armies, containing many elements not in sympathy with the existing regime, give them some cause for fear.

You are relied upon to report promptly any information of a kind which will correct or broaden the views of the Department.

Colby
  1. See section under Poland dealing with war with Russia, pp. 370 ff.
  2. See telegram no. 1215, July 7, to the Ambassador in France, p. 717.