861.00/6145

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The successes attained lately by the Bolsheviki over the forces of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin have created a situation where the Red armies, befreed from interior entanglements, may be used by the Soviet leaders for an attempt of an armed movement to the West. Political opinion, both in this country and in Europe, seems to be fully aware of the impending danger.

There are certain elements in the situation which carry eventual consequences so grave and so unhappy that I feel it my duty to bring them to your attention with all frankness and without reserve. What I have particularly in mind is the conception prevalent in certain quarters, which, impressed by the reverses of the Russian national armies, has abandoned any reliance upon the anti-Bolsheviki forces in Russia and is laying all hope on the action of a “cordon sanitaire” composed of border states.

It is expected in this connection that all encouragement will be given to these states together with actual assistance in munitions and supplies. Besides, it is a matter of course, even if not specifically stated, that the services rendered will meet their reward. In the cases of Poland and Roumania, territorial aggrandizement [Page 446] is foreseen; while the so-called Baltic states look to unreserved recognition of their independence. This would mean compensation at the expense of Russia by the violation of Russia’s territorial integrity or of her sovereign rights.

Such a course would obviously react most acutely on Russian national feeling of whatever color. The Russian nationalists have fully appreciated all of the efforts directed against the Bolsheviki. Moreover, the idea of military co-operation with the Polish armies and the armed forces of the Baltic provinces has been earnestly coveted by Russian patriots. But this co-operation was based on the conception of common interests in eliminating the Bolsheviki danger and was closely affiliated with the idea of a regenerated Russia settling amiably and to mutual satisfaction the delimitation questions with the border states and satisfying on the other hand the just and reasonable aspirations of the nationalities within a reunited democratic Russia.

The situation would be entirely reversed if Russian nationalism would be faced with the prospect that the defeat of the Bolsheviki armies would lead to a dismemberment and to the humiliation of Russia. It would put every patriot, who would be lending his efforts to fight Bolshevism from within, in a position where he would be working against the most cherished treasure of Russia’s constructive nationalism—that of unity and integrity of Russia.

Obviously in such a case the Bolsheviki military movement, irrespective of it’s ulterior motives, would for the present assume the feature of a national aim, directed to the defense and preservation of Russia as such. Not only would the Bolsheviki gain immensely in strength but the very basis for effective patriotic opposition from within would be undermined.

I will not indulge in detailed consideration of consequences of a character more general to which a policy of fighting Bolshevism at the expense of Russia might lead in the future. It will be sufficient to mention that Russia’s interior agony will be prolonged and opportunities created most propitious for the revival of imperialistic aspirations. Neither will I dwell upon the moral aspects, in the light of Russia’s sacrifice and contribution to the war.

The United States have shown throughout disinterested sympathy to the Russian people and their cause. It is my earnest belief that at this critical hour the United States Government will use it’s best influences to prevent a course directly menacing the national interests of Russia and which, besides being morally unjust, would lead to infinite international complications.

Accept [etc.]

B. Bakhmeteff