861.00/5829a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
The President: The present political and economic situation of the Russian people imposes, in my judgment, upon the Government of the United States the duty of determining upon a definite course of action for the future in dealing with Russia and of furnishing the means necessary to act in accordance with such determination. I have, therefore, the honor to lay before you the following report as to the present conditions existing in Russia, their causes, their importance to other nations, and the necessity to this country and to other countries of changing these conditions, together with suggestions as to practical means of accomplishing this change and the specific agencies which, if created, might be effectively employed to that end.
It is clear that the early settlement of the difficulties by which Russia is now distracted is of vital concern to the United States. Russia is among the largest factors in the complicated system of production and distribution by which the world is clothed and fed. It is not to be expected that economic balance can be regained and living costs brought once more to moderate levels while its vast area, comprising one-seventh of the land surface of the globe, is rendered sterile by civil distraction. It is not less vitally important to the United States that there should be established in Russia with the least possible delay a government expressive of the will of the people and capable of performing its international obligations, and that Russian resources should be no longer at the disposal of adventurous [Page 437] revolutionaries, seeking to subvert democratic governments everywhere, or within reach of a possibly renascent imperialism which might conspire once more to establish itself in forcible control of the world’s affairs.
These considerations led the government during the past year to adopt every measure with respect to Russia which gave promise of hastening the end of civil war, the establishment of orderly and constitutional government, and the relief of the material distress of the people. The experience of these efforts proved that it was impossible to attain the ends desired by dealing with the so-called Bolshevik group which controls the central portions of European Russia and part of Western Siberia. On the other hand, written assurance was obtained, through Admiral Kolchak and his associates, that the co-ordinated anti-Bolshevik movements would direct their efforts, if they suceeded in driving the Bolsheviki from Moscow and Petrograd, to the democratic rehabilitation of the Russian State. They expressly repudiated all attempts to revive the former land system or to impose again upon the Russian people the regime of caste and privilege which the revolution destroyed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In Siberia much energy has been devoted to helping the Russians to keep in operation the long line of railways, known as the Trans-Siberian, which stretches from Vladivostok westward into European Russia and constitutes the main artery through which the economic life of those vast regions is sustained. In the autumn of 1917 the Russian Railway Service Corps was organized in the United States and upon the invitation of the Provisional Government of Russia proceeded to Siberia.1 The intervention of the so-called Bolshevik revolution and the attendant disorders made it impossible for the corps to begin work immediately, but in April, 1918, it commenced operations on the Chinese Eastern Railway which, while in Chinese territory, is one of the chief links in the Trans-Siberian system. It soon became necessary to provide a comprehensive plan of operation for the whole system and to co-ordinate therein the various contributory efforts of the Russians and Americans and those of our principal associates. I submit herewith the text of official notes and cablegrams, showing in detail the nature of the understanding arrived at and the terms under which the railway operations are now being carried on.2 As you will observe, a proposal of the Japanese Government was accepted by the Government of the United States and our chief associates, whereby the general execution of the railway plan is [Page 438] confided to an Inter-Allied Committee, under the chairmanship of a Russian, and operations are in charge of a Technical Board, at the head of which is the distinguished American Engineer, Mr. John F. Stevens. The operating personnel of the board, so far as the United States is concerned, is provided by the Russian Railway Service Corps, which is commanded at present by Colonel G. H. Emerson and comprises about 230 American railway experts. Mr. Stevens and the Railway Service Corps have applied themselves to a peculiarly difficult and discouraging task with the same unflinching devotion which brought victory to our military operations in France. They deserve our appreciation and gratitude.
The operation of the Trans-Siberian railway has been regarded throughout as a Russian undertaking, in which the United States, Japan and the associated powers are assisting, and the costs will eventually be borne by the Russian State. To meet the immediate situation and for the purpose of paying the salaries of the Railway Service Corps and the purchase of materials in the United States and the payment of freight thereon to Siberia, there was allocated from the fund for National Security and Defense the sum of $5,000,000, practically all of which has now been either expended or appropriated to definite expenditures.
As an integral part of the railway operations, the United States is maintaining in Eastern Siberia a military force comprising approximately 9000 men. You will recall by reference to the documents submitted herewith (appendix No. 3)4 that the maintenance of a military guard is made an indispensable condition of our continuing to assist in maintaining the railway in operation. Public order is stabilized by the presence of these troops and important sections of the railway are guarded by them from the depredations of irresponsible and adventurous bands which are taking advantage of the uncertainty of the times for their personal gain. A much larger body of troops is being maintained by Japan.
Aside from these governmental operations the people of Russia and Siberia have had within the past year the assistance and support of the American Red Cross and the Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Associations. The operations of the Red Cross in North Russia and especially in Siberia have been directed to the relief of the sick and needy and have called forth from the local officials and the people alike expressions of the most profound gratitude.
Means have been studied by which relief might also be extended to the innocent people within the Bolshevik lines. They are suffering from the direst want and it would be in the purpose and desire of [Page 439] this Government to help them. The humanitarian appeal is strong and it is felt that relief of the popular distress would be one of the surest ways of fostering domestic peace and rational government. All attempts in this direction have been frustrated so far by the uncompromising attitude of the Bolsheviki, their interference, for political ends, in the distribution of food and other commodities and their persistent attempts to avail themselves of any means to spread abroad their doctrine of violence and unreason. The possibility of relieving the population within the Bolshevik lines has not, however, been given over. It is, indeed, one of the purposes of this report to lay before you the desirability of providing an agency competent to undertake measures of relief and to stimulate a resumption of normal economic life in all parts of Russia and Siberia when and where opportunity makes it practicable.
Reports reaching the Department of State indicate a constantly growing opposition to the Bolsheviki in the area of their control, manifesting itself in workmen’s strikes and the activities of the so-called “Green Army” which appears to consist of armed bands of revolting peasants. The ability of the Bolsheviki to maintain themselves so far in the face of these and other difficulties is to be attributed, so far as one may judge, to the energy and ruthlessness which characterizes the Bolshevik leaders, the lethargy of large portions of the population, resulting from five years of foreign and civil war and nearly two years of famine and terror, and to the advantages inherent in a compact and central strategic position, and the possession of the machinery of government, including the means of uttering paper money.
The difficulties besetting the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik forces are very great. From a military point of view, they must operate independently over vast stretches of territory which are separated from one another and imperfectly provided with the means of communication. The military equipment which has been furnished them from the outside is not comparable in quantity with that which the Bolsheviki found at their disposal or have been able to produce in the munition factories of central Russia. They are hampered on the political side by the unwelcome adhesion of unenlightened reactionaries, the too frequent lack of administrative capacity among their followers, and the difficulties and contradictions growing out of the need for conciliating shades of opinion which in many cases have little in common in the ends which they seek beyond the elimination of the Bolsheviki. One must admire the courage with which these leaders have met the obstacles in their path and the steadfastness which they have shown up to the present time in their opposition to German imperialism, while fighting with but desultory support from [Page 440] the Allied and Associated Powers, for the principles of democratic self-determination in Russia.
The issue of the struggle cannot be foretold, but I am confident that the cynical and unmoral opportunism of Lenin and his followers will not in the end prevail. It may fall before military successes of organized anti-Bolshevik movements operating openly in the field, or it may fall before less obvious forces working within the territory which the Bolsheviki now control and among those who have heretofore willingly or unwillingly accepted their domination. Events must take their course; but it lies within the right and interest, if not within the duty, of the United States and the other enlightened nations of the earth, to encourage by all available means the creation of a situation favorable to the rapid movement of events through the natural channels marked out for them by the interplay of purely Russian factors toward the establishment of a Russian government resting on the collective will of the Russian people and concerning itself with Russian affairs.
In considering the more precise nature of our future course, a clear distinction must be made between the Bolsheviki and what has come to be known by somewhat fortuitous association of events as Bolshevism. The Bolsheviki in the proper sense of the term are one wing of the Russian Social Democratic party. In 1903 differences arose in this party on the question of tactics. The other wing, known as the Mensheviki, have supported the view that they should arrive at the fulfilment of their party program by the accepted method of convincing the majority. They have advocated in this respect the principles of democracy. The Bolsheviki, led by Lenin, have stood, on the contrary, for a small, centralized and highly disciplined group of active workers who should bring about a minority revolution and establish thereby the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” or forceful control of the state by a small, militant section of the unpropertied elements of the population. Such has been the history of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In practical application of this doctrine the Bolshevik government has developed into a military dictatorship controlled by the small group immediately surrounding Lenin. Although two years have elapsed since this group came into power, there has been no important change, except by death, in its personnel. With the aid of their immediate and devoted followers they have built up the “Red Army”, the man-power for which is chiefly supplied by the conscription of peasants, and the military leadership in part by the enrollment of officers of the old regime, whose families are held as hostages for their loyal behavior. Against this machine it may be that only force will prevail.
[Page 441]What is commonly known as Bolshevism, on the other hand, is a popular state of mind growing out of the war and past abuses. It is compounded of demoralization and protest. It furnishes many misguided recruits to the ranks of the Bolsheviki and imparts to their movement the recurrent flushes of popular vitality which help to sustain it against the military attacks of its enemies. Bolshevism, thus conceived, is obviously not to be conquered by force. It is preeminently an economic and moral phenomenon against which economic and moral remedies alone will prevail. While recognizing the practical necessity, in certain contingencies, of supporting with military supplies the forces which seek to oust the Bolsheviki from the seat of government, I desire to emphasize above all the vital need for relieving as soon as possible the economic distress which foments and perpetuates the popular state of mind called Bolshevism.
The more efficient measures for accomplishing this are of two sorts. The first are in the nature of emergency relief and call for the distribution in especially distressed areas, at certain limited periods, of food and manufactured necessities. To furnish this relief will require approximately the sum of $25,000,000 which, if appropriated by Congress, could be expended, so far as there may be need therefor, through the Russian Bureau, Incorporated, mentioned hereinafter.
The second sort of measures are of a more permanent character, being such as will revive the normal processes of economic life. I desire to bring first to your attention under this head the need for continuing to assist in the operation of the Trans-Siberian railway. If the efficiency of this railway is still further lowered, as it undoubtedly will be in case American support is withdrawn, not only will the eastern approach to European Russia be practically shut off but the commercial and industrial life of the vast Siberian territory, which is 1,200,000 square miles larger than the forty-eight states of the American Union, will be paralyzed. One of the granaries of the world and an important source of dairy products, hides and minerals will be left, in so far as Japan and other powers do not take up the burden without our participation, to work its own way slowly out of a welter of political and economic disorganization. It is peculiarly fitting that the aid, which we have so frequently promised to the Russian people, and which we desire so fervently to give, should take, in part, this form. The organization of our own country has depended so greatly upon the development of railway communication that we bring to the same vital problem in Siberia sympathetic understanding and knowledge gained through long experience. It is an appealing thought that we, who have seen our own far-flung democracy grow strong with the development of [Page 442] railway communication, should help the Russians to bind together in the same way the extensive regions which it may be expected will one day form parts of a great democratic nation. It is for these reasons possibly that the Siberian route seems the natural channel of future interchange between Russia and America. We should feel that if this channel were stopped by the disintegrating forces of political instability and social unrest, the widest door to Russia would be closed. We have, moreover, established with Japan a thorough basis for a working cooperation and the engagements thus mutually undertaken impose upon us a share of the responsibility and the burden of assisting the Siberian people through their present period of distress.
It is difficult to estimate precisely the sum needed to support the railroad work during the coming year. Much will depend upon the extent of line remaining in the control of the elements with which it is possible to cooperate, and the contributions made by other Governments. The American representative on the Inter-Allied Railroad Board places the maximum needs at $30,000,000 and it is believed that the United States should stand ready to contribute one-half of this amount or $15,000,000. The expenditures would be charged against the future Government of Russia and would eventually be covered into the Treasury.
The third measure which I desire to recommend rests upon the necessity of setting up promptly in the region served by the Trans-Siberian railway and in the accessible portions of European Russia as nearly a normal exchange of commodities as possible. In some parts of these regions the people have raw materials which they can exchange for manufactured articles. The breakdown of the usual processes of trade has been so complete, and in particular the means of transportation are so generally lacking, that this exchange cannot be effected unless some special agency is constituted which will be able to sustain operations involving longer delays and greater risks than unaided private enterprise is capable of enduring. In some regions raw materials having an outside market are inadequate in quantity or totally lacking. As it is expected that the total supplies furnished to all regions would hardly exceed the total value of the raw materials sooner or later available throughout Russia and Siberia, it will be feasible to extend relief in these cases in exchange for general Russian securities of one kind or another, provided the necessary capital is available to some competent agency for that purpose. With this situation in view, and having in mind, on the other hand, our moral obligations to Russia as an associate in the struggle against German imperialism, the impossibility of restoring normal conditions even in the United States while Russia remains [Page 443] in economic disorganization, and the danger to our own life and institutions which proceeds from the continued existence in Russia of an active center of pernicious political and social propaganda—with these urgent considerations in mind, I suggest as a practical means of reviving commerce and restoring normal trade conditions, the creation of a governmental agency to be known as the Russian Bureau, Incorporated, and that this Bureau be supplied with a working capital of $100,000,000, to be employed under such restrictions and safeguards as may be deemed expedient, for the following purposes:
- 1.
- To provide a plan for insurance on exports to Russia while in transit and on both exports and imports while in warehouses there.
- 2.
- To make loans to American exporters who desire to make shipments to Russia.
- 3.
- To make loans to Russian Cooperative Societies, Zemstvos, Municipalities, and other established Russian organizations or responsible individuals against the production of raw material.
- 4.
- To buy, sell, or exchange commodities in a general way if within the judgment of the directors of the Bureau its main object is not being accomplished under the three foregoing heads.
Obviously, the charter of the corporation must be broadly conceived and much latitude left to the discretion of the directors, if it is to cope adequately with the difficult and rapidly shifting problems which will confront it. Its operations would be without profit. Interest should be charged on advances and premiums taken for insurance only to the extent necessary to cover operating expenses. It is contemplated that the capital allotment of the Bureau should be held intact so far as possible and eventually covered into the Treasury. Its prototype, the Russian Bureau, Incorporated, which was organized under the War Trade Board and which has recently been liquidated as a war measure, has returned to the Treasury its entire capital fund plus a certain margin of safety not yet precisely determined. It has already been observed that the appropriation recommended for the continued maintenance of the Russian Railway Service Corps and the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway would constitute a charge against the future Russian State. The emergency relief fund of $25,000,000 would alone constitute a final and non-recoverable disbursement, so far as it may be found necessary to employ it.
In recommending these measures to you, I have given thought to the heavy burden which already rests upon the people of the United States growing out of the prosecution of the war against German [Page 444] imperialism and to the measures of material relief which have already been adopted in favor of the distressed populations of Europe. I am convinced, nevertheless, that further sacrifices are necessary if we are to consolidate the fruits of victory. A limited group of men in Germany sought to impose upon the world by a policy of force and opportunism their conception of government and society. The heroism of our soldiers in the field and the devotion and self-sacrifice of our citizens at home frustrated their design. We are faced now with an issue which is different only in the nature and extent of the forces which are marshalled against us. A limited group of men in Moscow are endeavoring to impose upon the civilized world by opportunism and force a new order of existence of their own conceiving. The more destructive forms of the unrest now existing in this country cannot be disassociated from the inspiration of their propaganda and example. They have dragged Russia into a state of misery, of hideous brutality and of despair. They challenge us to the defense of our national well-being and institutions and I earnestly hope that we will reply by carrying into their immediate field of activity, in the greatest measure practicable, a contest of economic reorganization. When the necessities of our self-defense call thus for measures which instincts of humanity and loyalty also dictate, there seems to me a manifest duty imposed upon the United States which it will perform with the same vigor and determination with which it has performed every duty in the past.
Respectfully submitted,
- See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. iii, pp. 206 ff.↩
- Enclosures not printed; see ibid., pp. 249 ff.↩
- Enclosures not printed.↩