811.5294/94
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily in the United States
I explained to Mr. Shidehara the tentative conclusions which I have reached as a result of my discussions with residents of California and Japanese representatives during my recent trip to San Francisco.
I told Mr. Shidehara that there was practically a unanimous determination on the part of the people of California to prevent all Asiatic immigration to California. I explained to him that in my judgment this was not primarily economic but that it arose from the fear of the people of California that the presence of a large body of unassimilable people would threaten them with a serious and persistent race problem. I said that there was a division of sentiment among those who had studied the question whether the Japanese people ever could assimilate with Western civilization. I further expressed my opinion that this question could only be determined by the test of experience and I saw in the California conditions a peculiar opportunity for such a test.
There were admittedly 85,000 Japanese already there and if we could allow two or three generations to pass without adding by immigration to that number we would then know how Japanese had blended into the economic and social structure of California life. I explained that the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” had not succeeded satisfactorily in preventing immigration during the past ten years. I believed that if arrangements could be made to provide for total exclusion in the future that we would thus establish the foundation for better treatment by Californians towards Japanese already there. I further told him that the initiative would in my judgment undoubtedly pass and that any effort on the part of the Japanese residents or the Federal Government to prevent its passage by propaganda or otherwise would only serve to accentuate the present antagonism. I had, I said, serious doubts as to the validity of the existing and proposed discriminatory legislation against Japanese residents, in view of our Constitutional provisions and treaty obligations, and that I wished that question could be determined. I asked him to think over the following procedure to handle the problem for the immediate future.
First, to wait in the hope that a test of the validity of the Act of 1913 might be made in our courts so that we know whether we were discussing a real or fictitious situation.
[Page 13]Second, to begin immediate discussions of amendments to strengthen the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” so that it would hereafter operate totally to exclude all Japanese. I pointed out that this procedure would accomplish the following results:
(1st) The pendency of a litigation in our courts would give Mr. Hara’s6 Cabinet the opportunity to explain that the legislation which was sure to pass by initiative and referendum was still undetermined as to its effect and in this way allay any possible resentment in Japan. (2nd), At the same time it would give a chance for so strengthening the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that if the Supreme Court should decide in the test case that the legislation of 1913 was valid, then the result of the negotiations of an amended “Gentlemen’s Agreement” could be published and thus give ground for modifying the California laws. If, on the other hand, it was held not valid, the new and effective “Gentlemen’s Agreement” would operate to prevent subsequent action by California.
I spoke at length and very frankly of the problem in its general aspects; that it represented the whole issue of contact between the West and the East and that it could only be approached in a broad and statesmanlike spirit. So long as it involved undetermined questions of assimilability, it was absolutely essential that we wait until time had solved these questions. In the meantime we must adjust our minds to the conclusion that the people of our Western coast would not permit any further additions to the population by immigration until time had determined these questions.
He replied:
- First, that he agreed with me as to my conclusion about the feeling in California. He had always wished that the legality of the legislation of 1913 had been tested; that the reason it had not was that he, as Counselor in Washington then, consulted several eminent American lawyers and was assured by them that the legislation could not be successfully attacked. … He was inclined favorably to my suggestion that the question ought to be definitely determined.
- Second, as to my suggestion of strengthening by carefully thought-out amendments the terms of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”, he would admit that he had been earnestly working on that for some time and had made a careful study of the provisions with a view to determining what amendments could be made. He enumerated the various causes of the increase in population in spite of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” and thought that some of them could be remedied. He was quite prepared to discuss that general problem seriously.
He asked me whether I believed that any good could come of the international commission such as had been suggested by the conference [Page 14] held in Tokyo. I told him that in my judgment that plan was utterly impracticable; that our Government would never consign a domestic question of immigration to an international commission and if any further reason were desired, I had no faith that such a commission, if approved by the Government, could reach any conclusions of this subject that could not be better reached by diplomatic conversations. He said he was glad to hear me say that, as he had advised his own Government exactly to that effect—that the American Government would never consent to such a plan.
In conclusion I explained to him that I had not had an opportunity to report to my own Department on my general observations in California, and I had no idea what their views would be, but speaking entirely personally I thought that we should handle the present situation thus:
- First: to cooperate sympathetically in any effort that might be made by Californians independently to test the validity of the 1913 legislation, and I admitted to him that I had so expressed myself to Californians.
- Second: to begin at once a discussion of the strengthening of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”, to hold any announcement of the result until such time as any test case as to the validity of the legislation might be determined, or it might be necessary, in order to neutralize threatened Congressional action.
I pointed out in conclusion that whether the legislation was valid or invalid, it seemed to me essential that our Governments should agree on a larger understanding that meant total exclusion for a sufficiently long period to test the assimilability of those Japanese already resident on the Pacific Coast.
- Takashi Hara, Japanese Prime Minister.↩