File No. 763.72/9081
The Ambassador in France ( Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 6, 1.17 a.m.]
3293. Joint telegram from the Allied ministers at Jassy dated March 1:
The President of the Council, on his return from Bacau where he had accompanied the King, called us together to communicate the status of negotiations. Count Czernin confirmed to the King his former statements, while insisting on behalf of his Sovereign on the necessity of accepting the conditions, otherwise the dynasty would disappear and Roumania would be shared between Hungary and Bulgaria. Count Czernin stated clearly that the Dobroudja would be entirely ceded, that is to say, up to the most southern arm of the Danube; furthermore that the cession would be made not to Bulgaria but to the Quadruple Alliance. The object of this latter stipulation is evidently to give the Austro-Germans a means of bringing pressure to bear on Bulgaria and permitting them, if need be, to profit by the rivalry between this power and Roumania. As for the rectifications [Page 762] of the frontier in favor of Austria-Hungary, they affect the three following points: the Iron Gates, the Valley of Jin, and the region of Dorna-Vatra. The economic conditions have still not been defined. Count Czernin confines himself to stating that they concern the wheat and petroleum, that is to say, all the riches of the country, and “that they will not be harsher than the territorial conditions.”
General Avereseo told us that from the position in which the Roumanian Government finds itself, if it does not consent to negotiate on this basis, there only remain the following alternatives:
- (1)
- Capitulation, which would have the political advantage of avoiding a peace concluded between legal authorities, but which would present the drawback of allowing to fall into the hands of the enemy the railroads, war material, etc. Furthermore, Roumania would lose for an indefinite time all independence without any profit resulting for the Entente, according to the President of the Council.
- (2)
- The struggle to the end which always, according to General Avereseo, would only have a limited duration and would result in a certain catastrophe, with the same drawbacks as the preceding solution. He again mentioned the absolute impossibility in which the Allies find themselves henceforth to bring opportune assistance to Roumania. He repeated that the retreat into Russia of the Government, the royal family and a small portion of the Army is absolutely impossible, the Allies not having improved the relations of Roumania with the Maximalists, who, on the contrary, are redoubling their hostility against her.
The President of the Council asked us afterwards if the continuation of the negotiations on the basis of the Austro-German [proposals] would not be, in spite of their [harshness], the least prejudicial decision both for Roumania and for the Allies. He added that in the event of a peace under such conditions, Roumania would consider herself as always united to the Entente. It was necessary to put the following question: Could Roumania, at the time of the congress, count on the support of the Allies to obtain the revision of such a peace, notably, of the conditions relative to the Dobroudja and to the frontier as [indicated]?
We replied in the most emphatic terms by referring to our former statements concerning the necessity of struggling to the end and preparing at the same time, despite all the difficulties, the evacuation of the whole or part of the Army as well as of the royal family and the Government.
The President of the Council insisted on his point of view and drew attention to the danger for the Entente of incurring, by its uncompromising attitude, the resentment of the Roumanian population [Page 763] and throwing it completely into the arms of the Germans. He urgently requested us to communicate his statements to our Governments so that they might give us instructions if they considered it desirable to do so.
We were [omission] the interest to be gained by giving the widest publicity to the German ultimatum by comparing it with the denial of Nauen (see our telegram of February 141) as well as to the monstrous threat of dividing Roumania between Hungary and Bulgaria.
No radiogram of the countries of the Entente appears yet to have turned to account the impudence of this attitude and the flagrant contradiction presented by it in the same way as the Berlin and Vienna Governments have done in order to hold public opinion in their own countries.
- Not printed.↩