File No. 763.72/8824
The Ambassador in France ( Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9.50 p.m.]
3173. Joint telegram from the ministers of United States, Italy, France and England at Jassy, February 8:
Mr. Bratiano has acquainted us with the discussion which took place yesterday at the Council of Ministers on the attitude to be adopted with regard to the German ultimatum. He told us that the Council could not arrive at a decision, a certain number of the Ministers, while declaring themselves against assuming power alone, being opposed to any peace negotiations. Mr. Bratiano added that in his opinion choice must be made of one of the three following solutions: (1) a separate peace; (2) immediate rupture; (3) peace negotiations with a view to delay. The President of the Council declared that personally his decision was already made. He rejects the two first solutions and only consents to remain in power if the third is adopted. According to him this would have the advantage of possibly permitting the opportunity of benefiting by some successful event to improve the situation by bringing about a closer union with the Maximalists and aggravation of the [crisis in Austria, etc.]. He concluded by assuring us that if the Conservative Ministers form a cabinet of resistance to the utmost, he will give it his full support, will authorize the members of his party who would dissociate themselves from him to enter this cabinet.
We replied to Mr. Bratiano that the point of view of our Governments had been clearly defined in our collective letter of February 2 (see our telegram of the same day1), that consequently we could only pronounce against any negotiations for peace. We added that as a matter of fact there were only two solutions to be faced, peace or war. All so-called dilatory negotiations could only result in the early conclusion of a separate peace. We are told on the other hand that the controlling centers have the presentiment that the Germans are disposed to accept advantageous conditions, for Roumania and especially the maintenance of King Ferdinand on the throne. This feeling if not immediately counteracted by successes on the part of the Allied Powers risks to become decisive in the direction of peace.