File No. 861.00/3227
The Consul Detailed for Special Duty in Russia and Siberia (Jameson) to the Secretary of State1
[Received November 17, 2.23 a.m.]
14. Having visited during autumn chief cities of central and western Siberia from Chita to Ekaterinburg, Russia, I submit here-with [Page 430] brief report regarding political conditions in territory above mentioned as follows:
- (1)
- There is great political agitation by conflicting political parties everywhere and presence of Czech forces supporting government alone enables new government to exist.
- (2)
- Russian army in very poor condition because of shortage of clothing, the lack of arms and ammunition, the lack of experienced officers, unreliability of troops because impossible to know how many are Bolsheviks, and the lack of discipline due to extreme socialistic ideas.
- (3)
- There is considerable friction between officials of new Russian government and temporary Siberian government, though they are in accord on surface; these feelings may cause open rupture any time, splitting government.
- (4)
- Czechs not only helped form all-Russian government but are supporting it against all opposition.
- (5)
- Strong Bolshevik propaganda reinforced by anarchical and socialist societies causes frequent and often serious uprisings throughout western Siberia, some of these apparently due to German instigation.
- (6)
- Austrian and German war prisoners are constant menace because any more military [momentary] success of insurgents enables them to release thousands of these prisoners from prison camps, making formidable rebellion of small uprising.
- (7)
- There is strong monarchist movement gaining ground daily throughout Siberia.
- (8)
- Kerensky is in close touch with all-Russian government and it is feared will try to make himself part of it; believe any government with Kerensky as member will be failure as feeling against him intense.
- (9)
- There is strong feeling among many Russians that the American Government [un]willing to help Russians unless guaranteed concessions and commercial advantages; this feeling increased by efforts of our consular and commercial offices to collect information regarding economic and commercial assets and needs of Siberia.
- The Russians want help in establishing sound government and look to America as democratic government for assistance; our declared desire to help Russian people has hollow ring, when they need everything and can obtain nothing from us.
- (10)
- Our failure to send troops to support Russians and Czechs on Volga front in fighting against Bolsheviks and Germans has shaken Russian confidence in America.
- (11)
- And most important, the Russian Government must have help in many ways and very soon in order to continue to exist—its leaders are determined to obtain help; if possible they prefer to obtain it from America, but if we do not give soon there is great danger they will make a [Page 431] bargain with Japan, offering large concessions for immediate and adequate help.
- (12)
- In this connection, Government may revert to monarchy; number of strongest leaders are known to favor, especially the men who are said to be negotiating with Japan.
Shall be pleased to report in detail regarding any of the points above mentioned. Am convinced that this is the time for the American Government to show its desire to help the Russian people by actions. Suggest as first step that we have the embargo against imports into Siberia raised and see that Russians know that America has caused raising of embargo, not some other nation. Also suggest that American plans for relief and reconstruction work in Europe after the war be extended to Siberia immediately; namely, goods of all kinds shipped to Siberia including military supplies to enable new government to preserve order. If these two acts can be carried out at once you will secure the enthusiastic support for America of the vast majority of the Russian people. Acknowledge by telegraph.
- Sent via the Legation in China.↩