File No. 861.48/679
The British Chargé (
Barclay
) to the Secretary of State
No. 1099
Washington
,
October 3,
1918
.
[Received October
4.]
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I duly telegraphed
to my Government the text of the memorandum enclosed in your letter
of September 27, with respect to the disposition for the winter of
the American expeditionary forces in Siberia and in Russia, and the
sending of supplies for the use of the Czecho-Slovak forces.
[Page 404]
I have now the honour to transmit, herewith, a copy of a telegram
which I have received from Mr. Balfour in reply, setting forth the views of His
Majesty’s Government in the matter.
Believe me [etc.]
[Enclosure]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (
Balfour
) to the Chargé at Washington (
Barclay
)
We fully appreciate the attitude of the United States Government
and their desire to act in such a matter in accordance with the
advice of their military authorities. Our position is, however,
a little different to theirs. In the first place our military
authorities do not take the same view. So far as they are able
to judge, the Czechs, if given the full support of every one of
the Allies, might still be able, in conjunction with the forces
under General Alexeev,
to hold the line of the Volga against any force that is likely
to be brought there by our enemies. The position is very obscure
and possibly further information might modify their judgment but
that is the present view of the case by our soldiers. Apart from
this we feel the very greatest reluctance in abandoning elements
in Russia loyal to the Allies; General Alexeev, for instance, has fought
throughout the war against our enemies and in the early part of
it he and his troops rendered essential and heroic services to
the Allied cause. Since the revolution he has never wavered and
we know he has resisted many approaches from the German side
backed though they were by old associations such as Milyukov. We feel, therefore,
honourably bound to do our very utmost, even at some risk to our
own interests, to come to his assistance. If we were now to ask
the Czechs to withdraw to the east of the Urals, that would be
to cut off from Alexeev
and those with him their last hope of Allied assistance. We
therefore propose, subject to any observations that the United
States Government may have to make, to present this view of the
situation to our French and Japanese Allies and to appeal to
them to continue their efforts to stand by our friends in
European Russia. We quite recognize that the above
considerations do not apply to the United States in the same way
as they do to those who fought side by side with the Russians in
the early part of the war, and His Majesty’s Government will
quite understand it if the United States Government feel unable
to take a more active line than that indicated in the telegram
under reply. We venture to express the hope that the United
States Government will appreciate our position in the matter and
will not think it amiss if we endeavour to carry out the task
that seems to be imposed upon us by obligations of honour. In
short, if they feel unable to assist us beyond the point
indicated, we hope they will not discourage our other Allies
from helping us.
