File No. 861.00/2476
The Consul at Moscow ( Poole ) to the Secretary of State 1
[Received August 11, 8.20 p.m.]
683. The situation has come to the most critical pass which has yet been experienced. The Department no doubt has full reports from the Embassy concerning developments at Archangel. Chicherin assured me on the 28th that the note to the British representative, communicated in my No. 679,2 unlike the previous protests concerning Murman, is really meant, and that the Soviet government is dispatching troops to Murman and to Archangel. Respecting the expedition to Murman, he said that there will be an inevitable conflict with any foreign troops encountered and that it is not to be foreseen where such conflict may end. Admitting by inference that the local Murman Soviets deplore the withdrawal of the Allied forces, he said that they will nevertheless have to bend to the will of the central authorities. Concerning the dispatch of troops to Archangel, he remarked that, with so much talk of intervention, the Soviets must be prepared to resist a landing.
As the Red Army is of slight military value, and has already more than it can do on the Czech front, this belligerent attitude of the Soviets derives its chief importance from the menace of direct German cooperation. The British have learned from a source they consider sure that reported, 27th, Chicherin instructed Soviet representative at Berlin to request formally of the supreme German command military assistance against the Allies and the British. Observers fail so far to confirm persistent rumors of the passage east or north Ukraine of actual German units, and the situation in the Ukraine as well as events on the western front suggest their general improbability. However, the Department is aware of German war prisoners in Russia and of the presence of number of important German forces in Finland. An observer just returned from Kem reports continuance of military activities in Karelia threatening the Murman railway at various points, and reports come from good sources of preparations for a movement northward toward Pechenga Bay or Murmansk.
The development of the political situation during the week lends color to the view that the Germans have decided to support the Bolsheviki for the moment, and that the Bolsheviki, in despair of dealing with the situation themselves, have accepted. The general [Page 237] bearing of the Bolshevik leaders has become most assured during the week and they are most active and outspoken respecting Allied intervention. Some of the most indiscreet among them have stated openly that the general mobilization, which is now being attempted with only moderate success, is directed against the Allies. Their subservience to German domination has become most manifest. See my Nos. 6681 and 680.2 On the other hand the anti-Bolshevik parties are experiencing a resurge of pro-Ally sentiment, resulting from conviction of a German-Bolshevik understanding and the success of the Allied arms in the west.
The moment is peculiarly ripe for Allied intervention, of the unavoidable necessity for which sooner or later I trust the Department is also convinced. Coming at this time, it promises to result in a declaration of war against the Allies by the Bolsheviki and an alliance with Germany. This will have two important effects: (1) A reciprocal alliance with imperial Germany will come as a final revelation of the sordid and insincere selfishness which characterizes the greater part of the Bolshevik leaders; it will place the onus of action on them and throw definitely into the Allied camp the parties of opposition. (2) It will draw Germany into central Russia, increasing her military effort in the east and widening the surface of the Russian [theater of war].
While, as pointed out in my No. 643,3 the Russian press exaggerates the unrest in the Ukraine, it claims it is still certain that the Ukraine situation seriously hampers German freedom of action in the west. Chicherin argues that if the Allies intervene they will encounter the same difficulties in the portions of Russia occupied by them. There is a fundamental difference. Germany has nothing to give and ruthlessly strips occupied territory of food and manufactures. I take it for granted that the Allies will not overlook the political aspects of intervention which in some ways overtop the purely military in importance and that within the regions defended the good will of the population will be secured not only by tactful administration but direct economic assistance. In this way the influence of intervention will spread far beyond the field of military operations, based on the formula that, while Germany takes, the Allies give, food.
It [is] generally understood that the feeding of even small portions of northern Russia is an enormous undertaking, but its assumption can not be avoided by non-intervention, as the famine of the coming winter will imperatively command the attention of civilized nations by its humanitarian, if not military and political [Page 238] aspects. Obviously we cannot and should not undertake to send our own food, except possibly a few initial shiploads to appease the population in the territory immediately to be defended. Northern Russia can be adequately fed only from the granary of western Siberia. To effect this the new front must include Semipalatinsk, [omission], and Ekaterinburg, as well as the points now held by the Czechs.
On this account and in view of favorable military situation created by the unsuccessful Soviet attack on the Czechs and because the Czechs, if not promptly supported, will inevitably be crushed by direct or indirect German military pressure, the moment is also ripe for intervention in Siberia. While action in northern Russia might be limited to an armed demonstration designed only to draw Germany into central Russia, intervention in Siberia must be especially [effected by] sufficient military force to create a secure secondary base for operations in northern Russia and to maintain communication with Archangel via Vyatka and Kotlas, if not Verkhneuralsk. If intervention can also in time project itself down the Volga with your [sic] supporting expeditions towards Ekaterinoslav on the one hand and towards the Caucasus on the other, so much the better, but that is for the future.
Like intervention in northern Russia, that in Siberia will fail if undertaken as a purely military enterprise. There is need for as good political and economic administrative genius as can be found. As shown in my Nos. 628, 637, and 650,1 the Siberians are disgusted with Bolshevism and consider Allied intervention the only means of escaping German domination, but they distrust the Japanese. Against this we have their faith in America and we must develop this asset by every conceivable means.
Regarding intervention in general the people of the Allied countries must not permit themselves illusions. The bulk of the Russians are generally ignorant and moved only by immediate and material considerations. The educated political leaders are party men lacking in the western conception of patriotism. No class has developed self-reliance and all dislike hard work. They look to others for guidance and support and delude them[selves] with the thought that foreign intervention will forthwith bring order and comfort without special privation or effort on their part. It is certain therefore that even with the good will of the Russian people we can count upon very little serious practical help from them. We must also foresee that, following a possibly enthusiastic initial reception, there will be a reaction of disillusion and discontent.
[Page 239]Have shown foregoing to Smith 1 and asked him to inform Department of his views.