File No. 861.00/406
The Consul General at Moscow ( Summers ) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge, by transmission through the Embassy, the Department’s telegraphic instruction of the 5th instant asking for information as to the political situation in this district, and to enclose herewith a copy of a preliminary telegraphic report1 which I have sent the Embassy, in compliance with instructions.
In furnishing the Department with the information requested it will not be considered that the situation is exaggerated or that the opinions are biased. Facts are given as they present themselves, and while all freedom-loving people naturally have a tendency to see what they wish to be brought about in its most optimistic light, and are prone, in doing so, to overlook what they do not wish to come to pass, and to underestimate the underlying causes, treating the revolution from above instead of from beneath, yet in so serious a matter as that now confronting the United States it is of prime importance to know the actual condition of affairs, no matter how dark the situation may appear, and to be prepared for any emergency.
The cause of the present revolution in Russia is exactly a repetition of Spanish domination in South America: corruption and misgovernment, oppression of the ignorant and poorer classes, failure to provide for moral and material emergencies by proper education of the masses, the granting of privileges to the nobility, and a general demoralization of the people by overt acts of the educated and governing classes. The reaction will be in proportion to the corruption practised for so long, and ignorant lawlessness will be the crop of the seeds of intelligent corruption and decay. The masses of the people are not looking for independence and freedom, for the simple reason that they do not know what it means, and are too ignorant, [Page 68] for the moment, to be taught. Their undeveloped minds only see revenge against those whom they consider their oppressors, the confiscation of their lands and property, and anarchy. In the trains, on the trams, everywhere, one only hears the remarks: “The rich have sucked our blood for generations; it is now our turn!” The very ignorance of the masses makes it impossible to argue with them. They do not know exactly what they want in the way of political institutions. This is natural, as they are wholly uneducated. Yesterday the Government of the United States was their ideal of a free country. To-day this same Government is found to be imperialistic. Any government where there is law and order is to them autocratic. They do not understand what they are fighting for or what they are to gain by it. They have the instinct of self-defense but certainly not patriotism. It is not their fault for they have been brought up as little more than cattle. They are consequently the victims of every demagogue who wishes to demoralize them and appeal to their passions instead of their patriotism. In this sense they are much more difficult to persuade to look at matters in a practical sense than to resort to force to satisfy their vengeance.
I have been told from authoritative sources that the commanders of the Russian regiments sent to France were told soon after their arrival there that the troops under their command were absolutely unfit, by reason of their ignorance, for modern warfare, and that they were allowed no positions of importance to be assigned to them. It is also stated that when the revolution broke out in Russia one of the regiments began to show insubordination, whereupon the French forces forced them to fight at the point of the bayonet, which was the only argument they were capable of understanding. Under these conditions they behaved themselves well.
The above is cited to show that there is serious doubt as to whether the people were prepared for so sudden a change in the Government, especially of so radical a nature as has taken place, or as to whether their untrained minds are capable of grasping the meaning of a free and democratic Government. It is more than probable that the masses do not comprehend the dangers besetting the nation, and that freedom to them is libertinism. It is useless, under the present conditions, to theorize on the results which might have been brought about, if the Government, the Church, and the higher classes had, since the liberation of the slaves, set themselves to the establishment and of giving an example of educational reform. The fact remains that this has not only not been done but the people have purposely been kept in ignorance, and the corruption in Government circles, especially in the army, navy, and administrative branches, has certainly inspired the people with lack of confidence. The time will [Page 69] undoubtedly come when all this mass of people will become educated and little by little work out their own destinies, forming a great nation. At present radicalism has gone to the brink of anarchy and further steps in this direction will plunge the country into chaos and civil war. To avert this and to oblige the people to realize their obligations towards the Allies and the danger from the enemy is the momentous task which now confronts the Temporary Government.
It is not to be understood that the masses of the Russian people cannot, in time, and with systematic education, equal in intelligence and patriotism, any other nation. The idea meant to be conveyed is that as an actual fact they are not, for the moment, favored by these conditions, through no fault of their own. If education had been commenced at the time of the liberation of the serfs the position in the world of a large percentage of the Russian people would be vastly different from what it is at present, the land would be more intensively cultivated and distributed, and industries of all sorts would be more common and productive. The majority of the people would then have something to lose by anarchy and would oppose it and demand a stable and free government. As it is, the great mass has nothing whatsoever to lose by a chaotic state of affairs.
As a result of the Japanese war the soldiers and sailors and the people in general lost all confidence in the Government and its corrupt agents. The revolution of 1905–6 was the result, and the people gained a certain foothold by the establishment of the Duma. The war was unpopular, and the country unprepared for it. It was, however, an educator, and the beginning of the downfall of the present dynasty. The present war found the country also unprepared, though vast sums had been voted, especially since the threatening attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary at the time of the annexation to the latter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for placing the army and navy on a war basis. The squandering and pilfering of this money, instead of its employment for the purposes for which it was destined, brought the present Minister of Foreign Affairs (just resigned), Milyukov, into disfavor with the Government on account of his violent opposition thereto. It seems that the Japanese war failed to teach a lesson which, if it had been profited by, would have greatly changed the present chaotic condition of the country. Russia, through its Minister in Belgrade, M. de Hartwig, a rabid Panslavist, precipitated the conflict for which the Central powers were so eager, and sent an army into the field without arms and ammunition.
Russia’s diplomacy has always been as clumsy as that of Germany, and about equal to the existing system of Government. The real backbone of the country, the conservative landowning class, systematically refused to enter either Government or diplomatic [Page 70] service, and regarded both local and foreign representatives as sinecures. M. de Hartwig, however, was an exception to the rule, and was boldly championed by the people, though he was working in direct opposition to Sazonov, the Prime Minister, and feeling his power with the people his policy in the Balkans precipitated the Turkish war, and had it not been for the intervention of the great powers, the question of the Dardanelles would have then and there been solved, and the split between the allied Balkan nations avoided. But M. de Hartwig possessed two ambitions which were ultimately destined to plunge all Europe in war; namely, to humiliate Austria-Hungary, and to panslavize the Balkans and the Slavic provinces of the Dual Empire, thereby extending Russia’s sphere of influence (the vanguard of annexation) straight through to the Adriatic. But he was human and, being so, committed a great mistake in championing the cause of Serbia against Bulgaria, forcing that latter and stronger country to seek an alliance with the Central powers. Serbia insisted on occupying western Macedonia which, in population at least, was purely Bulgar. In the treaty of 1912, signed by the several nations leagued against Turkey, and instigated by De Hartwig, this section of the Balkans was assigned to Bulgaria, while Serbia was to have what is known as Old Serbia embracing the rich valley of the upper Vardar River and the prosperous city and old capital of Serbia, Uskub, now called Skoplje, as also the Sanjak of Novibazar, being further assured that at the proper moment she would be supported morally and materially in occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and obtaining an outlet to the Mediterranean either on the Dalmatian coast or to the south of Scutari, at either one of which places the Danube Adriatic Railway, to be constructed with Russian capital, was to have its terminal.
But the thirst for conquest and the formation of a greater Serbia, a greater Bulgaria, a greater Montenegro, and a greater Greece, led Serbia to break with Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. The latter country, assailed on all sides by Turks, Rumanians, Greeks and Serbs, was forced to surrender, but the peace of the Balkans was disturbed forever. Bulgaria threw in its lot with Austria and Germany, while Greece fell away from its alliance with the Serbs, leaving the latter isolated. In this De Hartwig’s policy was destructive, as it was he who instigated the Serbs to break with the Bulgars, considering the former as more Slavonic than the latter, and consequently more apt to coincide with Russia’s policy against Austria.
Having committed this error the Minister set himself deliberately to the task of disintegrating Austria-Hungary, and of using the Serbian Government, absolutely subservient to him, for that purpose. The Central powers were aware of all this and when the Archduke was assassinated, naturally took advantage of the opportunity to [Page 71] throw the responsibility of the conflict on Serbia and began the war. Either Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism was to rule in the Balkans.
Russia came to the assistance of Serbia, as was expected, and was followed by other nations of the Triple Alliance. Russia’s duty therefore towards the Allies in fighting the war to a finish is greater than any other country, as the conflict began in her interests. To ask for peace now, or to refuse to fight and leave the struggle to those who came to her assistance at a perilous time, cannot be countenanced. If the Japanese war was unpopular the present one, on the contrary, appealed to the great mass of the people, and had the old regimé been prepared and prosecuted the campaign with vigor, the disorganization now existing, owing to defeats and retreats, would have been avoided. Even though unfit for modern warfare and clumsy, yet in numbers alone would the army have forced its way to the front. The beginning was the psychological moment for the Russian triumph. Lack of arms and ammunition prevented it, and this fact, together with corrupt and German-paid ministers and officers, disseminated dissatisfaction and discouragement in the ranks of the army. This soon brought on insubordination and finally degenerated into the present dangerous state, the discontent and loyalty of the army being openly undermined by German agents working with the knowledge and consent of the Government. If the situation at the front existed even in form until the revolution began, it was due to the efforts of the educated classes and the nobility who struggled against the Government itself in many instances to furnish food and supplies to the army, either individually, collectively, or through the Zemstvos.
There is no doubt that the mobilization of the greater part of the nation’s strength, a certain amount of travel and contact with other elements and classes, opened the eyes of the erstwhile ignorant peasants and has given them a little learning which has proven indeed a dangerous thing, for it has been misdirected. Their undeveloped minds were an easy target for provocateurs at home and abroad, and the corrupt state of affairs flagrantly visible to their eyes, and continual reverses due thereto, only aggravated the situation. Discouragement led to a general feeling of revolt towards those who had brought the disasters on the country, and having only a veneer of knowledge of the causes and of those responsible therefor, they confounded the guilty with the guiltless, and are endeavoring now to tear down all form of government and establish a reign of anarchy and ignorance. The tottering Temporary Government is unable to enforce order and discipline, and provocateurs of all sorts, German-paid agents, anarchists and criminals let loose from prisons, and lawless elements of every nature are hard at work cementing the state of anarchy which is commencing and which will end in civil war [Page 72] unless stopped. The great mass of the Russian people seem to be forming themselves into two groups, the one for, and the other opposed to organized government. Very few indeed of the educated class sympathized with the old régime, and welcomed the downfall of the dynasty, strong in the conviction that intelligent and patriotic men like Milyukov and Guchkov would be supported in the formation of a free and democratic government. But they had underestimated the ignorance of the people as a mass and the evil effects of the provocateurs, and when the crisis came the soldiers and workmen, instead of ranging themselves on the side of law and order, practically placed the Temporary Government under house arrest and disregarding the interests of the country and the perils to which it was subjected, initiated a regimé of insubordination, anarchy, and persecution far greater than ever existed before, disintegrating instead of cooperating, destroying without constructing. One idea and one alone seems to possess them; namely, the plunging of the country into anarchy.
This state of chaos is complicated by the lack of national patriotism. A Pole cares nothing for Russia. He is before all a Pole and in defense of Poland may and doubtless will do heroic deeds. The same is so with the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Bessarabians, the small [Little] Russians, Baltic Province Germans, Jews, Tatars, etc., etc. They are continually pulling against the National Government and fomenting class interests. The same is true to a great degree with the Russians proper. The workmen are not striving to build up a country. They are, first of all, caring for their own interests, and in doing so are willing to sacrifice country, honor and all. The same is true with the peasant and other social classes. Russia, as a nation, seems to occupy but little their thoughts.
There are enclosed herewith a number of clippings (translations) from the local press which show the disturbed condition of the country.1 The articles are selected from the best writers of the most serious papers and reflect the state of anarchy into which the state is rapidly drifting. Especial attention is called to the last enclosure No. 11.1 From fear of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Party the press refused to give publicity to the article, but it was printed in pamphlet form and distributed around the streets in great numbers. Though fiery in its tone it outlines, nevertheless, the situation as it exists and prophesies the final result of a continuance on the part of the workmen and soldiers of their policy of disintegrating the nation for selfish purposes.
In the above report on the conditions in this jurisdiction I have confined myself strictly to the causes and effects of the revolution. The political disturbances in Petrograd. the conduct of the workmen [Page 73] and soldiers’ deputies, the rise and fall of the cabinets in rapid succession, the speeches in the Duma, and the present position of the Temporary Government, have all been described by the Embassy and the Consulate in Petrograd, and to dwell on same would only be a duplication of work.
The Consulate General will continue from time to time to advise the Department of the labor and other questions as they arise. The situation is serious and bids fair to grow worse. But little, if any, help can from now on be expected from the army, while on the other hand strikes and internal disorder may cause civil war.
I have [etc.]