File No. 6993/6
Minister Egan to the Secretary of State
Copenhagen , August 9, 1909 .
Sir: I take the liberty of making to you a confidential communication on the present state of Danish politics and finances, principally [Page 558] as concerning the future of the West India Islands. I do not presume for a moment to forestall in any way the intentions of the United States Government concerning these islands, but as I think the opportunity of acquiring them may some day arise, I feel it my duty, unless I am otherwise directed by you, to pave the way gently as far as possible toward that acquirement. I had hoped to be able to pay a visit to the United States, sailing on September 7th, principally because Director Cold, until recently Governor of the Danish West Indies, is sailing at the same time. As I am quite sure that, owing to the change of secretaries here, the Department will scarcely grant me leave to sail at that time I am most desirous that ex-Governor Cold shall have the opportunity to meet yourself or somebody of importance in the State Department. As this is his first visit to the United States and he is a person of high standing here, I am frankly most desirous that he should not receive the impression that the United States is an arrogant Power, determined because of that power to acquire some of the few remaining possessions of this little country. Therefore I shall take the liberty of giving ex-Governor Cold a letter of introduction to you. I should naturally have preferred to present him personally to the President and yourself and also to have attended the luncheon of the Chamber of Commerce in New York with him; but as this seems out of the question I shall commit him to your amiability.
On Saturday, Admiral de Richelieu called on me to say privately that he had been called on by the King to advise as to the formation of a Ministry and that in case of the combination he had in view failing, he would probably be expected to assume publicly the responsibility for the new Ministry, which would mean that he would be the Premier. He is at present, by all odds, the most important man in Denmark. Although a conservative as to socialism, he is the only man outside the socialists themselves who has any influence with them. His plan was to unite Count Friis, who is an advocate of the land defence, and therefore looked on as having English sympathies, and Christensen, who, opposing the land defence, is looked on as having German sympathies. This of course is the popular view. Neither Friis nor Christensen has any special English or German sympathy. This combination would neutralize Christensen’s influence in Jutland where he has a great following among the peasants and where Count Friis has large landed estates. If Count Holstein-Ledreborg could be added to the Ministry, Holstein-Ledreborg having a great reputation here and regarding constitutionalism as meaning the Government of the Kingdom by three influences—the King being mediator between the two houses of Parliament—a very strong Cabinet would be made. So far, Richelieu has not succeeded and it looks to-day as if he should be obliged to accept, against his will, the premiership. Richelieu has done very much to assist Denmark in the financial difficulties of the last year; he tells me that at present the financial condition is deplorable, but he is very optimistic as to the ultimate result. And now I come to the relation of all this with the question of the Danish West Indies. If the present financial difficulties continue, the Danish Government will have to get money somewhere. Iceland is beginning to give trouble and there will no doubt soon be an attack on Danish monopoly in Greenland. De Richelieu is very progressive and I think has no prejudices whatever against the sale of the islands. Now and [Page 559] then one hears the announcement made that the Government here will make an exchange with Germany, giving the Danish Antilles for the former Danish possessions in Schleswig-Holstein. This, of course, is absurd but it is sometimes uttered by reactionaries in apparent good faith. The country people, the peasants, meaning the farmers, are simply interested in low taxes and good prices for butter, milk, and what cattle is exported. The sale of the islands would not be unpopular in the Lower House. The landed proprietors in the Upper House have certain national prejudices against depriving Denmark of any of its possessions. The loss of Schleswig-Holstein still embitters them. And then, too, they have the greatest desire in the world to grip every piece of land; but the financial condition counts with them as it does with everybody here. Those members of the haute bourgeoisie who hotly objected to the Sale of the islands are beginning to cool in their enthusiasm. The people who stand foremost against such a sale are, I think, some of the members of the Royal family, but even this opposition would not count in the face of a financial necessity. I do not mean to suggest that any movement should be made on the part of the United States to acquire the islands at present; in this time of crisis it would fall dead; people have other things to think about; but the press is becoming more and more favorable to the United States. The interchange of professors, the celebration at Aarhus and all the amenities recently affected here have raised us in the estimation of the Danes, who are very sensitive, as the people of all small nations are, and their temperament must be considered. If it were not for this crisis it is probable that a tremendous discussion would have arisen in the press on the question of sending a war vessel to the Hudson-Fulton celebration. As it is, only the fear of spending money and the fact that the Valkyren would need to be thoroughly overhauled at great expense, prevented the Ministry of two weeks ago, there is no Ministry now, from sending a representative. De Richelieu is, however, very much in favor of sending the Valkyren. He is a great admirer of the United States and as I think you know, the principal influence in the councils of the Scandinavian-American Line.
I have [etc.]