Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

44. Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency¹

Washington, undated

U.S. Information Policy in Vietnam

American government policy on information matters in Vietnam is based on maximum candor and fullest disclosure of the facts consistent with national security interests.

This policy represents a realistic assessment of the role that information activities must play if Vietnamese and American efforts to check communist aggression are to succeed. These efforts must be understood by the Vietnamese people, who are bearing the main burdens of the war. Secondly, they must be understood by the American people who are providing the bulk of outside assistance. Finally, these efforts need the support of the allies of Vietnam and the United States. The chances for success in Vietnam will be seriously compromised if any of these groups feel that they are “not getting the facts,” that the true situation is being concealed or that they are being misled. Therefore, the policy of maximum candor and full disclosure makes sense not only as a traditional element of U.S. government information policies but also as a requirement for the prosecution of a hard, dirty war.

This is what is being done. There is no censorship of news copy. There is no “managed news,” no attempt to blink at unsavory facts. The only restriction on newsmen is a request for their voluntary cooperation in matters directly affecting the security of U.S. and Vietnamese forces in the country. Aside from this, newsmen are given a full briefing by a top-level Embassy spokesman on all aspects of U.S. activities in Vietnam once a day, and more often as required. In addition to these briefings, the Embassy makes a continuing effort to get newsmen to the scene of activities outside the Saigon area: the major restriction here is the problem of physical security in areas where Viet Cong guerrillas are active.

These arrangements have been worked out over a period of several years, largely as a result of requests by American and other journalists covering the war. Their chief complaint was the lack of overall coordination of official U.S. news output, with the result that, on occasion, spokesmen for individual elements of the American Mission were telling only parts of the story, sometimes in incorrect and contradictory fashion.

To meet newsmen’s desires for a more orderly arrangement, the American Embassy instituted new procedures in June 1964.² The key element in these arrangements was reaffirming and strengthening the Ambassador’s traditional role as the authorized official spokesman for the United States. This role is particularly complex in Vietnam where the Ambassador is in charge of a complex mission comprising both military and civilian elements responsible to a half-dozen Washington agencies. In order that these elements might speak with one voice—i.e., the Ambassador’s—the then-Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, designated the director of USIS, Barry Zorthian, as his spokesman for the entire mission. Mr. Zorthian, who is a Minister-Counselor of the Embassy, not only coordinates information output within the American Mission but also with his counterparts in the South Vietnamese government. This latter factor is an important one in setting U.S. information policy in Vietnam. Our actions must be guided by the fact that we are in Vietnam in an advisory, not a command capacity. Secondly, our ideas on information policies do not always coincide with those of South Vietnamese officials.

With the commencement of air strikes and the further build-up of American forces in South Vietnam early in 1965, these procedures were further refined. The idea of instituting censorship procedures to meet the new security factors involved was reviewed and rejected. The emphasis, as in the past, was placed on voluntary cooperation by the newsmen in respecting the security requirements of individual U.S. installations in South Vietnam. Thus the policy of maximum candor and full disclosure was once again reaffirmed.

The consensus of newsmen, both American and foreign, in South Vietnam is that they are getting an accurate running account of U.S. government operations under this arrangement. They may have individual complaints about alleged gaps in Embassy news output, but by and large they agree that the framework for this output, with its reliance on a single authoritative spokesman, is a good one. There is particular praise for the manner in which Barry Zorthian has handled his duties. The New York Times (April 30, 1965) praised “the major improvements brought by a new civilian information chief in Saigon.”³ The difficulties Zorthian and his associates have in providing newsmen with a complete picture of American activities in South Vietnam have been noted succinctly by Frank McCulloch in the May 7, 1965 issue of Time: “I think pointing a finger of blame at any of the exasperated parties in the press-USIS-military conflict is a serious mistake. No one is really at fault. It is just Vietnam.” Despite the Embassy’s attempts to meet these difficult conditions, some criticism continues. In most cases, this criticism is uninformed or is based on the critic’s willingness to ignore the facts. It is useful to review, briefly, the main criticisms.

1. Censorship. The critics claim it exists. It doesn’t. No copy coming in or going out of the country is censored by anyone, American or Vietnamese. Newsmen have been briefed on the need for their voluntary cooperation in matters involving security matters; they have been given the ground rules. These rules have been broken by some American and other newsmen, i.e., the disclosure of the use of highly-classified U.S. military equipment. In such instances, the Embassy has little recourse but to remind the offenders of the consequences of their actions for the war effort. Under existing rules, no disciplinary action is taken, nor is any plan for such action being considered at this time.

2. USIS Role. Another criticism is that USIS should not have the “authorized spokesman” responsibility since its major job is to “put the best face” on American government actions for overseas audiences. Therefore, the argument goes, the American people are being propagandized by their own overseas information agency. This ignores two basic facts. The first is that, for over two decades, USIS public affairs officers at our embassies all over the world have been the official spokesmen to both American and local newsmen. Mr. Zorthian’s position is, in this regard, no different from that of his USIS counterparts in 105 other countries. The second fact is that USIS is not in the business of handing out two versions of the truth, one for American newsmen and the other for local journalists. Any attempts to set up such a double system would be, in one word, disastrous.

3. Escorts. A frequent criticism is that the mission requires that American newsmen be accompanied by “escorts” when they visit military installations in Vietnam. In general, such escorts have not been assigned to newsmen; when they have, their role has been to facilitate newsmen’s access to military facilities.

4. Transportation. The charge here is that USIS and the Embassy do not provide transportation for newsmen to visit areas outside Saigon. The fact is that such facilities are provided whenever feasible. USIS played a major role in assuring access by newsmen to the Da Nang base. In other areas, the Embassy arranges transport for newsmen whenever possible. The major restriction is the fact that the Vietnam war is a war of small scattered actions taking place over an immense territory. There are, however, no restrictions on the movement of newsmen throughout the country.

In summary, there are information problems in Vietnam and there doubtless always will be as long as the war goes on. However, considerable progress has been made. Suspicions and antagonisms which once characterized relations between the American Embassy and newsmen have been largely dissipated. Unrealistic and unnecessary restrictions have been lifted. Most importantly, the American government now speaks with one voice in South Vietnam in a way that provides a full, credible account of our efforts to assist that troubled country.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Advisory Commission—Information—1965. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. Rowan sent a copy of the paper to Stanton under a May 5 covering memorandum. In it Rowan indicated that following the April 26 U.S. Advisory Commission on Information meeting, he had asked his staff to “prepare a summary of U.S. information policies in Vietnam” for the commission members. Copies were also sent to Olom, Moore, Larmon, Hoyt, Novik and Chandler. (Ibid.)
2. The new procedures are detailed in a June 4 memorandum from Rowan to Johnson and a June 6 telegram from the Department of State to Saigon; both are printed, respectively, as Documents 197 and 203 in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964.
3. The complete quote in the April 30 editorial is: “Misleading information—foisted upon the nation in past years—continues on a reduced scale, despite major improvements brought by a vigorous, new civilian information chief in Saigon.” (“Information for What?” New York Times, April 30, 1965, p. 34)