Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

172. Talking Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency¹

No. 35

Washington, December 13, 1967

VIET-NAM IN PERSPECTIVE

(1) QUESTION: Why is the United States fighting in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: In the most basic terms: The U.S. is in Viet-Nam because (a) the peace and security of Southeast Asia are vital to the U.S. national interest; (b) the U.S. has solemn commitments to aid South Viet-Nam (SVN) against aggression; we will keep our pledge to assist SVN, as we would assist other nations with whom we have similar commitments through agreements and treaties; (c) we believe that nations, large and small, have the right to chart their own destinies without the threat of external force and interference.

Because we have a vital interest in the peace and security of Southeast Asia, we joined other powers in signing the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) of 1954, which the U.S. Senate approved by an 82-to-1 vote.²

One of the most important provisions of that treaty states that “each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area . . . would endanger its own peace and safety,” and, in that event, would “act to meet the common danger.” A protocol, signed and approved with the treaty, extended this provision to the non-Communist states of former French Indo-China (Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia).³

At the request of the Government of SVN, and in keeping with our SEATO obligations, we went to the aid of South Viet-Nam when that country was subjected to “aggression by means of armed attack” from the north. We are helping the people of South Viet-Nam and their government to defend themselves against aggression directed, politically and militarily, and largely supplied by North Viet-Nam. The so-called “war of national liberation” in Viet-Nam is nothing more than a new form of aggression.

We seek only to help the South Vietnamese people control their own destiny, determine their own future, lead their own lives as they choose and not as imposed by Hanoi. We do not seek to overthrow or destroy the Government of North Viet-Nam. We are determined to prevent its aggression from succeeding.

(2) QUESTION: Is there really any legal basis for U.S. military aid to South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: U.S. actions are justified under the SEATO Treaty, the Geneva Accords of 1954, and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The right of self-defense against armed attack is recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense . . .”).

North Viet-Nam violated the Geneva accords in instigating, directing and sustaining armed attack against South Viet-Nam.⁴ As the victim of armed attack, South Viet-Nam has the right of self-defense, and to have the assistance of others in that defense. South Viet-Nam asked for such assistance. In line with Article IV of the SEATO Treaty, the U.S. and four other SEATO members have undertaken to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.”

In addition, on August 10, 1964, the U.S. Congress—with only two dissenting votes—authorized U.S. participation in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.⁵

(3) QUESTION: If the war in Viet-Nam is such a threat to Asia, why have so few SEATO members joined the U.S. in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom have not contributed militarily to Viet-Nam. All the other SEATO signatories—the U.S., Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand—have troops in South Viet-Nam. Thus, all five Asian-Pacific members of SEATO are fighting side by side with South Vietnamese troops.

South Korea, with some 48,000 front-line troops, is making a major contribution in South Viet-Nam.

Other Asian nations—Japan, the Republic of China, and Malaysia—have supplied medical teams, technicians, advisers, and economic and educational assistance to South Viet-Nam.

In all, more than 30 countries are providing South Viet-Nam with non-military assistance in one form or another. More than two dozen medical and surgical teams from various countries are working in South Viet-Nam, caring for civilian needs as well as military casualties.

Among the non-Asian contributors of assistance are Canada, the German Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, and the Netherlands. These countries have sent doctors, nurses, teachers, agricultural advisers, engineers and other technical personnel to help bring a better life to all the South Vietnamese.

(4) QUESTION: Why is the U.S. reluctant to bring the question of peace in Viet-Nam before the United Nations?

ANSWER: There is no reluctance on the part of the U.S. We have repeatedly sought to move the Viet-Nam conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. On January 31, 1966, the U.S. formally requested the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) to consider the Viet-Nam problem, and to recommend steps toward a peaceful solution.⁶ In September of 1967 the U.S. again circulated a draft UNSC resolution aimed at bringing peace to Viet-Nam, based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962.⁷

However, Hanoi, Peking and Moscow have repeatedly opposed submission of the Viet-Nam problem to the U.N.⁸

Since the summer of 1964 Hanoi has taken the position that (a) the U.N. is not competent to deal with the Viet-Nam problem, and (b) Hanoi would consider null and void any Security Council resolution on the Viet-Nam question. During the February 1–2, 1966, Security Council discussions of the U.S. draft resolution on steps toward peace, the Soviet Union opposed the inclusion of the resolution in the Council’s agenda. France took a similarly negative attitude.⁹

(5) QUESTION: If the United Nations approach is not possible, why doesn’t the U.S. agree to a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference to discuss possible peace negotiations?

ANSWER: The U.S. would welcome the reconvening of such a conference to discuss Viet-Nam and the future of Southeast Asia. The United States has made this clear on numerous occasions.

In fact the U.K., a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, has sought to reconvene such a conference—only to be rebuffed in this endeavor by the other co-chairman, the Soviet Union. Like the USSR, Hanoi has opposed the Geneva Conference approach, stating its refusal to take part in such a meeting.

(6) QUESTION: Isn’t Hanoi’s refusal to participate based largely on U.S. refusal to recognize the right of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) to take part?

ANSWER: President Johnson has said that inclusion of the NLF in peace talks does not pose an “insurmountable problem,” and that the Viet Cong (VC) “would have no difficulty in being represented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression.”¹⁰

On November 2, 1967, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, made it clear that the United States “would not stand in the way” of a Security Council invitation to the NLF. Furthermore, Ambassador Goldberg, in expressing U.S. willingness for the reconvening of the General [Geneva?] Conference, stated that the U.S. “would recognize the competence of the conferees (the co-chairmen, the Soviet Union and Britain) to decide the invitees and the scope” of the discussions.¹¹

(7) QUESTION: Why does the U.S. refuse to accept the NLF as the representative of a considerable segment of the population of South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The NLF itself claims to be the sole legitimate representative of all the South Vietnamese, not just a portion of them.

But the South Vietnamese do not accept the NLF as their “sole representative” or “only legitimate voice.” South Viet-Nam has many groups with different religious and ethnic origins, including Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Cambodians, and Montagnards. These groups, and certainly the almost one million refugees who fled from North Viet-Nam to the south in 1954–55, do not recognize the NLF as their “sole” spokesman.

(8) QUESTION: What evidence is there that the Saigon government has any better claim than the NLF to be the “sole” representative of the people of South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: In the summer of 1967, 83 per cent of 5.8 million registered South Vietnamese voters elected a government of their own choice.

Of course those South Vietnamese in areas under Viet Cong control were unable either to register or to vote. But of those who were free of Viet Cong control and eligible to register, some 70 per cent did register. And 83 per cent of the registered electorate cast ballots for leaders of their choice.

That choice was a clear rejection of the NLF’s claim to represent the South Vietnamese people. Through assassinations, kidnapping, and other forms of intimidation, the Viet Cong tried to disrupt the elections in areas they did not control. Most of the eligible voters were not deterred from making their choice. The turnout at the polls shows that the Viet Cong not only failed in their objective but do not have the popular support they claim.

Under the circumstances, the elections were almost a miracle in politics. In the midst of a cruel, mean guerrilla war, under constant Viet Cong terror and threat, it took courage to vote. Nevertheless the elections took place, and provided an example of free choice in democratic diversity.

There was ample diversity, a wide range of choice, in those elections. There were “peace” candidates, and “hawks” as well. In both the presidential and assembly elections there were many issues, many proposals, many candidates. The new Saigon government and its leaders represent the outcome—the product of the determined exercise of free choice by the South Vietnamese who were free to choose.

(9) QUESTION: Hanoi termed the elections a “farce,” and denounced the victors—Generals Thieu and Ky—as “puppets.” Isn’t there some basis for such charges?

ANSWER: One can understand why Hanoi resorted to such bitter denunciations, for it failed completely in its objective of disrupting the elections.

Surely, if the elections were rigged, General Thieu would have far outdistanced all opposition. As it was, he drew only 35 per cent of the total vote for president. He was one of 11 candidates for the post, and the people naturally scattered their votes. But the fact that the voters gave him 35 per cent of the total—twice the vote for his nearest rival—can be considered a very substantial demonstration of popular support.

Hanoi and the NLF are quick to criticize elections in South Viet-Nam. The fact remains that there have never been free elections either in North Viet-Nam or in areas under Viet Cong military control. Some 500 foreign newsmen and observers who witnessed the elections in South Viet-Nam concluded that these were generally fair and free. This means that irregularities which occurred were certainly no more serious than those which figure in elections in highly developed democratic countries with long histories of free elections.

(10) QUESTION: Didn’t the election of Generals Thieu and Ky merely perpetuate military rule?

ANSWER: The South Vietnamese people have civilian constitutional government now. The Constituent Assembly worked hard and long to evolve a strong constitution. South Viet-Nam’s elected bicameral legislature is a guarantee against one-man rule or rule by any one group, including the military.

The members of the Senate and House represent many different elements of Vietnamese society. There is no single “military” bloc. Those military men who were elected could not have won without civilian support. Eleven out of sixty elected senators are military or former military men; 30 of the 137 elected representatives have a military background.

The fact is that neither President Thieu nor Vice-President Ky controls a dominant bloc in either the Senate or House. And in selecting his cabinet, President Thieu gave ministries to only three military men; 24 to civilians. The Prime Minister is a Southern Buddhist civilian, Nguyen Van Loc. Other civilians head the key ministries of foreign affairs, of justice, and of all the ministries controlling the economic and educational life of the country.

The cabinet is representative of the varied religious, regional and ethnic groupings in Viet-Nam. There are twelve southerners, ten northerners, and seven central Vietnamese. There is a rough balance between Buddhist and Catholic representation. Ethnic Montagnards and Chinese also are represented.

(11) QUESTION: Why are you bombing North Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The primary purpose of the bombing is to make infiltration from north to south more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese army. The targets are bridges, supply depots, munitions factories, roads leading south, and truck convoys and trains moving in the same direction. Every possible precaution is taken to prevent bombs from falling on nonmilitary targets.

(12) QUESTION: Hanoi claims the U.S. has a deliberate policy of hitting targets that are not even remotely connected with the war effort, and that hospitals have been a prime U.S. target. Isn’t that true?

ANSWER: It is entirely possible and most regrettable that some civilian targets may have been inadvertently hit, either by stray bombs or by NVN anti-aircraft ordnance which comes to earth after failing to hit its targets. It is not true that U.S. bombing is aimed at civilian targets. None of the foreign diplomats and news correspondents from neutral countries in Hanoi has accused the U.S. of deliberately bombing civilian targets.

While there have been mistakes, for no airmen are infallible, these errors hardly compare with the deliberate Viet Cong policy of terrorism against civilians in South Viet-Nam. Since 1958, 58,000 civilians have been killed or kidnapped in the course of the Viet Cong’s continuing, systematic, premeditated program of assassination and intimidation.

(13) QUESTION: You say the U.S. is bombing North Viet-Nam to halt the flow of men and supplies to the south, but you acknowledge that such infiltration continues. Doesn’t this show that the policy of bombing has failed?

ANSWER: The U.S. has never claimed that its aircraft could or would halt infiltration entirely. Defense Secretary McNamara has said repeatedly that the primary objective of U.S. air action over North Viet-Nam is to reduce the flow of continued infiltration of men and supplies from the north to South Viet-Nam, and to increase the cost of such infiltration. The bombing makes it clear to the North Vietnamese leaders that, so long as they continue their aggression against the South, they have to pay a price in the north.

Weighed against its stated objectives, the bombing campaign has been successful. The North Vietnamese have paid, and will continue to pay, a high price for their continued aggression. It has been made abundantly clear to Hanoi’s leaders that they cannot expect North Viet-Nam to remain a sanctuary while North Vietnamese forces conduct operations freely outside their own territory.

Complete interdiction of the flow of men and supplies from north to south has never been considered possible by U.S. military leaders. The air assaults, however, have made North Vietnamese infiltration increasingly difficult and costly.

(14) QUESTION: Many countries have urged the U.S. to stop bombing North Viet-Nam. Why do you ignore such pleas?

ANSWER: President Johnson has said the U.S. is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions—provided that, while the discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. The U.S. and many other countries consider this a reasonable and fair proposition.

If Hanoi is interested in peace, all it would have to say is “Yes,” publicly or privately, to the President’s offer. Unfortunately, Hanoi has not responded affirmatively to this or any other proposals made by the Vietnamese Government, the U.S., the U.N. Secretary General, Pope Paul, and other governments and groups—all striving for peace in Southeast Asia.

(15) QUESTION: The leaders in Hanoi and some other capitals have said talks could start when you stop bombing. You ignore this signal, and insist that Hanoi accept your conditions. Why are you so adamant about demanding a specific concession from Hanoi to stop bombing?

ANSWER: There has been considerable misunderstanding of what Hanoi has said, or is supposed to have said, on the question of bombing and talks.

Hanoi insists that the U.S. stop bombing, permanently and unconditionally. Hanoi has said this over and over. In responding on February 15, 1967, to a letter from President Johnson proposing the start of discussions toward peace, Ho Chi Minh demanded unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other military activity of the U.S. troops and the other allies of South Viet-Nam.¹²

As Ambassador Goldberg pointed out at the U.N. on September 21, 1967, Hanoi in its public statements “has merely indicated that there ‘could’ be negotiations if the bombing stopped.” Some governments and individuals had expressed their belief or assumption that negotiations “would” begin if bombings were halted. Ambassador Goldberg commented:

“We have given these expressions of belief our most careful attention, but no such third party—including those governments which are among Hanoi’s closest friends—has conveyed to us any authoritative message from Hanoi that there would in fact be negotiations if the bombing were stopped. We have sought such a message directly from Hanoi without success.”¹³

Secretary of State Rusk has stated:

“We’ve made it very clear that, as a step toward peace, we are prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam. If anyone anywhere in the world can demonstrate that stopping the bombing is a step toward peace, they will have no difficulty in Washington.”¹⁴

In fact, the U.S. has stopped bombing on five occasions, ranging from two days in one period to 37 days in another, without any positive response from Hanoi.

What the GVN and its allies need to know is what will happen if the bombing stops. There is no word from Hanoi, however, nor from any power which has Hanoi’s confidence.

(16) QUESTION: You claim you would do anything possible to promote peace, yet you won’t halt the bombing of North Viet-Nam. How do you reconcile these views?

ANSWER: You can’t expect the U.S. to stop the bombing permanently without some reciprocity to relieve the beleaguered South Vietnamese. This is not likely to contribute toward peace.

Mr. Rusk’s explanation of the U.S. view on this aspect of the situation:

“For us to say, ‘We will stop, you go right ahead with your war; you live there safely and comfortably, without being disturbed, while you send men and arms into South Viet-Nam for the next 50 years’—where would be the incentive for peace?

“Now, we are interested in peace; we are not interested in a sanctuary which will let them carry on these operations against South Viet-Nam and Laos for eternity, while they sit there in a sanctuary taking their own time, paying no price, trying to seize their neighbors by force.”¹⁵

That is why the U.S. needs something more than a vague indication from Hanoi that talks could possibly start if the bombing stopped. Cessation of bombing, without any concrete reciprocal action from the other side, does not appear to be a fruitful way to move toward peace.

(17) QUESTION: It seems to me that you talk a lot about peace and continue to escalate the war. Thus, you make the prospect of peace increasingly difficult. How sincere can your peace gestures really be?

ANSWER: The U.S. proposals for peace negotiations have been openly, fully and clearly spelled out by President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and other top U.S. officials.

On November 11, 1967, President Johnson stated that the U.S. would be ready and willing to meet with the other side on a neutral ship, in neutral waters, to discuss peace negotiations.¹⁶ That proposal was another in a series of pledges he has made to go anywhere at any time to begin discussions with North Vietnamese representatives.

Unconditional discussions have been proposed more than 30 times by the U.S. itself and, collectively and individually, by nations of the West, and nonaligned or neutral countries. Some Communist countries have sought to bring the Viet-Nam issue to the conference table. World leaders, among them Pope Paul VI and U.N. Secretary General U Thant, have exerted their influence to bring about negotiations.

The U.S. welcomed all such initiatives but Hanoi rejected them.

All Hanoi has to do to test U.S. sincerity is to agree to discuss, with the government of South Viet-Nam and its allies, a settlement or even the conditions for a settlement.

(18) QUESTION: You place great emphasis on the U.S. “commitment” in South Viet-Nam. Doesn’t this commitment increase the risk of world war?

ANSWER: We believe the possibility of world conflict would increase if the U.S. abandoned its commitments in Asia, Europe or elsewhere. The U.S. has allies around the world. It cannot consider some of its commitments less firm or less important than others.

If on several occasions the Soviet Union had not believed that the U.S. meant what it said about Berlin, or if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed President Kennedy’s statement that Soviet missiles had to be removed from Cuba,¹⁷ general war could have resulted. In the same way, it is important that North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union place equal credence in the determination of the U.S. to fulfill its commitments in Southeast Asia.

Thus, it is clearly in the interest of world peace that the U.S. live up to its commitments.

(19) QUESTION: Isn’t it a fact that neither the U.S. nor South Viet-Nam ever signed the Geneva Accords of 1954? Does this account for the failure of the U.S. in 1956 to support free elections in Viet-Nam, although the Accords called for such elections?

ANSWER: The powers represented at the Geneva Conference of 1954 were Cambodia, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Agreements reached during the conference were summarized in a Final Declaration which bore no signatures at all.

The Agreements called for provisional partition of Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel. They called for an end to all hostilities in the country, and for the formation of an International Control Commission—comprising representatives of Canada, India, and Poland—to supervise the execution of the agreements. The Final Declaration of the conference called for free elections in 1956 to bring about unification of Viet-Nam.

At that time South Viet-Nam not only protested the partitioning of the country, but also emphasized the impossibility of holding free elections in the Communist-controlled north. Therefore SVN did not accept the Final Declaration. The United States did not join in the Final Declaration because of reservations about certain features of the Accords—in particular, their failure to include United Nations supervision of the proposed 1956 elections. The United States, however, issued a unilateral declaration¹⁸ stipulating that the U.S. would (a) refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the Geneva Agreements, but (b) view any renewal of aggression in violation of the accords as seriously threatening international peace and security.

By 1956, when the elections were to be held, the situation in North Viet-Nam showed that free elections were in fact not possible in the north. Under such conditions, the RVN did not consider itself obliged to take part in elections which (a) could not be free, (b) would greatly favor more populous North Viet-Nam, and (c) could only result in the takeover of South Viet-Nam by the Hanoi regime.

For its part the U.S. advocates free elections today, as it did in 1954. The U.S. said in 1954:

“In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.”¹⁹

And that is the U.S. stand today.

(20) QUESTION: Aren’t the Viet Cong, in reality, revolutionaries engaged in a war of national liberation?

ANSWER: In Communist terminology, a “war of national liberation” means a war to achieve eventual Communist control. This clearly applies to the Viet-Nam war.

In an article written for Pravda on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ho Chi Minh said that victory in a “war of national liberation” can be won only when it has developed into a Communist revolution. Ho wrote:

“Only with the leadership of a party that knows how to apply Marxism-Leninism in a creative manner to the practical conditions of the country is it possible to bring the national liberation revolution to victory and the socialist revolution to success.”

A war of national liberation, therefore, is the form of aggression which stimulates and exploits dissidence and violence within a non-Communist state in order to subvert that state. It uses the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It readily serves the purposes of a disciplined minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

The nature of the conflict in South Viet-Nam is very clear. The “liberation” proposed by Hanoi and the so-called “National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam” means a Communist takeover of SVN by force, and an end to the free choice of the South Vietnamese in determining how they will live and govern themselves.

(21) QUESTION: Who, then, are the Viet Cong?

ANSWER: Viet Cong means Vietnamese Communist. It refers to the military forces and political cadres of the National Liberation Front. The NLF is the invention and instrument of the Lao Dong—the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam. The NLF is designed to cloak Hanoi’s continuing efforts to overthrow the government in the south, establish a Communist regime, and unify the country under the government in Hanoi.

(22) QUESTION: What proof have you that Hanoi invented the NLP and now controls it? Many people believe that the NLF is a genuine South Vietnamese indigenous nationalist movement.

ANSWER: In 1959, Hanoi openly called for “national liberation” of the south, using (a) an estimated 5,000 Communist cadre left in South Viet-Nam after the 1954 division, and (b) additional cadre infiltrated from the north. This 1959 decision was best described by North Viet-Nam’s military leader, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who said:

“The north is the revolutionary base for the whole country.”

In establishing the National Liberation Front in 1960, Hanoi sought to create the fiction that the north was not directing the effort in the south. The NLF attracted a following by skillful organization and propaganda, selectively reinforced by the use of terrorism; and by exploiting the theme of social injustice, with promises of a variety of economic and government “reforms.” Much of the following of the NLF has been involuntary. Thousands of former Viet Cong have testified that they were driven to cooperate by fear of reprisals against them or their families. Viet Cong claims of widespread popular support also are tellingly refuted by the absence in the NLF’s leadership of any Vietnamese of national stature.

In 1961, Hanoi sought to convince the world that the NLF was a genuinely indigenous southern, nationalist movement. It did this by creating the name “People’s Revolutionary Party” (PRP) for the principal element of the NLF, which until then had been the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party of NVN. A captured secret document of the Lao Dong Party, the North Vietnamese Communist Party, disclosed the facts. The document revealed that in November, 1961, the Party’s Central Committee passed a resolution which makes clear that the PRP differed only in name from the Lao Dong Party:

“It must be clearly understood that this is only a name change. Although the overt name is different from what it is in North Viet-Nam, nevertheless, secretly . . . the party segment in South Viet-Nam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under the leadership of the party Central Committee, headed by Chairman Ho . . . . Except for the name, there is no change whatever.”

(23) QUESTION: You insist that Hanoi controls the NLF and directs the war in the south; yet Hanoi does not admit it has troops in South Viet-Nam. How can Hanoi control the war without the use of its own regulars?

ANSWER: From prisoners, documents, films and numerous defectors, we have solid proof of the presence in South Viet-Nam of about 55,000 North Vietnamese army regulars. We know the numbers of their divisions and regiments, and even the dates when they entered the south. We know that other regulars from NVN—in addition to the 55,000—serve in Viet Cong ranks. We have photos and films of North Vietnamese generals, including the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh, directing North Vietnamese troops in the south. We have orders and various memoranda sent to these troops and to the VC from Hanoi.

Since the 1959 decision in Hanoi to launch a major military campaign in the south, more than 100,000 fighting men and tons of military equipment and supplies have been moved into the south from the north.

In June, 1962, the Indian and Canadian members of the International Control Commission—with the Poles dissenting—investigated South Vietnamese charges of North Vietnamese activities in the south.²⁰ The Indians and Canadians concluded:

“In specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the north to the Zone in the south, with the object of carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the south. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.”

Since 1962, more evidence has rapidly accumulated. We can now reconstruct the chain of events that led to the current presence in the south of more than 55,000 North Vietnamese regulars.

Early in 1964, the Communists believed that an NLF victory in the south was imminent. South Viet-Nam was in a state of grave political unrest. The Diem regime had fallen, the Viet Cong had stepped up subversion and terror, and the South Vietnamese army had suffered numerous setbacks. Sensing that victory was possible, Hanoi committed regular troops and vast new resources for a final blow. Documents prove that this decision was made early in 1964—well before the first U.S. combat units arrived in South Viet-Nam in May, 1965.

Prisoners from the 95th Regiment and 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) have revealed they were being prepared for infiltration in April, 1964. The first regular NVA units began arriving in the south in November, 1964. The first complete tactical unit of the NVA—the 808th Battalion, with cadre drawn largely from the 325th Division—reached the south in November, 1964; it was joined the following month by other elements of the 325th Division, including the 95th Regiment.

The trickle soon became a steady flow. By the end of 1965, there were some 26,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars in the south; in 1966, more than 40,000. In 1965, NVA regulars comprised about one-fourth of the total main-force Communist strength in the south. By the end of 1966, there were 63 NVA battalions and 83 Viet Cong battalions. In all, the NVA regulars then constituted almost 43 per cent of the Communist main force. And this proportion rose to 45 per cent by mid-1967.

(24) QUESTION: Still, the number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces does not approach the total of South Vietnamese, U.S. and other forces in South Viet-Nam. Doesn’t this indicate that the Viet Cong have been able to continue their operations because, unlike the Saigon government, they have the support of the masses?

ANSWER: There is little evidence of popular support for the VC. Why should the peasants support the VC, who have killed or kidnapped 58,000 South Vietnamese peasants, village officials and local government workers since 1958? Why support the VC, who are now levying taxes at a rate higher than Saigon’s rate, and who are even now forcing South Vietnamese youth to join their forces?

The Viet Cong today control at best some 17 per cent of the population in SVN. The VC method of control remains, basically, the use and threat of terror. It is not surprising that the VC are now losing the support of the rural population. And it is quite natural that, as the VC situation becomes more desperate, Viet Cong defections have increased. In 1964 there were 5,417 Viet Cong defectors; 11,124 in 1965; 20,242 in 1966. During the first 10 months of 1967, twenty-five thousand VC gave up and rallied to the GVN under its “Chieu Hoi”—“Open Arms”—program.

In 1966, the GVN controlled areas inhabited by about 55 per cent of the population. By November, 1967, it controlled about 67 per cent, with the Viet Cong holding only 17 per cent, and the remainder in contested areas.

(25) QUESTION: The U.S. has repeatedly said this war must be won by the South Vietnamese. Yet it has became an American war, with many more Americans dying in the war now than Vietnamese. How can you say it is not a U.S. war?

ANSWER: During the first six months of 1967, the weekly average of South Vietnamese killed in action was 213; of Americans, 188.

From June through September, 1967, the weekly average of South Vietnamese killed in action was 172; of Americans, 162.

In 1966 a total of 8,679 South Vietnamese were killed in action. During the same period, 7,901 Americans were killed in action.

The primary task of the U.S. forces has been to oppose the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in major military engagements, and to search out and destroy the enemy in his camps and bases. The U.S. has air power to concentrate on this aspect of the war.

The South Vietnamese army is concentrating on the defense of villages and hamlets, a task which includes clearing areas of the enemy and holding areas from the enemy. Such engagements are just as deadly, just as bloody as major operations, and perhaps even more difficult than major operations.

Some South Vietnamese units are not so tough as they should be, and the South Vietnamese leaders themselves know this. But other units are showing courage and determination. The South Vietnamese soldier’s morale is mounting. Desertions from the South Vietnamese army, once a problem, have greatly decreased. The South Vietnamese soldier has improved markedly since early 1965, when the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were making military gains. And the South Vietnamese soldier is continuing to show increasing promise as a skillful, effective fighter.

(26) QUESTION: What is being done to improve the life of the average South Vietnamese, especially of the peasants?

ANSWER: In the midst of a brutal war, with its demand for tremendous sacrifices and great drain of manpower, the GVN has been moving ahead—slowly, but with great determination and increasing success—to improve social conditions. The United States and many other nations are giving the GVN considerable support in re-building and developing the country.

In the past two years, 42,000 peasants have been trained in improved farming techniques and animal husbandry. Almost 2,000 new hamlets have been built, providing a haven for some three and one-half million peasants to work the land. The farmers have greatly benefited from the building of 400 kilometers of canals, 100 dikes, 1,200 kilometers of roads. There have been noteworthy improvements in education, with 4,777 classrooms added in 1966 and 1967. Hamlet school teachers are being trained at the rate of 3,500 a year, and a massive textbook program is under way. By mid-1967, more than eight million school books were distributed.

Life in secured hamlets is being revitalized by trained teams of South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development (RD) workers who seek to advance the process of nation-building. More than 600 RD teams of 59 men each joined the program in 1967, as compared with 450 in 1966, and another 800 to 1,000 teams are expected to be added in 1968.

(27) QUESTION: Doesn’t the system of land tenure in South Viet-Nam continue to benefit rich landlords, not the poor peasants?

ANSWER: In the first six months of 1967, under a GVN program of redistributing state-held land, some 12,000 farm families had received such land. The GVN has given 93,000 families permanent titles to some 500,000 acres of other land—including squatter lands, former French-owned rice lands, and lands expropriated from landlords. Over 900,000 acres remain to be distributed, and the transfer of titles is continuing.

Actually, the GVN had already begun an enlightened land reform program earlier in the late 1950’s. All French-owned rice lands were expropriated; land holdings were limited to 250 acres, and rents to 25 per cent of the principal crop; tenant farmers were given substantial security of tenure. By 1961 a majority of farm families owned at least part of the land they farmed, and rented lands belonged to the small local farmer, not to absentee landlords. Unfortunately, the widespread insecurity of war made it difficult to enforce and re-establish effective administration in various areas.

Since 1965, the GVN has issued several decrees prohibiting the military from assisting in the collection of back rent, and exempting tenants from paying back rents for periods when the land was under Viet Cong control. There are provisions for providing land for tenants who had been given title illegally by the Viet Cong. In the richest rice-growing area of South Viet-Nam—the Mekong Delta—an aerial survey is under way to clarify the present pattern of land ownership. The survey will enable the government to grant permanent titles much more quickly to farmers who otherwise would have to wait years for a formal ground survey. Meanwhile, data on present land holdings are being collected systematically. The new data will help the GVN develop new land policies and to improve existing programs.

The GVN, therefore, fully recognizes that land tenure practices constitute a major rural issue, and is giving high priority to steps to improve the situation.

No one denies there are land problems in South Viet-Nam. But they are problems largely caused by the dislocation of war—lack of adequate rural administration, failure to implement existing legislation, inadequate data on land holdings.

(28) QUESTION: Are the small farmers gaining any benefit from the various programs?

ANSWER: The farmers themselves, with the help of GVN and U.S. experts, have established their own organizations—the Agricultural Cooperatives, the Farmers’ Association, and the Tenant Farmers Union.

These organizations are actively supporting fertilizer and corn-hog programs made possible by the creation of the Agricultural Development Bank, a public institution providing low-interest credits to enable the farmers to use fertilizers and other products to increase their productivity. In 1967 the supply of fertilizers was expected to increase by 50 per cent. The U.S. is supplying 300,000 tons of fertilizer, valued at over $35 million, to this effort. And the GVN is importing over 60,000 tons of feed corn to promote hog production.

As hostilities abate, these programs will spread, and the farmers will benefit more and more.

(29) QUESTION: How can you justify the deliberate destruction of rice fields and other crops by herbicide spraying? Isn’t this taking food from the mouths of poor farmers and their families, and gaining nothing but hostility?

ANSWER: The destruction of rice fields and other crops impedes the Viet Cong. Crop destruction has taken place only in areas fully controlled by the Viet Cong for a considerable period of time. There the harvested foodstuffs, used solely by the Viet Cong, sustain the attackers in their military operations and their acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. Farmers in areas where crops are to be destroyed are warned in advance and given assistance if they leave such areas and come under GVN protection as refugees.

(30) QUESTION: In addition to destroying crops, aren’t you also using defoliants over the jungle in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The heavy vegetation of many of the jungle and swamp areas in South Viet-Nam provides natural shelter for the Viet Cong guerrillas, and makes it easier for them to move without detection. The RVN has used chemicals against the shelter of natural growth, not against people; against the crops which the Viet Cong grow, not against the guerrillas themselves. The defoliant exposes the lurking marauder—it does not harm him, but makes it harder for him to carry out his destructive mission.

Chemical defoliants have been widely used as herbicides, or weed-killers, all over the world for more than 15 years. They are in regular use in such other Asian countries as Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

Use of herbicides is also widespread in the USSR. On March 5, 1962, then Premier Khrushchev, in a report to the Soviet Central Committee, urged that “herbicide production be placed on a wide industrial basis.”

(31) QUESTION: Why do you use poison gas against the other side? Don’t you adhere to the Geneva Conventions which prohibit this kind of warfare?

ANSWER: Neither the RVN nor any of its allies has used poison gas. Tear gas, which has been used on occasions against the Viet Cong, is neither lethal nor toxic.

To force the VC from tunnels and other hiding places, tear gas is sometimes used. Tear gas is a nontoxic agent which police forces use for riot control in almost every country of the world as a means of limiting violence and casualties. It causes tears and sneezing only; it produces no pain, burn or other harm; its effects last only a few minutes and leave no aftereffects. Its use is not contrary to any Geneva convention.

(32) QUESTION: Why are South Vietnamese and American soldiers so brutal or callous toward civilians? I have seen shocking films and photos of their behavior.

ANSWER: The task of South Vietnamese troops and their allies is to protect civilians, not brutalize them; to deter the terrorists, not emulate them. But, most regrettably, innocent civilians are sometimes caught in the crossfire and passions of any war.

Covering the South Vietnamese side of the war, newsmen and cameramen tend to focus on incidents involving civilians. Such incidents, because they are so infrequent, are especially newsworthy. Viet Cong brutality is less easily covered by foreign correspondents. The VC make sure that newsmen are not around to witness the terror killing of a RD worker, or of a district chief and his family. Viet Cong attacks are so numerous that they no longer make dramatic news.

The fact is that the South Vietnamese and their allies have provided some two million refugees from the Viet Cong with food, housing, education, training, and medical care. Of those two million, an estimated 1.2 million have been successfully resettled within South Viet-Nam even while that country fights for its national life.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 309, Master Copies, 1967. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. The Talking Paper was distributed by pouch to all USIS posts under cover of Infoguide 68–14, December 15. According to the Infoguide, Talking Paper No. 35 updated Talking Paper No. 27, “The Issues in Vietnam,” which was sent March 4, 1966, as Infoguide 66–7, a copy of which is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies, 1966.
2. See footnote 3, Document 124.
3. For text of the Protocol, see 6 U.S.T. 81.
4. For further information about the Geneva Accords, see footnote 2, Document 71.
5. Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or Joint Resolution 1145, “To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia.” See Document 26.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 59; and Earl W. Foell, “U.S. plea puzzles UN: Vietnam role uncertain,” Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1966, p. 1.
7. See Earl W. Foell, “UN sees U.S. Viet hope dim,” Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1967, p. 1.
8. See Robert H. Estabrook, “Gromyko Vows Aid to Hanoi,” Washington Post, September 23, 1967, p. A1.
9. See Carlyle Morgan, “Paris-Hanoi notes rouse speculation,” Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1966, p. 4.
10. Johnson made this statement during a July 28, 1965, press conference held in the East Room of the White House at 12:34 p.m. where he said: “We have stated time and time again that we would negotiate with any government, any place, any time. The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all. I think that could be worked out.” (Public Papers: Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 794–803)
11. See John W. Finney, “U.S. Says Vietcong Could Take Part in a Peace Parley,” New York Times, November 3, 1967, p. 1.
12. For an English translation of Ho Chi Minh’s letter to the President, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, attachment to Document 82.
13. See “Text of Goldberg’s Address to U.N. Assembly on Peace in Vietnam and Mideast,” New York Times, September 22, 1967, p. 16.
14. The quote is taken from Rusk’s July 19 news conference. However, the actual quote as reported in the Department of State Bulletin is: “We’ve made it very clear that we are prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace. If anyone anywhere in the world can demonstrate that stopping the bombing is a step toward peace, they will have no difficulty in Washington.” (August 7, 1967, pp. 159–167)
15. The quote is taken from Rusk’s October 12 news conference. (Department of State Bulletin, October 30, 1967, pp. 555–564)
16. Reference is to the 7:11 a.m. remarks the President made on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise: “The United States follows the dream of peace, so we include even the seas in our search. For us, the wardroom could easily be a conference room. A neutral ship on a neutral sea would be as good a meetingplace as any.” (Public Papers: Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 1017–1019)
17. Reference is to President Kennedy’s October 22, 1962, televised report on the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806–809)
18. Reference is to the July 21, 1954, declaration made by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith on behalf of the United States at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. For a text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, Indochina (In two parts), Document 1073.
19. This statement is part of the declaration cited in footnote 18 above.
20. See “Saigon Hails Report,” New York Times, June 26, 1962, p. 8.