102. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers)1
Responses have been coming in from all over the world to a State/USIA Circular asking for analyses of local attitudes toward the Vietnam conflict and recommendations concerning how Washington can improve its output. I think one or two responses are particularly worth calling to your attention.
Ambassador Bowles’ response is the best I have read. After reviewing the local situation concerning Indian attitudes toward Vietnam, Ambassador Bowles quickly reports on the measures he has taken in New Delhi to get our position across. He has done a lot. But his ideas about what we ought to do here in Washington are, perhaps, more pertinent.
He calls for a maximum emphasis on the efforts of the South Vietnamese Army and a playdown of the role of our forces. He strongly urges an even greater effort to publicize the positive efforts being made by the Vietnamese and Americans to improve the life of the people, to bring about social and political progress, etc.
Ambassador Bowles thinks we can improve reporting on the actual fighting by developing ways “less likely to strike adverse emotional chords.” The daily concentration on killing is what he had in mind. He emphasizes the harm done by photographs; they are “extremely costly.”
He calls for more emphasis on the bloody terroristic actions against villagers and civilians by the Communists and their attacks against economic growth, social reform, and political progress.
His next point is even more interesting. He calls for greater emphasis on the role of the Chinese. He says the war is an uneven contest, as it is now being reported, between the most powerful nations in the world and a tiny nation of farmers in North Vietnam. He would use the presence of the Chinese in North Vietnam, as well as their inflexibility against negotiations.
He would stress our treatment of POW’s in contrast with Hanoi’s.
[Page 310]In backgrounders, he thinks we should be far tougher about the Soviet failure to seek peace. He would create doubts about the Soviet desire for peace. While the Soviets denounce the Chinese as reckless dogmatists, they are in fact Peking’s captives: China tells Hanoi what to do, then Hanoi tells the Russians what to do. Skepticism of the Soviet bona fides is needed. “The point should be driven home over and over again that Kosygin and Brezhnev have taken no tangible steps toward a peaceful solution.”
We should stress relentlessly our continued efforts for a political solution. Next he wants illustrated feature articles in simple language stressing the massive economic development that can begin immediately after hostilities.
We should reiterate our support for a peace agreement that satisfies the governments of both South and North Vietnam, lessening the notion that this is an American war. He would somehow mute the emphasis on bombing which he feels underscores the notion that the basic contest is between big Uncle Sam and little Ho Chi Minh.
He thinks it is very important to avoid bombing civilian centers. He thinks hundreds of millions of people around the world admire the way the North Vietnamese are standing up to the bombing attacks. He would couple these attacks with their objective: to bring Hanoi to the peace table.
Moving away from Ambassador Bowles’ notions, the next best paper is from Ambassador Jim Bell in Malaysia. He points out that the Government of Malaysia continues its broad support for the United States in Vietnam. He reminds us that the Foreign Minister has recently publicly stated that South Vietnam would have fallen to Communist aggression if the United States had failed. Since the bombing the Malaysians have been more careful. Even so, the Foreign Ministry is preparing a White Paper to discuss the general power equation in Asia and why Malaysia must continue to support our effort in Vietnam.
Jim Bell thinks it is vital for Asian audiences to get across the absolute fact that we will remain in Vietnam until our objectives are achieved. Despite the President’s speeches some Malaysians still question that we will stick and not weary.
Ambassador Bell is also worried about the war looking white versus yellow. To correct this distortion he would send small groups of carefully selected Vietnamese students to Asian countries to explain the South Vietnamese fight for freedom. In reverse, he would invite Malaysian students to South Vietnam to areas outside Saigon, avoiding all Americans.
He wants more personalized attention to editors, politicians, officials, and professors on the part of our Embassy officials. He thinks [Page 311] that each American overseas should send personal notes to contacts, including useful articles and speeches of high quality. The audiences he has in mind are in policy-forming or influential positions.
He is worried about the extensive publicity given to body counts, number of tons of bombs dropped, etc., all of which tend to overshadow the “economic and social aspect of the U.S. effort which news media often ignore . . . serious consideration should be given to releasing only bi-weekly or monthly summaries of detailed statistics on casualties, etc.”
He would like a USIA film totally devoted to economic and social programs in Vietnam. He would like a series produced on a continuing basis. He says the best effort in Malaysia last year on behalf of South Vietnam was a USIA-produced movie, “Night of [the] Dragon,”2 shown on commercial circuits and television. He thinks MGM or Paramount ought to produce full-length films of that caliber for commercial showing.
Jim Bell calls for more consultation among the Allies to listen, to ponder, to measure the real feelings of ordinary men and women in Asia, quoting the Straits Times.3 To increase Asian involvement he would recommend personal correspondence by the President or Secretary Rusk to Asian leaders requesting their suggestions. He suggests visits by me or Secretary Rusk to Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and possibly Laos, not previously or recently visited. He would use these visits to explore views of Asian leaders not previously consulted. He suggests a conference of Asian and U.S. intellectuals, maybe at the East-West Center, to seek Asian views.
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Vietnam) 1966 July–August. No classification marking. Humphrey initialed the first page of the memorandum. Kintner sent a copy to Marks under an attached August 17 covering note indicating that the memorandum “will be of interest to you if you have not received a copy.” (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 71.↩
- One of the leading newspapers in Singapore, founded in 1845.↩