File No. 893.00/2512

Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State

No. 1155

Sir: In continuation of my despatch No. 1143 of the 14th instant, I have the honor to submit further observations on the present political situation. It is difficult to give any clear and definite information, as there are a great many currents and countercurrents of intrigue and influence, but the following notes are submitted for any value they may have in keeping the Department informed.

There are enclosed herewith two clippings from the Peking Gazette of to-day, dealing with the present situation.2 The breach between the Chin Pu Tang and the Kuo Min Tang has become still more apparent, and for the time being the advantage of political tactics seems to lie with the latter party. The rump parliament, which is to be convened to-morrow, will probably be controlled by the Kuo Min Tang leaders, who have secured the allegiance of His Excellency Sun Hung-yi, Minister of the Interior. This politician is not generally credited with a very high character; he formerly had Chin Pu Tang affiliations, but recently a violent wordy encounter occurred between him and Tang Hua-lung in Shanghai, in which they expressed quite frankly their opinion of each other. This sign of an evident breach was followed by Sun’s allying himself with the Kuo Min Tang, under Tang Shao-yi. It is believed that he carried with him nearly fifty per cent of the Chin Pu Tang parliamentarians, most of whom arrived under his aegis in Peking last week.

The game of the Chin Pu Tang to have their men appointed governors of the provinces in order to control the next parliamentary election has evidently aroused the other party, which now aims at not only controlling the present rump parliament, but the entire Government, including the provinces. The Chin Pu Tang members in parliament seem to be flirting with the monarchical members. The monarchists are, however, at heart entirely suspicious of and thoroughly opposed to both of the revolutionary parties.

His Excellency Tuan Chi-jui is kept in the Cabinet in order to control the military. It is believed that Tang Shao-yi desires to make His Excellency Feng Kuo-chang Minister of War. The other generals would, however, not be favorable to such a proposal. The military are maintaining a waiting attitude. Most of them seem to be persuaded that, with all the partisan bickerings and intrigues likely to be consequent upon the assemblage of Parliament, neither of the revolutionary parties will be able to maintain itself and that the balance of power will be in the hands of the military. Some of the latter are plainly in favor of a monarchical restoration. His Excellency Hsu Shih-chang, the ex-Premier, appears to be busier than he has been for years; his visitings and activities are believed to be relative to his loyalty to the Ching Family.

A Cabinet Minister stated to me that telegrams had been discovered which revealed an intrigue on the part of Liang Chi-chao to put Tuan Chi-jui in the place of President Li. Such a policy if [Page 91] really pursued could only be accounted for by a desire of Liang Chi-chao to ally himself with the military, utilizing the control exercised by General Tuan.

It is generally expected that should Tang Shao-yi become Premier, he would try entirely to dominate the political situation, with the result of thoroughly antagonizing the military party. In order to strengthen himself, he has come to an understanding with the most radical wing of the Kuo Min Tang, including Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing. He has of late constantly expressed himself as persuaded that the Japanese Government has entirely changed its attitude toward China; and that, having realized that a conquest or coercion of China is practically impossible, Japan will now pursue a policy of friendly cooperation. It would therefore appear that Mr. Tang is actually desirous of giving the Japanese the impression that he desires to cooperate with them. What his attitude would be after he should feel himself assured in power with certain assistance from Japanese sources, would remain to be seen. It is also believed here that before accepting the premiership, Mr. Tang would assure himself specifically of financial support from Japanese or other sources.

The situation for the next few weeks and also the political future of China in general is therefore quite uncertain. It is to be hoped that Parliament will disappoint its critics by not attempting to interfere with every branch of the Government, and that it may submit to the leadership of responsible and experienced men, themselves animated by a desire to put an end to factional fights and to begin constructive work. Most observers would say that this is probably too much to expect, yet there is undoubtedly a chance at hand to take a step in advance in the working of representative institutions in China, notwithstanding all the difficulties in view.

I have [etc.]

Paul S. Reinsch
  1. Not printed.