File No. 893.00/2491
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State
Peking, July 14, 1916.
Sir: In continuation of my despatch No. 1117 of the 14th ultimo, I have the honor further to report on the political situation and to enclose, for the information of the Department, copies of the following reports from the various consular offices in China.2 There is also enclosed an article, reprinted in the Peking Daily News of July 12,2 giving an account of the political action of the navy from the point of view of its leaders.
Immediately following the death of President Yuan Shih-kai, and continuing for about two weeks thereafter, there was a lull in the political controversies which promised fair for cooperation among the different political elements. But the opportunity was not taken advantage of by the President, who had not developed a definite policy of handling the situation and who was perplexed by contradictory counsels. Being of an optimistic temperament, he was, however, hopeful that all difficulties would shortly be settled. Meanwhile, as time elapsed, the mutual antagonisms which had preceded the death of President Yuan again emerged, and the leaders of the different factions became more and more specific in the demands which they made upon the Central Government. Having at first declared that the withdrawal of Yuan would completely satisfy them, the southern leaders now demanded the revival of the Provisional Constitution of 1912, and the resurrection of the Parliament, whose members’ legal terms of office, so far as the lower house is concerned, had already expired by limitation of the organic law. Still held in the background, but frequently hinted at, was the demand for the punishment of the leaders of the monarchical movement.
The principal members of the last Cabinet of President Yuan and the other political leaders who had supported him, were loyal in their efforts to support the legal authority of His Excellency Li Yuan-hung and to hand the Government over to their successors with as little disturbance as possible. On June 28, the day of the funeral of Yuan Shih-kai, I had an interview with the President during the afternoon, at which time he expressed his assurance of having found a way to secure the cooperation of all factions in the support of the Government. He stated to me at this time that while he would, by mandate, declare the Provisional Constitution of 1912 to be in force and while he would summon the rump parliament, it was his intention that the latter should act only in a quasi-constituent capacity for the purpose of amending the parliamentary [Page 87] election law to the end of reducing the membership in that body one-half; experience had shown the membership of the present Parliament to be too large for the efficient conduct of business. I asked the President whether he did not consider it impossible to confine the Parliament, when summoned, to so limited a function and whether it was not rather to be expected that it would attempt to exercise a controlling power in the Government, and whether, unless there was a definite policy and recognized leadership, there might not be danger of confusion. The President insisted that the Parliament would be confined to the specific function indicated by him. I was astonished to have the President insist, when the question of the legality of the Parliament was under discussion, that the term of only one-half of the members of the lower house had expired; this was a plain error, as the organic law is explicit in making the term of all members of the lower house three years.
The counsellors who have the greatest influence with the President are mostly men belonging to the Chin Pu Tang. It has been their effort to induce the President to recall the rump parliament in which the Chin Pu Tang faction has the large majority and also to prevail upon him to appoint members of their party to the governorships in the provinces. The activities of these leaders have caused the antagonism between the Chin Pu Tang and the Kuo Min Tang to revive, with the result that the Kuo Min Tang leaders in Shanghai are beginning to take a position of distinct hostility to the Chin Pu Tang, a frame of mind which has, however, revealed itself more in the inner intrigues than by outward manifestation.
The most remarkable incident during the last few weeks was the declaration on the part of the navy, under the leadership of Admiral Li Ting-hsin, to the effect that while it was completely loyal to the President, it declared its independence of the Cabinet at Peking, and would persist therein until certain political demands had been fulfilled. A defense of this action on the part of the navy is contained in the enclosed article from the Peking Daily Neios of July 12,2 but, aside from the more amusing features of the situation, it is a somewhat remarkable commentary on Chinese political thinking and acting that the navy should have been made use of for playing politics in this manner.
The effect of all these activities and intrigues upon the military party in the north may easily be imagined. With a definite and just policy announced and enforced by the President, the military would have had no alternative but obedience, as they have lacked the means for a revolt. But they must also be given the credit for having loyally accepted Li Yuan-hung as the legal occupant of the presidency. It must also be considered that the military leaders of the north have under their control about 200,000 troops, among whom no sign of disloyalty has as yet appeared. They are, at all events, an element to be considered. The interpretation of the southern leaders is that the military must be treated with suspicion, must be excluded from all influence over the Government, and may have to be punished for complicity in the monarchical movement. No matter how much one may sincerely sympathize with any genuine effort to place the Government of China on a purely civil basis and to confine the military [Page 88] to their proper functions, after a thorough reform of the abuses in the army, yet it would appear to be a policy of doubtful wisdom to drive these men into a hopeless opposition. It would seem far better thoroughly to reorganize the Government first, and gradually to introduce the reforms called for in the military system. It is to be feared that if the military are driven to extremes, they may again take refuge in the monarchical movement and this time restore the Manchu ruler, a step which would probably entail the division of China.
On June 30, the appointment of the following Cabinet was announced:
Minister of—
- Foreign Affairs, Tang Shao-yi (Chen Chin-tao to act)
- Interior, Hsu Shih-ying
- Finance, Chen Chin-tao
- War, Tuan Chi-jui
- Marine, Cheng Pi-kuang
- Justice, Chang Yao-tseng (Chang Kuo-kan to act)
- Education, Sun Hung-yi
- Agriculture and Commerce, Chang Kuo-kan
- Communications, Wang Ta-hsieh
This represented an offer to obtain cooperation between different elements and it achieved a complete exclusion of former monarchical leaders from the Government. But Mr. Tang Shao-yi, notwithstanding the prominent part he has taken in urging action upon the Government, has thus far declined to take responsibility. At the present time the Acting Cabinet is composed of the following members:
Premier Tuan Chi-jui
Ministry of—
- Foreign Affairs, Tang Shao-yi (Chen Chin-tao acting)
- Interior, Sun Hung-yi (Hsu Shih-ying acting)
- Finance, Chen Chin-tao
- War, Tuan Chi-jui
- Marine, Cheng Pi-kuang
- Justice, Chang Yao-tseng (Chang Kuo-kan acting)
- Education, Fan Yuan-lien
- Agriculture and Commerce, Chang Kuo-kan
- Communications, Hsu Shih-ying
The temper of the southern leaders at the present time is to be satisfied with nothing short of their complete and recognized ascendency.
During last night a mandate was prepared for issue, providing for the arrest and trial of some of the principal leaders in the monarchical movement, as follows: Yang Tu, Sun Yu-chun, Ku Ao, Liang Shih-yi, Hsia Shou-tien, Chu Chi-chien, Chou Tsz-chi, and Hsueh Ta-ko. It is to be feared that the political effect of this action will be bad. Not long ago, in a Cabinet meeting, his excellency Tuan Chi-jui, the Premier, stated in so many words that if the monarchists were to be punished very few would be exempt, as practically all officials of the Chinese Government had either supported or acquiesced in the movement. Therefore, unless the mandate is to be interpreted as a shot in the air, to satisfy the cry which has been raised in the south for the punishment of the monarchists; and if it is to be followed by other attempts at [Page 89] punishment, it might easily cause a dangerous division to be brought about. The mandate as published will probably have little practical effect, as the men concerned are now resident in British concessions or colonies, whence they will not be extradited on political grounds, but only upon a prima facie criminal case being fully established. It is stated that the attempt to secure the extradition of Mr. Liang Shih-yi will be welcomed by him, as it would make necessary the bringing into the court of the whole status of the Bank of Communications, and the fact that under former Ministers of Finance, especially Messrs. Hsiung Shih-ling and Chou Hsueh-shih, the bank had advanced large amounts of money to the Government.
Among the prominent Kuo Min Tang leaders, only Mr. C. T. Wang, ex-Vice Speaker of the Senate, has thus far come to Peking to discuss the situation with the President. Mr. Tang Shao-yi stated to me at Shanghai that he would come in a private capacity after August 1st, i. e., after Parliament had assembled. Other Kuo Min Tang leaders also expect to come to Peking at that time.
The assembling of Parliament and the conditions consequent thereon is likely to test the capacity of the Chinese leaders for effective political action. The cardinal fact in the situation is that such a thing as a loyal opposition is not understood or appreciated in China: each party desires full control, in the same spirit as it was desired in his day by President Yuan, i. e., through suppressing and virtually outlawing all opposition. The political leaders of the various factions must learn either to cooperate with each other for the time being, until the Government has again securely reestablished its authority throughout all the provinces, or to adopt party Government with the understanding that parties may be alternately superseded by each other and that the function of a party is to govern well while in power, but not to look upon opposition to it as treason to be suppressed. It would appear that during the past year Chinese leaders have done a great deal of thinking on political matters. How far they have really learned to appreciate the essential requirements of political action under a representative government remains now to be seen.
The situation in some of the provinces, as is apparent from the consular reports herewith enclosed, is still very much confused. With the exception of some parts of Honan, the local troubles have nowhere taken on an anti-foreign character: in that province the activities of the Big Knife Society recall in a small way the troubles of 1900 and, therefore, bear a close watching. In Szechuan, Hunan and especially Kwangtung, bitter partisan struggles are going on. Chekiang is quiet, as is, temporarily, Shantung.
On the whole, the situation, while still full of uncertainty and containing possibilities of future trouble, may be said to promise a fair chance of reestablishing the authority and normal activities of the Chinese Government in all parts of the Republic, as the Head of the State is now formally recognized everywhere. But in the solution of individual difficulties and in the selection of men who are to exercise leadership, a great deal of controversy and trouble may naturally be expected.
I have [etc.]