The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)
Washington, November 4, 1914.
No. 192]
Sir: Receipt is acknowledged of the Legation’s No. 362, of September 10, 1914, with enclosures relating to Chinese inability to preserve strict neutrality in certain portions of the Province of Shantung, because of the military operations incident to the attack upon the German leased territory of Kiaochow by Japan and her allies.
In this despatch which was written by Mr. MacMurray, request is made for some intimation of the views of the Department upon the question of an increase in China of the military and naval forces of the United States “sufficient to meet eventualities.”
Mr. MacMurray’s analysis of the situation appears to the Department to be quite correct. While regretting that the wars which have unfortunately broken out in Europe have involved the Far East in hostilities, the Department realizes that the belligerents could hardly hope to keep their leased territories in China free from attack, since they partake of the nature of military bases. The international settlements, however, at the open ports of China, are regarded as belonging to an entirely different category. These settlements with their cosmopolitan population, the Department believes should be by general consent entirely excluded from the field of military operations.
In view of the possibilities of internal disorders in China threat ending the safety of life and property in these settlements, the American Government desires to do what it can with the consent of other interested powers to assist in the protection of these settlements, but the Legation must realize that the forces at the disposal of the Government for such purposes are limited.
When the Legation’s telegram of August 6, 8 p.m.,1 was received, an unfounded report was already in circulation to the effect that the United States was sending a large naval force to the Far East. In order to silence these rumors and prevent any misunderstanding, it seemed prudent to refrain from any act that might be construed as a threat of intervention, hence no immediate response was made to the request of the Legation for additional forces, but the War Department was consulted and agreed to keep the China expedition at its maximum strength and, as the Legation has recently been instructed, the Navy Department has decided to increase the number of vessels m Chinese waters.
[Page 190]Reference was made in the despatch under acknowledgment to the Department’s telegraphic instruction to Tokyo of August 19, 2 p.m.,1 in reply to the communication notifying the United States of Japan’s ultimatum to Germany. Mr. MacMurray, in his conversation with Dr. Koo, interpreted very correctly the reference to the Root-Takahira exchange of notes. The Department had reason to fear that the military operations undertaken against Tsingtao might lead to misunderstandings or that the revolutionists who were reported to be planning to take advantage of the situation might foment disturbances elsewhere in China and that a condition of affairs might arise which would invite, if not require, foreign intervention to restore order and therefore in its reply to the Japanese memorandum, it recalled the Root-Takahira exchange of notes to assure the Japanese Government that should the status quo in China be threatened the Department relied in full confidence upon Japan’s willingness to consult with the United States.
With respect to other questions raised in the despatch you are instructed that, while the Department desires, of course, to safeguard all American rights in China, to protect all legitimate American interests there and to promote by all proper methods the development of American trade, it is at the same time anxious that there shall be no misunderstanding of its aims by the Chinese Government. The United States desires China to feel that American friendship is sincere and to be assured that this Government will be glad to exert any influence, which it possesses, to further, by peaceful methods, the welfare of the Chinese people, but the Department realizes that it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China’s territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties.
I am [etc.]