File No. 763.72111/490
The Chargé d’Affaires in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
Peking, September 10, 1914.
[Received October 20.]
No. 362]
Sir: Referring to the despatch No. 334 of the 13th ultimo, with which the Legation transmitted the rules of neutrality adopted by the Chinese Government,1 I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a circular note, under date of September 3, by which (as reported in my telegram of that date, 9 p. m)2 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs notified the various legations that in view of the military operations actually carried on by the German forces in the neighborhood of Kiaochow Bay and by the British and Japanese forces at Lungkow and Laichow, it could not hold itself responsible for the obligations of strict neutrality within those places and the adjoining regions absolutely necessary for the passage and use of belligerent troops. This somewhat indefinite delimitation of an area within which, under the precedent of the Liaotung region in the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese Government declares itself unable to preserve the neutrality of its territory, was occasioned by the landing of Japanese expeditionary forces at Lungkow and Laichow (in regard to which I would refer to the despatches Nos. 79 and 80, of September 3 and 4, respectively, addressed to the Legation by the Consulate at Chefoo, of which copies were enclosed with my despatch No. 361 of September 9)3 against the protest—whether vigorous or perfunctory—of the local Chinese authorities.
From an official but reliable source it is learned that on the 3d instant, and again on the 4th, the German Chargé d’Affaires addressed to the Wai Chiao Pu protests against the Chinese Government’s acquiescence in the violation of the proclaimed neutrality of its territories, stating, that it would thereby incur liability for all damages to German interests consequent upon the operations thus permitted. I am informed that the Austro-Hungarian Minister also submitted a similar protest. To these protests I understand that the Chinese Government replied by citing anew the precedent of the Russo-Japanese War and disclaiming all responsibility in view of its helplessness to resist the military operations of the belligerents.
This matter of maintaining its sovereignty, as involved in the question of neutrality, has been one of much solicitude and anxiety to the Chinese Government. It would seem that, during the first weeks of the war, even the more serious and responsible of the [Page 187] Chinese were deluded by the rumors which were disseminated from Japanese sources to the effect that the American Government was preparing to act in opposition to Japanese interests in China; and upon that delusion they founded extravagant hopes that the United States would undertake to guarantee China against any territorial aggression or disregard of its sovereignty. The publication, in the Reuter News Service, of the substance of the note with which the American Government acknowledged the Japanese communication of the ultimatum to Germany (embodied in the instruction to the Tokyo Embassy, August 19, 2 p.m.)1 synchronized with a sudden and almost complete cessation of the anti-American agitation in the press controlled by Japanese influences. On the other hand, the suggestion of consultation between the American and Japanese Governments, in pursuance of the Root-Takahira exchange of notes of 1908, seems to have been interpreted in some Chinese quarters as indicating a determination on the part of our Government to insist upon its approval as a condition precedent to any Japanese action in Chinese territory. On the 27th ultimo Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, of the Wai Chiao Pu, called upon me informally, professedly at the instance of the President, to inquire as to the precise terms and purport of the American note. I enclose herewith a copy of the paraphrase which I subsequently furnished to him in accordance with the Department’s telegraphic authorization of August 27, 5 p.m.2 In discussing the matter with me, Dr. Koo strongly intimated the view that the Root-Takahira exchange of notes established in favor of the United States a right to be consulted with respect to any action contemplated by Japan in Chinese territories, as though to imply that such rights were held by our Government in trust for the Government of China; and he specified the possible landing of an expeditionary force in Shantung (beyond the limits of the zone of condominium established by the treaty of lease of the Kiaochow territory) as constituting a question in regard to which the Japanese Government would thereby be required to seek the approval of the United States. Not knowing how peremptorily our Government is disposed to insist upon its suggestion that the Japanese Government would doubtless desire to consult our own in the event that it should judge the situation here to require action, I pointed out to Dr. Koo that that suggestion in terms concerns only the case of internal disorders in China; and I furthermore reminded him that the Root-Takahira exchange of notes, although frequently referred to for convenience as an agreement, was in fact simply a joint declaration of policy rather than a convention establishing a legal status which either party might invoke against the other.
Since the Chinese Government’s circular of the 3d instant, delimiting the area within which the Chinese. Government finds itself unable to maintain the neutrality of its territories, Dr. Koo has called to inquire the views of our Government in this matter; and I have told him that I have not received and do not expect to receive any instructions which might be construed as a comment upon the action of the belligerent powers in landing troops in Shantung.
[Page 188]In connection with this matter of the neutrality of China and the supposition that the United States may in some way afford a guarantee thereof, it is perhaps relevant to refer to the agitation which is manifested in Shanghai, and particularly in the columns of the China Press, in favor of our despatching to China military and naval forces “sufficient to meet eventualities.” I venture to suggest that the eventualities thus rather vaguely referred to may be analyzed as follows:
- 1.
- War with one or more powers opposed to our interests in the Far East;
- 2.
- Intervention with a view to the maintenance or establishment of some particular political regime in China; and
- 3.
- The protection of American and other foreign interests against possible disorders.
The first two of these categories would seem at the present time to be negligible—wholly hypothetical and not to be anticipated as either actual or probable. For the purposes of the third category, which involves simply a police duty, the American forces now available here would appear to be almost adequate to meet any but the most serious and unanticipated emergency. It seems to me that it would (as indicated in my telegram of August 6, 8 p.m.1) be advisable to bring up to full strength the organizations now stationed in China but it would appear that any increase of forces beyond that limit would at the present time be not only unnecessary for the purposes which are now in view (and entirely inadequate, unless of an extraordinary nature, for the other hypothetical purposes of such forces) but likely to challenge misinterpretation and invite rivalry with powers better able than ourselves to fill this country with troops— and more likely to use them to the disadvantage of Chinese and incidentally of American interests. With respect to this question, however, I beg to request for the guidance of the Legation some intimation of the views of the Department.
I have [etc.]