Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1910
Ambassador Reid to the Secretary of State.
London, June 17, 1910.
Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith, as of interest to the department, extracts from the London Times of June 16 containing the report of a parliamentary question relative to the policy of the British Government in the matter of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, asked by Mr. Arbuthnot on the 15th instant, together with the report of Sir Edward Grey’s reply thereto.
I have, etc.,
[Inclosure.]
Mr. Arbuthnot (Burnley, Opp.) took the opportunity to obtain information as to the policy being followed in reference to railway construction in China. The impression prevailed that British interests in China were not being adequately supported by the Government, and answers given in reference to the Chinchow and Aigun Railway contract were not satisfactory. This railway had been sanctioned by Chinese imperial rescript, but there had been protests from Japan requiring a share of financial control, and by Russia on strategical gounds. The impression was that the British Government considered it advisable to support these protests regardless of British commercial interests. The two reasons given by His Majesty’s Government for their inability to take an active part in supporting British interests were, first, that the railway was one which did not largely affect the interests of this country; and, secondly, on account of the provisions of the Anglo-Russian agreement. The first reason was wholly opposed to the view of the commercial community. It must be obvious that the construction of a railway of this kind was a matter of the highest importance to British trade. The second reason was even more remarkable than the first. By the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement Great Britain undertook not to seek railway concessions north of the Great Wall of China on condition that Russia did not attempt to seek railway concessions south of the Great Wall. What in the world, he would ask the right honorable gentleman, had that got to do with the Chinchow-Aigun Railway, in which there was not one penny piece of concession? He also asked the right honorable gentleman whether the Anglo-Russian agreement was not out of date; or whether, at all events, it had not been very considerably modified by subsequent treaties, which laid down the principles of equal opportunities and the open door. He thought there was a call for some further elucidation from the Government as to the relationship between the old doctrine of spheres of influence and the new doctrine laid down by these treaties. The attitude of this country had given rise to considerable hostile comment in America, and he hoped the right honorable gentleman would be able to make a, statement which would allay certain misapprehensions and clear up what he believed to be certain misunderstandings which existed.
Now, I come to the question of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. I am afraid that on this point I shall disappoint the expectation of honorable members. I was not aware that this particular question was likely to arise in debate. I was told, through the usual channels, that the question of China would arise. There are many questions associated with China, and in endeavoring to ascertain which of these questions was likely to be raised I did not understand that the Chinchow-Aigun Railway was one of them. I have not, therefore, been able to refer back to all the details of this particular railway, and that is why I say I am afraid my remarks on this subject will be rather meager and will probably disappoint the expectations of those who expect to hear an important statement. The Chinchow-Aigun Railway is promoted by American financiers and a British firm of contractors, who applied for, and have been promised, a concession from the Chinese Government. It is not a concession of the particular kind referred to by the honorable member who raised the question, but it is something which is to be given to them by the Chinese Government in the nature of a concession for a loan for the making of a railway. That is perfectly legitimate on their part, and I have not the least right to complain, and I do not complain, of any action that has been taken. On the contrary, I look very favorably upon the cooperation of British and American firms in this or any other matter, and I am very glad to see them cooperating. I therefore do not in the least deprecate anything that has been done in this matter. But when I am asked to come forward and put diplomatic pressure upon the Chinese Government to put this agreement through, then I am brought up by the fact that in 1897 notes were exchanged between the British and the Russian Governments under which we agreed, on our part, not to press for railway concessions in this particular region. It is true we did not undertake any obligations to discourage them or to prevent British firms applying for them or promoting railways there. It was a purely negative undertaking on our part. But what I am reproached for is that I have not taken an active and positive part in promoting the construction of this railway. I think the honorable member who raised the question put a technical and somewhat narrow construction upon the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1897. He asked if it had not been superseded by a subsequent arrangement. In so far as it may have been modified by subsequent arrangements superior to it, it would have been superseded, but I am not aware that arrangements which were subsequently made have altered the natural meaning of the Anglo-Russian agreement or deprived it of its force. If any agreement of that find still exists it ought not to be put an end to without [Page 269] a mututal understanding between the two Governments concerned, and it ought not to be modified unless they understand exactly what the modification means.
The Chinchow-Aigun Railway is a railway which is to cross the line to Russia, and is to extend right up to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances understand exactly what the modification means.
The Chinchow-Aigun Railway is a railway which is to cross the line to Russia, and is to extend right up to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances I think that if the Chinese were going to have this railway made by foreigners we could not, in the face of the Anglo-Russian agreement, take an active part in supporting it until the Chinese had come to terms with Russia about it. Japan has not opposed the railway in principle, but has asked for participation, and I think that was a perfectly reasonable demand on the part of Japan. If Japan had taken up the line of stating that she wished to have a railway monopoly in Manchuria, that would have been a distinct breach of the open door. If she made use of her position there by giving prefential treatment to her own people as against others, that again would be a breach of the open door. But for Japan to say that after all that has passed she has an interest in Manchuria which justifies her in wishing for participation in railways which may to some extent compete with the railway which is already in existence—not, I say, in opposing them in principle, but in asking for participation in them—it would be going too far for us to declare that that is an unreasonable demand to make, and to take active diplomatic steps at Peking to press for the granting of this concession.
Mr. Arbuthnot. Is it not a fact that the Japanese demand involves some control over and above participation?
Sir E. Grey. I am not quite sure on that point. All that I am defending is our attitude of neutrality. In the face of the Anglo-Russian agreement it would have been impossible for us to take up the attitude of actively promoting the railway, which is going to be constructed by foreigners with money lent by foreigners, which is going to cross the Russian line at one point, and extend up to the Russian frontier and, therefore, is going to have a considerable influence on Russia’s strategical position, and to press for that railway without Russia being given any chance of participation, I think the only course consistent with the original interpretation of our political obligations in this respect is that we should say that, while we have every wish to see British and American finance cooperate in railway construction in China, yet in regard to this particular railway we can not but think it reasonable that China should consult both with Japan and with Russia if she intends to have this railway made by foreigners. In face of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1897, the only reasonable course for us to adopt would be to maintain a neutral attitude until the Russian and Japanese objections to the railway have been removed. I think that is the only reasonable course we can take, both on the grounds of our general policy and in accordance with the general sense of our treaty engagements. (Cheers.)
Mr. G. Stewart (Cheshire, Wirral, Opp.) said the termination of the Russo-Japanese War brought about in China a new era, in Which we were allotted the Yangtze Valley as our particular sphere of influence. But now the Yangtze Valley was opened to everybody, and he thought it only fair that Englishmen should be given opportunities in Manchuria, Shantung, and other spheres which were now closed to them. (Hear! hear!)