[Inclosure—Translation.]
The French Government has the honor to thank the Government of the
United States for its memorandum, dated December 17, 1909, relative
to Manchuria, as well as for the proposals of participation which it
contains both for the international system applicable eventually to
the existing railroads and for the construction of a future line
from Chinchow to Aigun.
In a general manner the Government of the Republic shares in the
unanimous desire of the powers to maintain the “open door” and “the
equality of commercial opportunities in Manchuria,” and is happy to
seize this opportunity to affirm once more the principle of the
sovereignty of China.
It considers, moreover, that the above principles are not menaced at
the present time by the actual situation held by Russia and Japan in
Manchuria, the rights and the special position of these two powers
there having been determined by treaties which form part of public
international law, the clauses of which they have not ceased to
respect.
Under these conditions France could not have adhered to the first
alternative considered by the Federal Government (international
administration and control of the railway lines in Manchuria) unless
by a common accord the two powers most interested had been disposed
to renounce their contract rights in Manchuria and to side with the
American suggestion.
In practice, even outside of political and moral interests difficult
to estimate, it would have been in any hypothesis hard to figure the
material expenditures, public as well as private, which it was
proposed to reimburse, and China would have run the risk of assuming
a heavy burden for its credit.
The second proposition of the United States Government (construction
of a railway line from Chinchow to Aigun by means of international
participation) enters, if one considers it by itself, in the system
of understanding between the powers for the construction, in
agreement with China, of the Chinese railways, system to which the
French Government has adhered; in this capacity it would be
disposed, in this case, to take part under reserve of obtaining
therewith advantages in proportion to its financial
participation.
But this adherence in principle remains itself subordinate to the
acceptance by the powers most interested, Russia and Japan, in case
these should consider definitively that the question of the
construction of the Chinchow-Aigun line can rest solely upon a
business basis, without provoking political, strategic, or economic
repercussions contrary to the rights which they hold by treaty.
