[Inclosure.]
Statements made by Mr. Delcasse in the
French Chamber, July 3.
M. Delcassé said: “I have in my previous declarations,
particularly last month, clearly explained the tendencies of our
policy in China. The chamber will remember that during the past
two years I have repeatedly stated that France, as mistress of
Indo-China, has no interest in provoking or desiring the break
up of China which is, perhaps without sufficient reflection,
spoken of. What I can affirm is that France has no wish for war
with China, but she cannot evade the duty of protecting her
citizens and of obtaining for her merchants the guaranties
obtained by others. It is for this and this alone that the
Government has taken the measures necessitating these credits.
France is certainly anxious for the maintenance of the
equilibrium in the Far East. She will see that it is not broken
to her detriment, but she cherishes no secret designs. I know
not, moreover, who could have particular objects. What I see is
that a common peril demands a common aim, and this is
comprehended by all the powers. This is the reassuring feature
of the situation, the difficulties of which it would be as
childish to deny as it would be to be disturbed by them. I
descend the Tribune after repeating the assurance that France,
whose efforts are already employed in facilitating the
rapprochement of the powers, will continue to neglect nothing
for maintaining and strengthening those sentiments of internal
and humane solidarity which would prevent them, if necessary,
from thinking of what might divide them.”
July 8, 1900.—“With reference to what is
taking place in northern China, we are asked why we have not
declared war against China, and why China’s representative in
Paris has not received his passports. But against whom are we to
declare war? As far as can be concluded from the information
from divers sources, either the Imperial Government has already
been swept away, or it is the prisoner of the insurrection,
which seems to be, indeed, forcing upon it the decrees which it
sends to the provinces, if it does not actually concoct them
itself. But thus far it does not appear that the governors of
the provinces, notably the southern and central viceroys, are
disposed to obey decrees, the origin of which they suspect, and
the authors of which they are inclined to regard as rebels, and
the chamber has already seen, without my having to go into the
matter in detail, that the consequences of an official
declaration of war would be to make throughout China a union
against the Occident, and thereby to oblige the Occident to
redouble the efforts which the situation of the province of
Pekin renders already considerable. Nor need I observe that such
an act as an official declaration of war against China can not
be the isolated act of any one power, but that all the powers,
having the same object, should as far as possible maintain
agreement as to the means to be employed to obtain this end, and
that France, in particular, whose interests in north China are
mainly general and common with those of the other powers, had no
special reason for taking an initiative which might make it the
object of suspicion as cherishing special aims which it
absolutely rejects. This, however, does not prevent us from
acting in Pe-chi-li with the other powers with all the decision
and vigor required by a situation of which it is impossible and
of which it would be culpable to hide from oneself the gravity
and difficulty.
