Mr. Conger to
Mr. Hay.
Legation of the United States,
Pekin, China, August 17, 1900.
No. 395.]
Sir: Continuing my dispatch of the 16th
instant, I have the honor to confirm on the overleaf my cipher
telegram of to-day, your telegram, undated, sent through Mr. Wu
Ting-fang and delivered to me under a flag of truce by a messenger
from the Tsungli Yamen, my reply thereto of July 16th, and also my
telegrams of August 3, 5, 9, and 11.1
Your telegram was the first communication received by anyone from
outside since the siege began, and mine the first sent out. On the
next day some of the other ministers sent telegrams to the Tsungli
Yamen, asking that they be forwarded as mine had been. They were,
however, returned with the reply that mine had been transmitted
under a previous arrangement, which it was not possible to repeat. A
few days later the British minister received through the Tsungli
Yamen an inquiry from his Government much the same sort as your
first telegram
[Page 162]
to me. They
said he could answer and that the rest of us also might send
messages; hence mine of August 5. They had heretofore requested us
to send “en clair” telegrams to our Governments, who must be very
anxious about us, simply saying “all are well,” which we refused to
do. * * *
My telegram of August 11 was sent because of the receipt by the dean
of the diplomatic corps of certain notes from the Tsungli Yamen,
translations of which are inclosed, concerning our quitting Pekin,
and was chiefly for the purpose of gaining time for the relief
column to arrive. The Chinese Government had, since June 19, been
continually insisting upon our leaving Pekin under Chinese escort,
to which we were determined never to consent, because it was
undoubtedly a plan to ambush us. This may be more easily believed,
since the identical officers and soldiers who were, by imperial
orders, daily shooting us down had been selected as our escort. So
by one excuse and another we put off a final decision or definite
refusal, as may be seen by the copies of correspondence
inclosed.
Returning to the situation at the time of my dispatch of June 18 (No.
393), on the 19th, at 4 p.m., each minister received an identic
note, whether or not their Governments had sent troops into China,
ordering us to leave Pekin within twenty-four hours, promising
adequate protection, etc. Resolving among ourselves that we would
never go under a Chinese escort, but deeming it wise not to refuse
pointblank, and thus give them ground for attack, we replied
courteously, declaring it impossible to leave within the time, and
requesting an interview at 9 o’clock the next morning with the
prince and ministers at the yamen, opening the way for further
discussion. The reply accomplished its purpose. The time was
postponed temporarily, as will be seen by copy of correspondence
inclosed.
The morning of the 20th, at 8.30, the ministers met at the French
legation ready to proceed in a body to the Tsungli Yamen as soon as
notified that the prince would be there. Not receiving any word by 9
o’clock, the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, who had personally
notified the yamen that he was coming there on business, started
with his interpreter, commissioned to tell the prince and ministers
that the corps was patiently waiting to hear from them.
Upon arriving almost to the yamen he was brutally murdered, shot
through the head by a man (so says his interpreter, whose chair
immediately followed) wearing the insignia of a Chinese official.
The interpreter, Mr. Cordes, was at the same time seriously wounded,
but succeeded in escaping to the American Methodist Mission
compound, which was guarded by American marines. Two mafoos
accompanied the baron, one of whom immediately ran to the Tsungli
Yamen and returned with some of the secretaries to the place, to
find the official chairs demolished, but the minister’s body already
taken away. The other returned quickly to the legation, and an
officer and 20 men started for the spot, but before they reached it
were met by a strong cordon of Chinese soldiers, through which they
were not strong enough to pass. The body was found yesterday, buried
in a rough coffin near where he fell, and to-day was decently
interred in the German legation. This was the last attempt of any of
the ministers to visit the Tsungli Yamen.
The Chinese army had turned out against us; the whole quarter of the
city in which the legations are situated was surrounded by its
[Page 163]
soldiers, firing began on
all sides and the battle against the representatives of all foreign
governments in China was begun.
The Methodist compound where all our missionaries had gathered was
abandoned; all coming to the legation at 12 noon. By 4 o’clock the
situation had become so acute that all foreigners, except the guards
and a few men in each legation, repaired to the British legation,
and the refugee native Christians, about 2,000, were placed in the
grounds of Prince Su, near by.
Our lines of defense were quickly shortened and strengthened,
trenches and barricades built, and the siege was on.
Four hundred foreigners, 200 of them women and children, with over
100 soldiers, were crowded into the British legation. In the house
given to our legation 30 people were for two months crowded into six
small rooms; but all were thankful that there existed so convenient
and safe a place to go.
The first attempts of the enemy were to burn us out by firing
buildings adjoining us, but by means of heroically fighting those
inflamed by the enemy, burning and tearing down others ourselves, we
soon had the British legation pretty safe from this danger. However,
from this date until July 17 there was scarcely an hour during which
there was not firing upon some part of our lines and into some of
the legations, varying from a single shot to a general and
continuous attack along the whole line.
Artillery was planted on all sides of us, two large guns mounted on
the walls surrounding the palace, and thousands of 3-inch shells and
solid shot hurled at us. There is scarcely a building in any of the
legations that was not struck, and some of them practically
destroyed. Four shells struck our gatehouse, tearing away our
flagstaff; four exploded in the servants’ quarters; three struck my
residence, two of them exploding inside; two struck the office
building, and two the house of Mr. Cheshire, while the roofs of
nearly all the buildings in the compound were sadly damaged by
innumerable bullets. To show in what storms they came, five quarts
of them were picked up to be remolded into new ammunition in one
hour in our small compound.
Our lines were at first made as short as possible and inclosed all
the legations except the Belgian, and were still further shortened
after the burning of the Austrian, Italian, and Dutch legations and
the imperial customs. Trenches were dug, streets barricaded along
these lines as fast as possible, but nearly all the work on these
had to be done under cover of darkness.
A veritable fortress was made of the British legation, walls were
strengthened and raised, openings filled, bombproof cellars
constructed, counter tunnels to prevent mining made, and everything
possible with our poor tools and materials was effectively done. In
our first barricades carts and furniture were employed and thousands
upon thousands of sand bags made in which every obtainable material
was used—satin portieres, silk curtains, carpets, oriental rugs,
table linen, towels, bedding, embroideries, cloths, silks, etc.
Fortunately for us we had the missionaries and their converts with
us. The former, being familiar with the Chinese language and
character, ably organized, superintended, and directed the Chinese,
who were invaluable help in constructing fortifications, and without
which it could not have been done.
All were industrious and helpful, but everyone will agree that no
[Page 164]
one is done any injustice
if Rev. F. D. Gamewell, of the American Methodist Mission, is
mentioned as the man to whose practical intelligence, quick
perception, executive ability, untiring energy, and sleepless
activity more than any other is due our successful and safe
resistance. We were obliged to combine all our force and efforts for
defense, so that neither time, strength, provisions, nor ammunition
should be wasted.
Sir Claude MacDonald, the British minister, was chosen for the
general command, and gave every satisfaction. He selected Mr. H. G.
Squiers, first secretary of this legation, as his chief of staff,
whose military training and experience had not been forgotten, but
which, thrown with energy and determination into the work, were
invaluable to the end.
Necessary committees were created, and the camp was thoroughly
organized. Stores of wheat, rice, and coal found within our lines
were quickly gathered into a general commissariat, which, with such
canned goods as we had in store, together with all our riding horses
and cart mules, have furnished us a substantial if not a very
palatable subsistence since.
The Chinese seem to have an innumerable soldiery and an inexhaustible
supply of ammunition. We began with only 400 marines, sailors, and
soldiers altogether, and some 50 miscellaneously armed civilians.
For the most part, therefore, we simply sat and watched, firing only
when necessary; but occasionally a severe attack had to be resisted
or a sortie made, which invariably, on our side, was successful. But
these frequently cost lives of brave men. Altogether we have
lost—killed, 65; wounded, 135; died of disease, all children, 7. Of
the United State, marines, Sergeant Fanning and Privates King,
Kennedy, Turner, Tutcher, Fisher, and Thomas were killed; Captain
Myers, Dr. Lippett, and 14 others wounded. The loss of the Chinese
is known to be ten times as great as ours.
To our marines fell the most difficult and dangerous portion of the
defense, by reason of our proximity to the great city wall and the
main city gates, over which large guns were planted.
Our legation, with the position which we held on the wall, was the
key to the whole situation. This given up, all, including many
Chinese Christians, would at once be drawn into the British legation
and the congestion there increased by several hundred. The United
States marines acquitted themselves nobly. Twice were they driven
from the wall and once forced to abandon the legation, but each
time, reenforced, immediately retook it, and with only a handful of
men, aided by 10 Russian sailors and for a few days a few British
marines, held it to the last against several hundred Chinese with at
least three pieces of artillery.
The bravest and most successful event of the whole siege was an
attack led by Captain Myers, of our marines, and 55 men—Americans,
British, and Russians—which resulted in the capture of a formidable
barricade on the wall defended by several hundred Chinese soldiers,
over 50 of whom were killed. Two United States marines were killed
and Captain Myers and 1 British marine wounded. This made our
position on the wall secure, and it was held to the last with the
loss of only one other man.
This position gave us command of a water gate under the wall, through
which the entrance of the relief column was made into this, the
Tartar city. The English arrived first, and General Chaffee, with
[Page 165]
the Fourteenth
Infantry and Captain Riley’s battery, a few moments thereafter.
I inclose a small rough plan showing the line of our defense on June
21 and on July 16 and thereafter.
During the siege the Belgian, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, and most of
the French legations were burned, and the post-office, three foreign
banks, residences and offices of all the customs officials, and all
the missionary compounds, except the Peitang, have been totally
destroyed. The Peitang is an immense Catholic cathedral connected
with a very large school, in which were refugeed 1,500 native
Christians. These, with Bishop Favier and a small corps of priests
and sisters, were defended by 30 French and 10 Italian sailors and a
number of Chinese Christians with arms. They were besieged during
all the time we were, and no communication with them was at any time
possible. This place was relieved on the 14th, and it was found that
the besieged there had received even worse treatment than those at
the legations— a French officer and 10 men killed and 8 wounded. One
building was blown up by a mine, which killed 120 Chinese
Christians.
No communication whatever was had with the Tsungli Yamen or any one
outside our legations until July 14, except communication by shot
and shell.
It was a reasonable supposition that the Chinese Government had fled,
abandoning the city to the fury of the fiendish soldiers. But we
have since found proof abundant and absolute that the Empress
Dowager and council remained in the city until just before the
arrival of the relief and that the attacks were organized and
directed by them, the whole force being under the immediate control
and direction of the Grand Secretary Jung Lu, the commander in chief
of the Imperial army.
The Tsungli Yamen, all along, has charged all the trouble on the mob,
bad Boxers, and brigands; at least, they did so up to the beginning
of the siege. Since then they designated them by the name “people
and militia,” but the very first attacks, except the burning of
buildings, were made upon us by men wearing the uniform of Chinese
soldiers, and who, it was soon learned, belonged to the regular
armies of General Tung Fu-hsiang or Jung Lu. Their barricades were
everywhere mounted with flags bearing the name and designations of
regular officers and their commands, and whenever men or guns fell
into our hands they were those of the Chinese army.
It is very likely that Boxers joined them in the attacks, but if so,
they donned the army uniform and carried the imperial arm.
From the decree of June 24, inclosed, you will see that the Boxers
were organized by the appointment to their command of Prince Chuang
and Kang I; that provisions were given them by an Imperial order,
and the members of the imperial family urged not to fall behind them
in acts of patriotism, etc. Decree of July 6 mentions the “Prince
and ministers in command of the Boxers.” Decree of July 8 gives the
total number of troops, including the Boxers. Report of Viceroy Yu
Lu of July 8 says he ordered provisions and firearms distributed
among Boxers. By decree of June 25 the Empress Dowager gave 100,000
taels to the Boxers.
Another convincing proof that it was soldiers who were besieging us
is the fact that whenever the Chinese Government wanted to
communicate with us, they could stop the firing and come through
their lines whenever they pleased.
[Page 166]
The Chinese Government was pretending to us and proclaiming to the
world that they were “protecting” us, when in fact if a thousandth
part of the shots fired at us by their soldiers had taken effect we
would all have been killed long ago. It is understood, also, that
they represented abroad that they were “provisioning” us. They did
send us on two occasions a few small watermelons, cucumbers, and egg
plant, and on another three sacks of flour, but nothing more. We
tried to establish a market where under a flag of truce, we might
purchase a few eggs and some fruit or fresh meat. They consented,
but the firing of their soldiers prevented it.
On July 14 a note signed “Prince Ching and others” came to us by a
messenger again inviting us to ambush, this time at the Tsungli
Yamen, but we didn’t go. However, a correspondence was started,
which for a time caused a cessation of artillery firing and lessened
greatly the rifle firing, showing that the Government could control
it if desired.
All the correspondence is interesting, and I inclose translations of
it for what it is worth. Two days before the arrival of our troops
“Prince Ching and others” asked to come and see us for the purpose
of arranging a temporary suspension of hostilities, requesting us to
name an hour, which was done for 11 a.m., the 13th of August. They
did not come, saying they were too busy, but that strict orders had
been given to their troops not to fire upon us and if anybody did
they would be court-martialed, etc. But during all that night the
most fierce and desperate attack of the whole siege was made along
the entire line, in which one German soldier was killed and a
Russian, Japanese, and American sailor were wounded. * * * On the
14th, as I have already written, we were relieved. I inclose various
extracts from the official gazettes, decrees, etc., which prove
conclusively the connection of the Imperial Government with and its
responsibility for the Boxer movement, and furnish very strong
evidence that it was planned, encouraged, and supported by the
imperial family. Prince Tuan, the father of the heir apparent, has
been their chief friend and protector. They have drilled and
rationed in his temple, his son was selected as heir apparent about
the inception of the movement, the prince was appointed to the
Tsungli Yamen at its height, and it seems certain that his advice
and that of the grand secretary Hsu Tung, Kang I, and other
influential but ignorant antiforeign officials, influenced the
Empress Dowager to actually believe that with the combined force of
Boxers and soldiers the expulsion or extermination of all foreigners
from China was possible.
So the movement began, first upon the native Christians, thousands of
whom have been most brutally butchered, then against the
missionaries, many of whom have been murdered and their property
destroyed. The most narrowing details are coming in of horrible
atrocities perpetrated in the country districts while we have been
besieged; then against the foreign merchants and all foreign
business interests, and finally against all the official
representatives of foreign powers in Pekin. * * *
The Government has fled, and up to the present no one to speak for it
has put in an appearance. It is, however, known that several members
of the Tsungli Yamen are in the city, and it is creditably reported
that Prince Ching is not far away; so the probability is that some
of them will soon be heard from. Further developments will be
reported in my next dispatch.
[Page 167]
I can not close this dispatch without gratefully mentioning the
splendid service performed by the United States marines who arrived
here on May 31 under the command of Captain Myers. With slight
exceptions their conduct won the admiration and gratitude of all,
and I beg you to kindly communicate the fact to the Navy
Department.
I inclose copy of resolutions passed by the American missionaries
expressing their high appreciation of the loyalty, fidelity, and
heroic courage of these men.
The loss to the American missions in China is something tremendous,
for there is probably not one of their houses, schools, or chapels
in this or the province immediately west of here undestroyed, and
many in the north part of Shantung have also been demolished. It is
reasonably certain that the missionaries who did not leave the
interior before the middle of June have all been murdered. We can
not as yet get accurate information of them here.
The damage to the general missionary cause is immeasurable and
irretrievable. Adequate indemnities may possibly be secured for all
material losses, but time only, with the most substantial guaranties
for the future, can even partially restore the desolated field. Just
how this can be accomplished does not at present clearly appear, but
in the reformation or reestablishment of government here, it should
somehow be brought about.
As showing the uniform cordiality existing between the missionaries
and this legation, I take pleasure in transmitting herewith copy of
a letter signed by all the male missionaries here.
I ought to add in regard to the note from Tsungli Yamen of July 19,
in which was transmitted to me a copy of the telegraphic Imperial
letter to the President of the United States, that almost identic
letters were at the same time sent to the Queen of England, the
Emperor of Germany, the Czar of Russia, and the President of France,
saying in each case that in her present difficulties China could
rely only upon that special power for aid.
I have the honor to be, etc.,
[Inclosure 1.]
Imperial decree, published in the Pekin
Gazette June 13, 1900.
On the 11th of June the Japanese chancellor was murdered by
desperadoes outside the Yung Ting Men. On hearing this
intelligence we were exceedingly grieved. Officials of
neighboring nations, stationed at Pekin, ought to be protected
in every possible way, and now, especially, extra diligence
should be displayed to prevent such occurrences when desperadoes
are as numerous as bees. We have repeatedly commanded the
various local officials to insure the most efficient protection
in their districts, and yet in spite of our frequent orders we
have this case of murder of the Japanese chancellor occurring in
the very capital of the Empire. The civil and military officials
have assuredly been remiss in not clearing their districts of
bad characters or immediately arresting such persons, and we
hereby order every yamen concerned to enforce a date for the
arrest of the criminals that they may surfer the extreme
penalty. Should the time expire without an arrest being affected
the severest punishment will be assuredly inflicted upon those
responsible.
second edict.
The Boxer desperadoes have recently been causing trouble of the
capital until Pekin itself has been involved. We have repeatedly
issued edicts stating our commands in explicit terms to be made
known to all, and we also ordered the various
[Page 168]
military commanders stationed at
or near the capital to severely put an end to these
disturbances. Yet now we have cases of arson and murder, and bad
characters of the lowest type are perpetually inventing rumors
on the pretense of revenging themselves on the converts. The
result has been that good subjects of ours have become involved
and regard our commands as something that can lightly be set
aside. In spite of the fact that these men are known to have
leagued together to commit acts of murder and arson they suffer
themselves to be misled by them. Good citizens, most of all,
desire to stimulate patriotism, and one would like to know when
in the history of a nation the condoning of anarchy among the
people has made that nation strong. We have now learned by
investigation that among the ranks of the Boxers are many braves
and desperadoes, who have vied with one another in disgraceful
acts of robbery and looting. We have already ordered Kang I and
others to proceed to various country districts and acquaint each
and all with our virtuous intentions, so that there may be
tranquillity. Let the Boxers who have already entered into
league disband themselves and be content. It is obvious that
various cases of murder and arson which have occurred are the
work of traitors, and only the fact of a man having himself
caused disturbance can make us regard him as a bad citizen.
These bad characters must be rooted out and no mercy can again
be shown. We order Sung Ch’ing to command Ma Yu-k’un to come
with ail speed to the capital and let strenuous efforts be made
to arrest all desperadoes in the region round Pekin. It is
important that the ringleaders be seized, but the subordinates
may be allowed to disband themselves. It is strictly forbidden
to the military to use these occurrences as a pretext for
causing trouble, and our hope is that the country may thus be
cleared of traitors and good citizens may be at peace.
[Inclosure 2.]
Imperial decree, published in the Pekin
Gazette June 17, 1900.
Lately the people and the Christians have sought means to stir up
enmity, and bad language has arisen on every side. Vagabonds
have taken occasion repeatedly to burn and rob. All foreign
ministers ought to be really protected. Jung Lu is ordered to
detail his soldiers at once and energetically use his authority
and go immediately to East Legation Street and vicinity and with
all his power protect those ministers. He must not be in the
least careless. If the ministers and their families wish to go
for a time to Tientsin, they must be protected by the way; but
the railroad is not now in working order. If they go by the cart
road, it will be difficult, and there is fear that perfect
protection can not be afforded. They would better, therefore,
abide in peace as hitherto, and wait till the railroad is
repaired and then act as circumstances render expedient.
Sanctioned. Respect this.
[Inclosure 3.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette June 21, 1900.
Ever since the founding of the dynasty foreigners coming to China
have been kindly treated. In the reigns of Tao Kwang and Hsien
Feng they were allowed to trade, and they also asked leave to
propagate their religion, a request which the Throne reluctantly
granted. At first they were amenable to Chinese control, but for
the past thirty years they have taken advantage of Chinese
forbearance to encroach on Chinese territory and trample on the
Chinese people and to demand China’s wealth. Every concession
made by China increased their reliance on violence. They
oppressed peaceful citizens and insulted the gods and holy men,
exciting the most burning indignation among the people; hence
the burning of chapels and the slaughter of converts by the
patriotic braves. The Throne was anxious to avoid war, and
issued edicts enjoining protection of the legations and pity to
the converts. The decrees declaring Boxers and converts to be
equally the children of the State were issued in the hope of
removing the old feud between people and converts, and extreme
kindness was shown to the men from afar. But these people knew
no gratitude, and increased their pressure. A dispatch was
yesterday sent by Du Maylard, calling on us to deliver up the
Taku forts into their keeping, otherwise they would be taken by
force. These threats showed their aggressions. In all matters
relating
[Page 169]
to
international intercourse we have never been wanting in
courtesies to them, but they, while styling themselves civilized
States, have acted without regard for right, relying solely on
their military force. We have now reigned nearly thirty years,
and have treated the people as our children, the people honoring
us as their deity, and in the midst of our reign we have been
the recipients of the gracious favor of the Empress Dowager;
furthermore, our ancestors have come to our aid, the gods have
answered our call, and never has there been so universal a
manifestation of loyalty and patriotism.
With tears we have announced the war in the ancestral shrines.
Better to do our utmost and enter on the struggle rather than
seek some means of self-preservation involving eternal disgrace.
All our officers, high and low, are of one mind, and these have
assembled, without warning, several thousand patriotic soldiers
(Yi p’ing Boxers), even children carrying spears in the service
of the country. Thus others rely on crafty schemes; our trust is
in Heaven’s justice. They depend on violence; we on humanity.
Not to speak of the righteousness of our cause, our provinces
number more than twenty, our people over 400,000,000, and it
will not be difficult to vindicate the dignity of our
country.
[The decree concludes by promising heavy rewards to those who
distinguish themselves in battle or subscribe funds and
threatening punishment to those who show cowardice or act
traitorously.
Another decree in the same gazette expresses the satisfaction
with which the Throne has received Yu Lu’s report of successful
engagements at Tientsin on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of June, and
gives great praise to the Boxers, who have done great service
without any assistance, either of men or money, from the State.
Great favor will be shown them later on, and they must continue
to show their devotion.]
[Inclosure 4.]
Abstract of the Pekin Gazette, June 24,
1900.
Yesterday shops and houses in the neighborhood of the Tung Ssu
Pai Lou and the Chang Anchieh were looted by braves with arms.
This is a serious matter, and we ordered Jung Lu to depute
officers to arrest the offenders. Eleven in all, belonging to
various divisions, besides 23 desperadoes from another body of
braves were arrested and executed on the spot, the public being
duly apprised of the occurrence. We now command the various
general officers to give strict orders to their subordinates
that the braves are to be strenuously kept in order. Should
these occurrences be repeated martial law will be put into
operation. If the various officers commanding patrols screen
offenders instead of rigorously enforcing the laws, we order
that they be severely punished after due investigation. We
command the military commandant’s yamen and those responsible
for the civil administration of Pekin and district to arrest all
desperadoes who may be creating disturbance and to execute them
there and then. Let no mercy be shown.
second decree of same
date.
The board of revenue is commanded to give Kang I 200 bags of rice
as provisions for the Boxers for general distribution among
them.
third decree of same
date.
Numbers of our people comprised in the I Ho T’uan (Boxers) are
scattered in all parts of the region round the metropolis and
Tientsin, and it is right and proper that they should have
superintendents placed over them. We appoint Prince Chuang (Tsai
Hsun) and the assistant grand secretary, Kang I, to be in
general command, and also order Ying Nien, brigade-general of
the left wing, and Tsai Lan, temporarily acting as
brigade-general of the right wing, to act in cooperation with
Chen. We command Wen Jul, adjutant-general of the Manchu army,
to be brigadier-general. All the memoers oi the I Ho T’uan are
exerting their utmost energies, and the Imperial family must not
fall behind In harboring revenge against our enemies. It is our
confident hope that the desires of each and all will be
successfully consummated, and it is of the utmost importance
that no lack of energy be shown.
[Page 170]
[Inclosure 5.]
Decree of the Empress Dowager, June 25,
1900.
A sum of 100,000 taels is granted in reward to each of the
following army corps: Sheng Tzu Ying, Fu Shang Ying, and the
corps of the Boxers. Also a sum of 60,000 taels each is granted
to the troops of Kan Su (Tung Fu Hsiang’s) and the Wu Wei Chun
in addition to the sums of 40,000 taels, which has already been
granted to them. The officials and soldiers of the troops are to
get in one spirit in order to accomplish the great deed and be
deserving the bounties received.
[Inclosure 6.]
Abstract of the Pekin Gazette, June 27,
1900.
An edict appeared yesterday directing, as a stimulus to exertion,
discriminating rewards to be given to the various army corps
that have distinguished themselves in the metropolitan district.
Now that the left wing of the army, under command of Sung
Ch’ing, has in sectional divisions marched to the capital, let
100,000 taels be equally divided to the men, and let orders be
given to rank and file to maintain the public with unanimity and
zeal.
second edict.
Since the beginning of hostilities between China and the foreign
powers, I, the Empress, have frequently given pecuniary rewards
out of the household funds both to the military officials and
the Boxers—a bounty abundant and continuous. At present affairs
are in a dangerous condition. You officers, therefore, should be
zealous to repay the imperial favor and embrace the opportunity
to achieve high merit. All who with courage and energy succeed
in attacking and destroying the enemy will certainly receive
extraordinary rewards. If there be any who desert the field of
battle, or through cowardice fail to advance to meet the foe,
they will be punished by death in the presence of the army, and
their officers will be liable to severe punishment. At present
the foreign troops have possession of the Taku forts. We direct
Yu Lu to order Lo Jung-kuang and his adjutants to devise means
to retake them without delay. In war martial law takes
precedence. If there be any plundering or other exactions from
the people on the part of officers and troops, besides the
execution of the offenders on the spot the immediate officers
(captains and lieutenants) will be court-martialed. If officers
can not restrain their men they will be severely punished. Let
no one plead ignorance as an excuse.
third edict.
The various army corps and the Boxers in the metropolitan
district and at Tientsin have already received pecuniary rewards
according to their merit. Let there be equally divided to the
various corps of Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese bannermen the sum
of 100,000 taels as a stimulus to exertion. Let also an equal
sum be given through the high officials to the two wings and the
advance division of the bannermen guards, to be distributed in
the same manner.
fourth edict.
The military forces at Tientsin are of great importance. To the
troops now there and the Boxers assisting them let there be
given to those who have distinguished themselves 100,000 taels
as a stimulus to exertion. Let this money be paid by Yu Lu and
let Yu Lu command the various army corps, and the Boxers to
arrange their forces to intercept the foreign troops and prevent
their creeping northward. Let them also recover the forts at
Taku.
[Inclosure 7.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette July 1, 1900.
General preparations are now being made for war, and owing to the
telegraphic communication being interrupted all official
dispatches are forwarded by couriers. Speedy transmission is a
matter of urgent necessity, but the courier arrangements
[Page 171]
have fallen for a long
time past into decay, the number of the men and horses at the
post stations not having been duly kept up. The high officials
are therefore directed to take steps to reestablish a regular
system of couriers.
The decree goes on to declare that now that there is fighting on
the coast of Chihli information as to the enemy’s circumstances
and movements must be obtained, and Yu Lu is directed to order
all loyal officials to send our numerous spies to obtain correct
information.
Another decree states that the members of the I Ho Ch’uan
(Boxers) began by taking loyalty and courage as their motto, and
it was expected that they would do good service in repelling
aggression. But of late there have been in the neighborhood of
Pekin many cases of wanton robbery and murder by characters
feigning to belong to the Boxers. If no strict distinction is
drawn, internal dissension will be added to foreign trouble and
the state of the country will be indescribable. Tsai Hsun is
ordered to keep those members of the I Ho Ch’uan who have made
submission under strict control and expel all persons pretending
to belong to it as an excuse for raising trouble. All cases of
gangs collecting to commit murder from motives of vengeance are
to be dealt with under the laws against brigandage. There will
be no mercy shown to leaders of future disorders.
[Inclosure 8.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette July 2, 1900.
Ever since foreign nations commenced propagation of their
religion there have been many instances throughout the country
of ill feeling between the people and the converts. All this is
due to the faulty administration on the part of the local
authorities, giving rise to the feuds. The truth is that the
converts are also the children of the State, and among them
there are not wanting good and worthy people. But they have been
led astray by false doctrines and have relied oil the
missionaries for support, with the result that they have
committed many misdeeds. They hold to their errors and will not
turn from them, and irreconcilable enmity has thus grown up
between the converts and the people. The Throne is now exhorting
every member of the I Ho Ch’uan (Boxers) to render loyal and
patriotic services and to take his part against the enemies of
his country, so that the whole population may be of one mind.
Knowing that the converts are also subjects owing fealty to the
Throne, we ask how they can bring themselves to form a class
apart and invite their own destruction. If they can change their
hearts there is no reason why they should not be allowed to
escape from the net. The viceroys are commanded to issue the
following notification: All those among the converts who repent
of their former errors and give themselves up accordingly to the
authorities shall be ignored. The people shall also be notified
that in all places where converts reside they shall be allowed
to report to the local authorities concerned, and each case
shall be settled according to the general regulations, which
will be drawn up later.
As hostilities have now broken out between China and foreign
countries, the missionaries of every nationality must all be
driven away at once to their own countries, so that they may not
linger here and make trouble. But it is important that measures
shall be taken to secure their protection on their journey.
The high provincial authorities shall make close investigation
into the circumstances in all places without their jurisdiction
and speedily take the necessary steps. Let there be no
carelessness. The above decree shall be circulated for general
information.
[Inclosure 9.]
Imperial decrees published in the Pekin
Gazette July 6, 1900.
- 1.
- A cashiered lieutenant-colonel, Shou Chang, permitted to
return to service.
- 2.
- Chen Shou appointed lieutenant-general of Sheng Ching, to
assist military operations.
- 3.
- A censor, Wen Piao, complains of brigandage in the
capital. We order that the princes and ministers in command
of the Boxers shall instruct their subordinates to arrest
the guilty and execute them on the spot.
- 4.
- Relief for the hungry poor who suffer from the high price
of rice.
[Page 172]
[Inclosure 10.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette July 8, 1900.
The posts about Tientsin are of extreme importance. Troops are to
be massed for their defense. The 72 fire companies, numbering
over 10,000 men, all animated by a spirit of patriotism, united
with the Boxers, would swell the strength of the defense and
turn the edge of the enemy.
[Inclosure 11.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette July 9, 1900.
We appoint Li Hung Chang viceroy of the province of Chihli and
superintendent of northern trade. As the guarding of Tientsin is
at present of the most importance, we direct that until the
arrival of Li Hung Chang, Yu Lu, in concert with Sung Cheng,
deliberate as to the best measures to be taken. Pending the
change of officers there must be no slackening of
responsibility.
[Inclosure 12.—Translation of the
Pekin Gazette, July 11, 1900 (sixth moon, 10th
day)].
Report of the governor-general of Chihli, Yu
lu, concerning military engagements.
I have reported already to Your Majesty on the 29th day of the
fifth moon (June 24), concerning our engagements with the
foreign troops on the 29th, in the morning.
Several hundred foreign troops with many native Christians moved
from the railway station to Men I Wei bridge in order to aid the
foreign troops surrounding the arsenal. Our regular troops,
together with the Boxers, forced them to retire. On the same day
at noon, from the wall surrounding the arsenal at Hei Ku,
several hundred foreign troops with cannon again attacked our
fortifications opposite the arsenal, in a place called Pai Niao.
Our troops opened fire and the engagement lasted more than two
hours, and only after that the foreigners retreated. As the
foreign troops situated at Hsi Ku had for several days been
attacked by our troops and had no means to move, and also no
reinforcements were coming to them, the same night they set fire
to the arsenal on three sides and, profiting by it, fled. Our
troops, seeing that the fire had risen, sent a detachment to
pursue the foreigners, and on the other side, together with the
Boxers, put out the fire. The foreigners retreated in disorder
to the Lao Lung T’ou Railway station. After having subdued the
fire an inspection was made of the different storerooms of the
arsenal, and it was found that nine of these had burned down,
but the others had escaped altogether.
On the same day at noon the foreigners bombarded from the
settlement the workshops situated close to the temple Hsi Kuang
Ssu (the “treaty temple”). One of the shells fell into the
kitchen of this temple. A fire broke out and the buildings of
the temple and also the woodwork of the workshops and several
buildings of the temple burned down. There remain, however, more
than fifty chien, and the machinery in them, although somewhat
damaged, can be repaired. The arsenal at Hsi Ku has not yet been
taken by the foreign troops. Likewise the workshops to the south
of the city have not been entered by the foreigners. At present
orders have been issued to guard them strictly. Outside the east
gate of the city of Tientsin, at a distance of some 20 li, the
arsenal was several times attacked by foreigners. From the 27th
day to the 30th of the fifth moon the foreign troops which had
just arrived were several times repulsed. On the 1st day of the
sixth moon the foreign troops again arrived from the eastern
side of the arsenal. They were repulsed by the commanding
officer, Pan Chin-shan, but they repeated their attacks several
times and were repulsed again, many of the foreign soldiers
being killed. Just at mealtime more than 8,000 foreign troops,
arriving from the foreign settlement of Tientsin, attacked the
arsenal. They were met by commander Yao. Cavalry arrived from
Chun Liang Ch’eng and attacked our troops, together with the
foreigners attacking us from the west. The shells and bullets
fell like rain. Pan Chin-shan was wounded in his right leg.
Shortly afterwards a shell fell into one of the workshops of the
arsenal and an explosion took place. The foreign troops, seizing
this occasion, entered from every side. We could not hold our
position and retreated to Hsi Ku. Three hundred of our soldiers
had been killed, but the foreign losses were also not
[Page 173]
insignificant. The
arsenal occupies a space about 20 li in circumference. The
foreigners had occupied only part of it, and, according to
information received, only a part of the buildings have been
burned and the machinery stores have not been damaged. The
respective troops have received orders to act together with the
Boxers and find means to recover the arsenal. At the same time
that the arsenal was attacked foreign troops advanced also from
the east of the river and attempted to repair the railway bridge
at Ch’en Chia K’ou, in order to divide our troops, but one of
the commanders, together with the Boxers, attacked them with
artillery and killed many of the foreigners, destroying also the
bridge which the foreigners had attempted to repair. The foreign
troops fled in disorder to the settlement. On the 2d and 3d days
of the sixth moon the foreign troops made no attempt en masse,
but they kept provoking our troops on the concession and at Na
Chia K’ou. They also made sorties from the railway station to
places situated to the west of the river, but each time were
repulsed by our troops. These are the details of the different
engagements which have taken place since the 29th day of the
last moon.
As far as the taking of Taku is concerned, we have learned from
the spies that small gunboats of different powers—more than ten
in number—are anchored at Tang Ku. The troops which have come up
to Tientsin have been towed up by steam launches in barges.
Among the troops the Russians were in preponderance. They were
also accompanied by coolies, hired by the Russians for the
repair of the railway, and by Christian natives. The Wan Men
bridge has been destroyed by the foreign troops, and the railway
upward from Chun Liang Ch’eng has not been repaired.
At present General Ma Yu-kun, with his troops, has arrived (on
the 3d day of the sixth moon) at Tientsin. On the arrival of
these reinforcements the inhabitants of Tientsin felt themselves
more secure. I have consulted with the above general about the
mode of continuing the warfare, and we have come to the
conclusion that in the first place it is necessary to force the
foreign troops to retire from the foreign settlement of Tientsin
and then to attack them at Taku. I have consulted on this
subject several times with Generals Na Meh and Lo, and hope to
be able to retake the Taku forts.
Rescript approving this mode of action.
memorandum by governor-general
yu lu.
Boxers at different places in my province have at different dates
arrived at Tientsin and taken part in the battles. At present
there is a Boxer chief of the district of Ching Hsi by the name
of Chang Te-sh’eng, who arrived on the 2d day of the sixth moon
with 5,000 Boxers and has presented himself to me. Seeing that
he is a man physically strong and mentally capable, I have
ordered him to choose a residence here and await further orders.
I have also directed that firearms and provisions should be
distributed to his followers. In case of merit on his part in
the future, a special report will be made by me on this
subject.
[Inclosure 13.]
Imperial decrees published in the Pekin
Gazette July 12, 1900.
The death of General Meh Shih Cheng.—Though he had done much to
train the troops, yet on the occasion he made many blunders. We
deprived him of his rank, but retained him in command, hoping he
would redeem his faults, but on the eleventh moon, (July 9), he
fell at the head of his forces.
Note by Yu Lu in the defense of Tientsin.—The gentry of Tientsin
have stated that after several days of hard fighting our troops
are sorely pressed. They ask reinforcements, and measures are
proposed for their relief.
A decree has been sent to the southern viceroys to hurry up
troops to the capital, which is described as in a state of
confusion.
[Inclosure 14.]
Imperial decree published in the Pekin
Gazette July 18, 1900.
The reason of the fighting between the Chinese and foreigners
sprung from a disagreement between the people and Christians. We
could but enter upon war when the forts of Taku were taken.
Nevertheless the Government is not willing lightly
[Page 174]
to break off the
friendly relations which have previously existed. We have
repeatedly issued edicts to protect the ministers of the various
countries. We have also ordered the missionaries of the various
provinces to be protected. The fighting has not become
extensive. There are many merchants of the various countries in
our dominions. All alike should be protected. It is ordered that
the generals and governors examine carefully where there are
merchants and missionaries and still, according to the
provisions of the treaties, protect them without the least
carelessness. Last month the chancellor of the Japanese legation
was killed. It was indeed most unexpected. Before this matter
had been settled the German minister was killed. Suddenly
meeting this affair caused us deep grief. We ought to vigorously
seek the murderer and punish him.
Not to mention the righting at Tientsin, the shun tien fu and the
governor-general of this province should command the officers
under them to examine what foreigners have been causelessly
killed and what property destroyed and report, that all may be
settled at once.
Concerning the wretches who have been burning houses, robbing and
killing the people these many days, they have caused this region
to be all in disorder. It is ordered that the governors-general
and the high officials should clearly ascertain the
circumstances and unite in reducing to order and quiet the
confusion and root out the cause of the disturbance. Cause all
places to know this general edict.
[Inclosure 15.]
A memorial published in the Pekin Gazette
July 24, 1900.
A memorial from Yu Lu and Sung Ch’ing describes later righting at
Tientsin. They state that General Meh Shih-ch’eng fell after a
desperate combat lasting six hours on the 9th of July, and that
on his fall his men retreated. The foreign troops forced their
way through the Hai-huang gate and the Hai-kuang temple was set
on fire, but the Chinese troops were reenforced and the
foreigners forced to withdraw to the foreign concession.
Artillery fire was opened on the concession and the Hung Lou
(red 2–story building) was destroyed and many foreigners killed.
Memorialists in the afternoon of the same day (July 9) led an
attack on the foreign concession, aided by the Boxers, advancing
from Ma Chia K’ou, and destroyed a 2–story building by artillery
fire, killing some score of foreign troops. The foreigners came
out in detachments and gave battle in the concession. The
Chinese gave way, but again advanced. When night came on,
however, the Boxers could no longer hold out, and the troops on
both sides were recalled.
On the 10th day of July a fresh attack was made by the Chinese
forces from the Lao Lung T’ou railway station, hoping to destroy
the railway, but this attempt was frustrated by fire from the
foreign troops. Many Chinese officers were killed, and a retreat
was only effected under cover of reenforcements brought up by
memorialists. It was reported the same evening that the foreign
loss was not small.
July 11, early, the foreigners attacked, but were forced to
retreat. At noon they again advanced and set up guns at Ma Chia
K’ou, firing at the Shui Shih Ying (naval secretariat) but,
though they set it on fire, it was not quite destroyed, but the
east and south gate of the city and places north and south of
the river all suffered from their fire, which was only stopped
by a flanking fire from the Chinese artillery.
The above, say the memorialists, is an account of the fight from
July 9 to July 11. Sung Ch’ing arrived at Tientsin on July 10.
He discussed the situation with Yu Lu and came to the conclusion
that the (positions of the) foreign troops in the settlement
were very strong, being protected by mines, but must be taken.
He heard also that there were many foreign war ships coming and
going at Taku. At the moment there were several score there and
over 10 inside, besides 3 torpedo boats, and at Tong Ku there
were over a thousand foreign troops. Further, the railway below
Chun Liang Ch’eng was working, with mines laid at each side to
prevent Chinese attacks. Thus it seemed that unless the trains
and steam launches could be stopped the foreigners could not be
destroyed. But the force at Tientsin only supplied for local
need, and though reenforcements were expected from Shantung,
dispatched by Yuan Shih-k’ai, these would not enable a
successful attack to be made on Taku, and further large
reenforcements were required.
Rescript expresses the regret of the Throne at death of the
officers mentioned, and announces that posthumous honors will be
bestowed on them.
[Page 175]
[Inclosure 16.]
A decree published in the Pekin Gazette
August 2, 1900.
Owing to the disturbances caused by the people and the converts
in the neighbor hood of the capital, war broke out between China
and the foreign powers. It was a duty to protect the envoys of
the various foreign States residing in Pekin, and the prince and
ministers of the tsungli yamen addressed frequent letters to
them inquiring after their welfare. They also, on account of the
minds of the people in the city being excited and the difficulty
of maintaining a complete defense, discussed with the various
foreign ministers the question of detaching troops to give them
safe escort to Tientsin, in order to avoid alarm and
apprehension.
We direct the grand secretary, Jung Lu, to select in advance
trustworthy officers, civil and military, of high rank, to take
trustworthy troops, and when the foreign envoys have fixed the
date for leaving the city give them safe-conduct on the road. If
there should be evil-doers who lie in wait to plunder, these are
to be immediately killed. Before the envoys leave the capital,
if they have telegrams to be sent to their countries, provided
they are en clair, the tsungli yamen is promptly to arrange the
matter for them without delay. This will exhibit the extreme
desire of the Throne to treat the people from afar with
tenderness.
[Inclosure 17.]
A decree published in the Pekin Gazette
August 2, 1900.
The merchants and missionaries of all countries in China have
nothing to do with the war that has broken out between China and
foreign powers, and for that reason we issue instructions to the
various provincial authorities to give protection as usual.
At the present moment great forces are collecting in the vicinity
of the capital, and all the high officers in command of troops
must also make the above aim their own, and steps must be taken
to protect all foreign merchants and missionaries in accordance
with the tender feeling of the Throne toward the people from
afar.
The converts are also the children of the State, but as soon as
the quarrel between them and the Boxers broke out they have been
occupying villages, digging intrenchments, and throwing up
barricades” in resistance to the Government troops. Such conduct
is equivalent to rebellion and must be severely dealt with. We
remember, however, that they were actuated by fear of
punishment, and if they will repent and reform the net may be
opened (to allow them to escape).
We yesterday received a report from Sung Ch’ing to the effect
that at Ta Pao Tien, in the Pao Ti district, he earnestly
admonished the converts and the missionaries and others who were
willing to deliver up their arms and their barricades, to fill
up their intrenchments, and to disperse to their villages. Thus
it may be seen that not all converts are willing evil doers.
Wherever there are converts who repent and make submission the
generals and officers and the local officials are hereby
directed to act as above, and not to put all to death. The bad
characters in different places who pretend to be patriotic
people—i. e., Boxers (I Min)—and pick quarrels in order to
pillage and slay are to be punished, in order that the springs
of disorder may be purified.
[Inclosure No. 18.]
The Tsungli Yamen
to Mr. Conger.
Pekin, June 19,
1900.
No. 187.]
Your Excellency: The princes and
ministers have the honor to inform the minister of the United
States that the viceroy of Chihli has memorialized the Throne
that he received a communication from M. du Chaylard, the French
consul-general (at Tientsin), on the 17th instant, stating that
the admirals of the foreign fleets had demanded the surrender of
all the Taku forts to them by to-morrow morning at 2 o’clock, or
else they will attack them and take them by force.
The princes and ministers have the honor to say that this news
has caused them great astonishment, China having been so long at
peace with the powers, and if now the foreign admirals intend to
seize the forts this would show an intention on the part of the
powers to break off friendly relations, and they would be the
first to offend.
[Page 176]
At the present time the Boxer banditti have risen in Pekin and
caused public excitement. The minister of the United States,
with his family and staff, being here, his legation is now in
danger, and China will find it a difficult matter to give
complete protection. The princes and ministers therefore beg
that within twenty-four hours the minister of the United States,
with his family, etc., and taking his guards, keeping them under
control, will leave for Tientsin, in order to avoid danger. An
escort of troops has been dispatched to give protection en
route, and the local officials have been also notified to allow
the minister’s party to pass.
[Inclosure 19.]
The Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps to the Tsungli
Yamen.
Your Highness and Your Excellencies:
The foreign ministers have received with great astonishment the
note which the Tsungli Yamen has sent them dated to-day.
They know absolutely nothing of that which the note contains upon
the subject of what may have taken place at the forts of Taku.
The foreign ministers can only accept the declarations and the
demand which the yamen makes to them and prepare to leave Pekin.
It is utterly impossible to arrange for the departure in the
short time of twenty-four hours. The Chinese Government must
understand that there are a great number of women and children
here and that it is a very numerous procession that must be
provided for.
The Tsungli Yamen tells us that it will furnish safeguards en
route. The foreign ministers desire to know in what these
safeguards will consist, understanding that the country is full
of rebels. We do not doubt the sincere willingness of the
Chinese Government in this regard, but since there are foreign
soldiers en route who are marching toward Pekin for the purpose
of cooperating amicably with the Government in reestablishing
order, the foreign ministers desire that these detachments
should be quickly advised, so that they may join us and all
depart together.
The foreign ministers must demand, besides the necessary means of
transport, carts, boats, and provisions, and also be accompanied
by some of the ministers of the tsungli yamen.
For the purpose of arranging all these questions the members of
the diplomatic corps request to be received by Prince Ching and
Prince Tuan to-morrow, Wednesday, at 9 o’clock a.m.
The diplomatic corps expect an immediate reply.
[Inclosure 20.]
The Tsungli Yamen
to the Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps.
On the 19th instant we received the dispatch of the dean, as
follows: “The diplomatic corps know absolutely nothing of the
forts at Taku. Your yamen directs us for the present to leave
Pekin. It will be impossible to depart in twenty-four hours. The
Chinese Government must understand that there are a great number
of women and children here, and that it is a very numerous
procession which must be provided for. We wish to be informed as
to the nature of the guaranty of security which you will furnish
us. The detachments at present en route to Pekin have no other
than friendly intentions. Moreover, we ask for to-morrow morning
at 9 o’clock an interview with your yamen.”
In making known to you by our dispatch of yesterday that you
ought to leave Pekin within twenty-four hours we were guided by
no other consideration than that of disturbances raised by the
bandits in the city of Pekin itself and the fear of not being
able to insure your protection. But the regions surrounding
Pekin being at present disturbed, it is to be feared also that
the departure of a procession of the families of members of the
legations and their children can not occur without great
danger.
Since your dispatch declares to us that it is impossible for you
to prepare to leave in twenty-four hours, we naturally agree to
the delay and negotiate anew.
[Page 177]
The relations of good friendship which have so long existed
between China and the different powers have not been stained by
any animosity. But at present, by reason of the disagreement
which exists between the people and the Christians, a state of
things has actually arrived which could not have really been
foreseen.
To-day, as the foreign ministers express a desire to visit our
yamen at 9 o’clock, we, prince and ministers, have an equal
desire to express to them our thoughts. But, it being true that
during these last days the streets are overexcited, the foreign
ministers in going from their legations to our yamen would
encounter en route very great danger, which gives us, prince and
ministers, great anxiety for you. Besides, we are daily on guard
at the palace, and it is impossible for us to be in two places
at the same time.
Your dispatch contains not only assurances of peaceful
intentions; it adds that you intend especially to safeguard good
relations.
The prince and ministers have been profoundly pleased with this
declaration, and we hope that you will be good enough to inform
us expressly what are the intentions and instructions of your
Governments, in order to enable us to negotiate in concert with
you again. We pray you, besides, Mr. Dean, to be kind enough to
communicate with haste this dispatch to the representatives of
the powers.
Compliments and cards.
[Inclosure 21.]
The Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps to the Tsungli
Yamen.
Your Highness and Your Excellencies: I
have the honor to inform your highness and your excellencies
that the foreign ministers have received and read with interest
your dispatch of yesterday.
In reply to the question put to them, they instruct me to make
known to you that their Governments have never given them any
but the most friendly instructions in regard to China. They have
at no time had any other purpose than assuring their safety. It
is for this purpose only that the detachments are at present en
route to Pekin.
The foreign ministers must for their part ask the entire
attention of your highness and your excellencies to the firing
upon them which has been continued since yesterday. They are
convinced that this must be done against the wish of the Chinese
Government, and that it may be charged only to rebels or to some
groups of soldiers acting independently. They therefore request
you to immediately put a stop to these aggressions, so contrary
to the terms of your note just received and to the friendly
spirit of the present dispatch.
[Inclosure 22.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
For the last ten days the soldiers and militia have been
fighting, and there has been no communication between us, to our
great anxiety.
Some time ago we hung up a board expressing our intention, but no
answer has been received, and, contrary to the expectation, the
foreign soldiers made renewed attacks, causing alarm and
suspicion amongst the soldiers and people. Yesterday the troops
captured a convert named Chin Hu-hsi and learned from him that
the foreign ministers were all well, which caused us very great
satisfaction.
But it is the unexpected that happens. The reinforcements of
foreign troops were long ago stopped and turned back by the
Boxers, and if in accordance with previous agreement we were to
guard your excellency out of the city, there are so many Boxers
on the Tientsin-Taku road that we should be very apprehensive of
misadventure. We now request your excellencies to first take
your families and the various members of your staffs and leave
your legations in detachments. We should select trustworthy
officers to give you close and strict protection, and you should
temporarily reside in the tsungli yamen pending future
arrangements for your return home, in order to preserve friendly
relations intact from beginning to end; but at the time of
leaving the legations there must on no account whatever be taken
any single
[Page 178]
armed
foreign soldier, in order to prevent doubt and fear on the part
of the troops and people, leading to untoward incidents.
If your excellency is willing to show this confidence, we beg you
to communicate with all the foreign ministers in Pekin,
to-morrow at noon being the limit of time, and to let the
original messenger deliver your reply, in order that we may
settle in advance the day for leaving the legation.
This is the single way of preserving relations that we have been
able to devise in the face of innumerable difficulties. If no
reply is received by the time fixed even our affection will not
enable us to save you.
Compliments Prince Ching and others, 6th moon, 28th day.
[Inclosure 23.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
I have received your letter of to-day’s date and avail myself of
the opportunity to recall to your highness’s recollection the
fact that among all civilized States a foreign envoy occupies an
almost sacred position as a guest whom his host is absolutely
bound to protect. When war breaks out between two States the
first anxiety of each is to give the envoys of the other safe
conduct out of its dominions, for it would be disgraced if harm
befell him within its borders. There has never been a case of
war between two civilized powers in which the safety of the
envoys was not guaranteed.
Now, what has been the treatment by China of the envoys who are
guests at her capital?
Ever since the 20th of June the troops of the Chinese Government
have kept up an incessant fire on all the foreign legations,
both with rifles and artillery.
Even if China is at war with the whole world she is bound to
protect the residence of foreign envoys.
Moreover, ordinarily when peace is declared after a war no action
is taken against the officials of the defeated power; but if
foreign envoys were to be killed in attacks on the legations by
the troops of the Government to which they are accredited there
is grave probability of personal reprisal against all those in
official positions in the city. I beg your highness ponder these
observations.
The letter under acknowledgment speaks of attacks by foreign
soldiers. There have never been any such attacks. All that has
been done is to defend the lives of those living in the
legations against the Chinese troops. We shall continue to
defend ourselves, but it would be better for China if she left
off attacking.
In accordance with your request I have communicated to the other
foreign ministers your suggestions that the ministers and their
families should go without armed escort to the Tsungli Yamen.
They beg me to state that they do not understand why they should
be safer there than in the legations.
I have only to add that if it is desired to make any further
communications I suggest that a trustworthy person be sent
holding a plain white flag or white cloth. He will be in no way
molested and will be allowed to return in safety.
I avail myself, etc.
[Inclosure 24.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
We received last night your letter of the 15th July with an
inquiry regarding the taking of your family to temporarily
reside in the Tsungli Yamen.
Although the different foreign legations are not far distant from
each other, yet they are somewhat scattered, and in her efforts
to protect them China may fail at one point while looking after
another. For this reason the suggestion was made that all should
collect at the tsungli yamen, so that there might be
concentration of force in the protection of a single place. This
was the object of the previous note.
We now see from the letter under acknowledgment that the proposal
is not acceptable
[Page 179]
to
the various foreign envoys. China must therefore increase the
number of troops and strictly restrain the militia, preventing
them from again opening fire on and attacking the foreign
legations, while the latter should also not fire from time to
time at pleasure, and so excite a general resentment which it
will be more than ever difficult to appease. China will continue
to exert all her efforts to keep order and give protection in
accordance with the general law.
We believe that your excellency and the other foreign envoys will
concur.
Further communications should be made in accordance with the plan
suggested in your letter.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 25.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
Glad to hear that the Chinese Government intend strictly
restraining the militia and not allow them to again open fire
and attack the foreign legations.
We have never fired except in self-defense, but the continual
attacks on us have naturally inspired great suspicion and it
will take time before confidence is restored. Chinese troops
moving across the north bridge were never molested until after
the 20th of June, when they fired on us. The writers of the note
must understand that while very anxious to reestablish peace and
quiet, we can not be sure who it is that is moving in our
vicinity, constructing barricades, preparing gun platforms;
therefore they must not blame us if we fire when we observe such
actions, for this is entirely in self-defense. It would be best,
as temporary measure, for the Chinese Government to forbid all
movements in sight of the legations until confidence is
restored. There will certainly, under those rules, be no attacks
by foreign troops.
They desire to add that even while this letter was being brought
in many shells were fired into the British legation.
Fortunately, no foreign envoy has as yet been wounded in the
attacks on the legations.
[Inclosure 26.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
We have just received your letter. The object of the entry of the
troops of different countries into Pekin was the protection of
the legations, but later as they strolled about the streets and
fired their rifles as they pleased there were cases of people
being wounded, and the neighborhood of the Chang An street
became almost closed to traffic. Moreover, on the 25th day of
the fifth moon (June 21), a Manchu noble named Jun happened to
be proceeding to court, when on reaching the street outside the.
Tung hwa gate (eastern gate of the palace) he suddenly heard a
rifle shot and the bullet pierced the covering of his cart. This
excited the anger of both the soldiers and people and led to
mutual attacks.
Now, since it has been mutually agreed that there shall be no
fighting in future on either side, there may be peace and quiet.
But there are now to the east of the Chien men gate on the city
wall foreign soldieys, who from time to time fire and make
attacks. If the soldiers could be controlled and not allowed to
go on the wall it would be most desirable.
Compliments, etc.
[Inclosure 27.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
I am in receipt of your letter of yesterday and beg to state in
reply that on the 19th of June the legations received a dispatch
from the Tsungli Yamen directing them to to leave the city by 4
o’clock next day.
A reply was sent stating that this was impossible owing to want
of transportation.
The yamen answered that the time could be extended. In spite of
this, at 4 o’clock
[Page 180]
that afternoon, fire was opened and an attack made on the
legations. The fire was, of course, returned, and probably it
was then that the cart of a Manchu noble was struck. From that
time until the 25th of June the Chinese fire was continued. A
board was then displayed on the north bridge, stating that an
Imperial decree had been received to protect the envoys and not
to fire, and that a dispatch would be handed over at the bridge.
A messenger was sent from the legation with a board stating that
in accordance with the decree he came to receive the dispatch,
but the Chinese soldiers threatened him with their rifles and he
had to return. The board remained on the bridge and Chinese
troops passed freely across and no shot was fired from the
legation. But at midnight the Chinese, having apparently
completed their preparations, suddenly opened a very heavy fire,
and from that day on the attacks on the legations have continued
without intercession.
As stated in a previous letter, such attacks on envoys are
absolutely without parallel in the history of the world. With
regard to the phrase in the letter under acknowledgment, that
there is a mutual agreement not to fire, I must again, as in my
previous letter, point out that preparations for attack are acts
of hostility equally with actual firing, and therefore the
legations can not at present allow the construction of gun
platforms, and earthworks, and barricades in their neighborhood,
even though no firing takes place, though it is to be hoped that
the time will soon come when mutual confidence will be restored,
and measures in defense of the foreign legations be no longer
necessary.
As to the request that the foreign troops shall be withdrawn from
the city wall, it is unfortunately the case that much of the
firing has been directed against the legations from the wall,
and therefore for the present the request can not be complied
with.
I beg to ask in conclusion that sellers of ice and fruit may be
allowed to come into the legation quarter, either along Legation
street or from the north bridge, as these are articles of which
there are none in the legations.
Compliments, etc.
[Inclosure 28.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Jung
Lu.
I received the message sent by the soldier. I have this morning
already sent a letter to the north bridge in reply to that
received yesterday.
The foreign ministers have no other desire than to see peace
reestablished, but it is difficult for them to have confidence
in consequence of the renewed attacks upon us. We never fire,
except when we see people moving about in our vicinity,
apparently preparing to attack us, or building barricades or gun
platforms or other offensive work.
The best plan to suppress attacking us would be to cut off their
supplies of ammunition, and thus by degrees peace will be
restored and confidence resumed.
It would be a very good thing also if some responsible person be
sent to discuss matters with us.
[Inclosure 29.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Jung
Lu.
Yesterday I sent to your excellency a letter, through General
Sun, commanding the direction of the Ha-ta-men. This morning I
have myself spoken with the colonel commanding the troops on the
wall in the direction of the Chien-men, who had informed me that
he wished personally to carry to your excellency a letter, in
case my previous letter has not reached your excellency. I beg
to repeat it. I would also add to this that the following orders
have been issued to all European troops until such time as
complete confidence has been restored:
- First.
- Our troops not to fire unless fired upon.
- Second.
- Soldiers constructing barricades to be fired
upon.
- Third.
- Any armed soldiers leaving their barricades seen in
the neighborhood of the legations will be fired
upon.
- Fourth.
- Any unarmed officers or soldiers carrying letters or
messages will not be fired at, but these should not
exceed two in number. If unarmed soldiers leave their
barricades or positions in greater numbers than the
above stated, shots will be fired over their heads, and
if they continue to advance they will be fired
at.
P. S.—While this letter was being written the yamen
secretary, Wen Pei, arrived and copies of the previous
letters were handed him.
[Inclosure 30.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
Yesterday we received the Secretary Wen’s report of his
interview, and learned that the foreign envoys also wish for
peace.
It is possible that the foreign envoys do not fully realize the
keen desire of the court on the present occasion to protect the
legations, and we feel bound to give a detailed explanation.
The discord between the people and the converts is of very long
standing, and trouble having suddenly broken out the whole
people are of one mind. The Throne has repeatedly issued edicts,
both for extermination and pacification, but all people detest
the converts (or the religion), this feeling being universal.
There is a great ferment, absolutely beyond control. The feeling
has gone so far that only the destruction of the legations will
satisfy it. For the last month, fortunately, your excellency and
others have been at peace and well to the happiness of all
countries and of China. But the fighting at Tientsin is now
proceeding fiercely, and it is not advisable that your
excellency and others should remain long in the city. Recently
in the Manchuria and Shansi the Boxers are from all sides
answering the call, and are showing their eagerness to serve
their sovereign. In both cases stringent decrees have been
issued directing the viceroys and governors concerned and the
high officers in command of troops to use every effort to keep
order and prevent a northward advance (sic?), but it is to be
feared that the rivers dammed up will overflow, and the calamity
will be indescribable.
After much consideration our only course is to again request your
excellency and others to temporarily retire to Tientsin. The
Throne will not fail to give protection, and will detach the
forces of Sung Ching and Sun Wan-lin to give efficient escort,
and guarantee your safety.
If your excellency determines to stay in Pekin, and if there
should happen any unfortunate disaster, we, the prince and
ministers, have faithfully given warning in advance and can not
accept the responsibility. We have stated what is in our hearts,
and it is for your excellency to come to a decision and send a
speedy reply, which we anxiously await.
(No “compliments” or usual ending of letters.)
[Inclosure 31.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
Yesterday evening I received your letter in which there are
several points I do not understand.
It is stated that the keen desire of the court to protect the
foreign legations is possibly not fully realized, and that a
detailed explanation will be given, but all that is explained is
that there is a great ferment absolutely beyond control, and
that the feeling has gone so far that nothing but the
destruction of the legations will satisfy it.
It is difficult to believe that since there is a real desire on
the part of the Throne to protect the foreign envoys there can
be any impossibility in doing so, provided proper orders are
issued to the troops of the Chinese Government.
An imperial edict might also be issued to the people explaining
that the foreign envoys are in the capital as the guests of the
Sovereign, and that it is in the highest degree important in the
interests of China that the legation quarter should be left in
peace. All persons disregarding this would then be treated as
disloyal subjects.
[Page 182]
With regard to the request that the foreign envoys should leave
the capital to go to Tientsin there are two observations to be
made for your consideration. In the first place, as long as the
envoys remain in the capital the reestablishment of friendly
relations in accordance with general desire is facilitated,
while their departure would mean that friendly relations with
China and all the other powers of the world had been definitely
broken off, and it would then take a very long time to
reestablish peace.
The calamities thus brought on the officials and people of China
would be indescribable. Moreover, so far as is known to the
foreign ministers the Chinese representatives at the various
foreign capitals are still at their posts, probably with the
same object of endeavoring to reestablish friendly
relations.
Secondly, in previous letters it was stated that it would not be
safe for the envoys to proceed to Tientsin. The present letter
also speaks of uncontrollable ferment and of the Boxers
gathering from all sides. I therefore beg you to explain why, if
the Chinese Government can not insure the protection of the
foreign envoys in Pekin by the Chinese troops, they feel
confident of their power to do so outside the city on the way to
Tientsin.
The letter closes by saying that you can not be responsible for
any unforeseen disaster that may occur. But as the foreign
envoys have come to Pekin in reliance on the protection of the
Chinese court I must point out that it is impossible for the
latter to free itself from the responsibility for their
safety.
I shall be glad to have an answer to this letter to communicate
to my colleagues.
Compliments, etc.
[Inclosure 32.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
We have received your reply stating that there were some points
in our letter not altogether clear. We now propose to explain
our meaning in full detail. From the first to last we have never
neglected the protection of the legations, but owing to the fact
that the numbers of rebellious people are daily increasing we
are greatly afraid that something may happen too suddenly to be
guarded against and produce a great calamity. This was why we
renewed the suggestion for a temporary retirement. As to the
inquiry what difference there is between giving protection in
the city or on the road, and why it is not possible to give it
in the former case while it can be given in the latter, there is
only an apparent discrepancy. For being in the city is
permanent, the being on the road is temporary. If all the
foreign ministers are willing to temporarily retire, we should
propose the route to Tung Chou and thence by boat downstream
direct to Tientsin, which could be reached in only two days. No
matter what difficulties there might be, a numerous body of
troops would be sent, half by water to form a close escort, half
by land to keep all safe on both banks. Since the time would be
short we can guarantee that there would be no mischance. It is
otherwise with a permanent residence in Pekin, where it is
impossible to foretell when a disaster may occur. No matter
whether by day or night, a single hour or a single moment’s
remissness may produce an alarm without time to take
precautions. This can be readily understood. The letter under
acknowledgment further states that the continual residence of
the foreign ministers in Pekin facilitates the reestablishment
of peace in accordance with the general desire, and that if they
leave it will be more difficult and will take longer to
reestablish friendly relations.
This observation shows that your excellency is not unmindful of
the friendship that has hitherto existed. There is certainly no
wish on the part of China for the calamity of war to be
indefinitely prolonged. But at the present moment the warships
of all nations have occupied an important fort and have further
seized Tientsin. Seeing that warlike operations are in progress
there, how does your excellency propose to put an end to
them?
As your excellency and the other foreign ministers have to
arrange the reestablishment of the status quo, it would seem
better to settle matters at Tientsin, and we would repeat our
request that you will pack your baggage by an early day and name
a fixed date in order that we may prepare boats and
provisions.
Compliments.
[Page 183]
[Inclosure 33.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
For the past month and more military affairs have been pressing.
Your excellency and the other foreign ministers ought to
telegraph home that your families are well in order to soothe
anxiety. But at present peace is not restored, and your legation
telegrams must be wholly en clair, stating that all is well,
without touching on military affairs.
Under these conditions the yamen can transmit them.
The writers beg that your excellency will communicate this to the
various foreign ministers. Compliments.
[Inclosure 34.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
I have conferred with my colleagues regarding the proposal in
your letter of the 25th instant that the foreign envoys should
leave Pekin for Tientsin via Tung Chou; and I beg to observe in
their name that while the letter speaks of arrangements being
made for boats and food, nothing is said in regard to chairs and
carts from this city to Tung Chou.
They would be glad to know what arrangements the Chinese
Government propose to make in this respect, and especially as to
the transport of sick women and children, who will require
special attention, and also to have further details as to the
escort it is proposed to provide. When my colleagues know these
details they will be in a position to examine the question,
which for the present remains in the same state as
heretofore.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 35.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
I have duly communicated to my colleagues your letter suggesting
that the foreign ministers should telegraph to their respective
countries news of the well-being of their families, permission
being given only to telegraph en clair, without reference to
military matters.
In reply I beg to point out that it is impossible to telegraph
that the ministers’ families are well, because women and
children have naturally suffered in health from the confinement
in hot weather during the siege of the last five weeks and the
lack of food to which they are accustomed.
I may further point out, with regard to the prohibition of cipher
messages, that nothing but a cipher message would be accepted by
foreign governments as proof that the envoy concerned was its
author, and that as to the stipulation that no military news
should be sent, the foreign envoys have no information in regard
to the military situation and therefore could not send
intelligence of that kind.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 36.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
(Undated. Received July 28,
1900.)
We hear that in the different legations there are housed a
considerable number of converts. The number of people being
large and the space small, this must cause much inconvenience in
this hot weather. Feeling is now quiet and tranquil, and the
converts mentioned may very well be sent out and directed to
quietly pursue their avocations. There is no need for doubt and
fear.
[Page 184]
If this meets concurrence, we would beg that an estimate be made
of the number of people and days fixed for sending them out,
notice being given us in advance, in order that there may be
mutual harmony.
We beg you to take the requisite action and also communicate with
the other foreign envoys with a view to their taking similar
steps.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 37.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
I received the evening before last your further letter with
regard to the proposal that the foreign ministers should proceed
to Tientsin, and also a letter with regard to converts in the
legations being sent out, tranquillity now prevailing, etc.
While my colleagues and myself were considering these letters we
were surprised to hear the sound of heavy firing from the
direction of the Pei Tang, which was evidently being attacked;
we have no means of knowing by whom.
Further, there was constructed in the course of yesterday
afternoon and last night a barricade across the North Bridge,
from which a continuous fire has been kept up on the legations,
and to-day there has also been a fire directed against the
French and Russian legations.
There seems to my colleagues and to me to be a strange
contradiction between the professions of a desire to protect us
contained in the letters we have received and the actions above
described. There are European officers and soldiers as well as
missionaries at the Pei Tang, and as long as attacks on the
legations and the Pei Tang are permitted, or if not permitted
can not be prevented, it is difficult to see how similar attacks
could be prevented on the journey to Tientsin.
We must, therefore, before further discussing the question of
transport to Tung Chou, invite your explanations with regard to
the above.
[Inclosure 38.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
We received yesterday your note. The Pei Tang affair was due to
the converts having previously gone out in all directions to
plunder food. There were also some around with rifles who, on
being stopped, immediately fired. This caused anger and
resentment amongst the people, who joined the crowd of Boxers
and made continuous attacks. A decree has now been requested to
the effect that if the converts do not come out to plunder—this
kind of people being also children of the State— they are to be
protected and not further attacked. This practice will thus be
gradually stopped.
As to the northern bridge matter, the troops of Tung were
building a road, and the legations misunderstood them to be
building a barricade and so opened fire, which the troops
returned. This was a misunderstanding on both sides which will
not lead to further attacks.
As to giving protection in temporarily leaving, it is not an easy
matter, and it was only after much arrangement and after it had
been found possible to give guaranty against mischance that the
suggestion was put in writing. The matter is one of the greatest
importance, and we could not purposely deceive.
We would therefore ask you and the other foreign ministers not to
be overanxious, but to come to a decision with regard to a
temporary retirement and send us a reply.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 39.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
Yesterday we sent a letter in reply to your note, and in it
stated that the mutual misunderstanding would not lead to
further attack. But last night there were some converts who
again fired on the posts of the Government troops, wounding 2 of
the
[Page 185]
latter. The fire
was immediately returned, and thereupon ceased. If the converts
are not more amenable to control, it is to be feared that they
will produce great disaster and ruin the whole situation. We
therefore request you, in consultation with the other foreign
ministers, to impose the strictest restraint, so as to avoid
hostility arising from this. This is very important.
We hear of late that the converts have collected in great numbers
and that they do not wish the foreign envoys to leave Pekin,
their hope being that they will thus have perpetual support.
Rumor is not, of course, to be trusted; but if the above is
really the case, we believe that the various foreign envoys will
have long ago seen through the design and will not fall into
their trap.
With regard to a temporary retirement, we sent yesterday an
answering note, to which we have not yet received a reply. We
must beg that within two or three days a date be fixed and
communicated, in order that preparations may be made.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 40.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
The letter received yesterday has caused me the greatest
surprise. In the first place, the legations are not defended by
converts, but by legation guards who came to Pekin with the
consent of the Chinese Government for that purpose. Secondly, no
shot was fired against the Chinese the day before evening, as
stated in the letter. But from the newly constructed barricade
on the north bridge and from other quarters there was directed
against the legations a steady fire during the whole of that day
and night, which was continued to the present moment, in spite
of the fact that not a shot has been fired in return. Last night
over 300 shots were thus fired without reply. Thirdly, the
letter under acknowledgment speaks of firing by the Chinese
Government troops. The foreign representatives are reluctant to
believe that the fire directed against them the last two days
proceed from the troops of the Chinese Government, but if it
does not they find it impossible to understand why it is
permitted to continue.
The writers of the letter do not yet seem to fully understand the
difficulty in which the foreign representatives are placed by
these renewed attacks, and I beg therefore to explain it in
fuller detail. Suppose that they declare their readiness to
proceed to Tientsin on a certain day; how are they to leave
their legations? It can not be expected that they should come
out and expose themselves to the fire now directed against them.
If that fire ceased shortly before their departure, what
security have they that it would not be renewed the moment they
were on the road?
This is the difficulty in which the foreign envoys find
themselves whenever they meet to consider the question of
proceeding to Tientsin. It is a difficulty that naturally
presents itself, and is in nowise suggested by the converts,
whose interference would not be for a moment tolerated by the
foreign representatives.
I shall again address you with regard to the subject of transport
to Tientsin as soon as I have received your reply to the present
letter.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 41.]
Prince Ching et al. to Sir Claude MacDonald.
We have received your letter of the 2d of August. With regard to
the question of a temporary withdrawal (from Pekin to Tientsin),
a public Imperial decree was issued yesterday appointing the
Grand Secretary Jung Lu to select capable civil and military
officers to take the troops to afford safe escort.
The Grand Secretary Jung Lu, before undertaking this responsible
duty, had already taken the greatest pains and naturally
considered every possible point, and it was not until he had
done so that he ventured to accept the responsibility. Thus the
case is quite different from that of some person without
authority taking upon himself duties for which he is unfit.
We would therefore request your excellency and the other foreign
representatives
[Page 186]
to
make your minds at ease and not to hesitate and be overanxious,
and earnestly trust that you will speedily send us a reply
stating the details of the arrangements and the date you have
decided on, in order that all necessary steps may be taken.
With regard to the firing during the night, it was, as before,
the result of a mutual misunderstanding. Fortunately neither
side crossed its frontier. It was more or less on the same
footing as the sounding of the evening drum and the morning bell
(of temple priests). It is really hardly worth a smile.
Compliments.
[Inclosure 42.]
The Tsungli Yamen
to Sir Claude
MacDonald.
A letter was yesterday addressed to you containing an inquiry as
to the date of departure of yourself and your colleagues. We
have not yet received a reply.
We have received frequent telegrams from the different Chinese
ministers abroad with regard to this matter, and all the foreign
offices request that safe escort out of Pekin should be provided
without delay. Now that the legations have all been placed in
telegraphic communication (with abroad) we must beg you to
speedily send a reply informing us of the date you have decided
upon leaving the capital, in order that with all haste the
necessary arrangements for the journey may be made.
As to the thorough and sincere protection to be given, full
details have been communicated in the previous letter.
Compliments.
(Cards of all yamen ministers—twelve. Hsu Ching Cheng and Yuan
Chang missing.)
[Inclosure 43.]
The Tsungli Yamen
to Sir Claude
MacDonald.
We beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday,
inclosing a telegram to Her Majesty’s secretary of state for
foreign affairs in reply to that forwarded by the yamen, and
also seven telegrams from other foreign ministers.
Telegraphic communication between Pekin and Tientsin is at
present interrupted, and all telegrams are sent to Chinanfu for
transmission. We have already sent the eight telegrams by 600 li
courier (courier supposed to cover 200 miles a day) to Yuan
Ta-jen, governor of Shantung, for speedy transmission to their
various destinations.
Compliments.
(Cards of twelve yamen ministers.)
[Inclosure 44.]
The Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps to the Tsungli
Yamen.
At the moment when His Excellency Sir Claude MacDonald was
occupied in replying to the letter received to-day, and to which
you refer, he received and communicated to me the red letter
which your highness and your excellencies sent to-day and in
which it is stated that all our Governments had expressed the
desire that you would furnish us without delay a safe escort for
leaving Pekin.
Although I know that this letter comes from the Tsungli Yamen, I
have, in my capacity as dean, called together the diplomatic
corps to consider this important matter.
The reply which I must address to the Tsungli Yamen, in the name
of my honorable colleagues, is very simple. We send you eight
telegrams for our Governments in order that we may ourselves
receive their orders and instructions direct, which we regard as
necessary before leaving our posts, and as soon as we receive a
reply we shall be in a position to arrange this matter with
you.
[Page 187]
[Inclosure 45.]
The Tsungli Yamen
to Mr. Conger.
Your Excellency: The princes and
ministers have the honor to inform the minister of the United
States that on the 7th of August the following decree was issued
from the Throne:
“Let Li Hung Chang be appointed as our plenipotentiary to consult
and make arrangements by telegraph of all matters with the
ministers for foreign affairs of the various foreign
countries.”
As in duty bound the prince and ministers send a copy of the
above decree for the information of the minister of the United
States so that he may respectfully take note accordingly.
[Inclosure 46.]
Sir Claude
MacDonald to Prince Ching et al.
On the 3d August I received from you a letter informing me that
an Imperial edict had been issued appointing the Grand Secretary
Jung Lu to select capable civil and military officers to take
troops to afford safe escort for a temporary withdrawal of the
foreign representatives to Tientsin. You added that the grand
secretary before undertaking this responsible duty had already
taken the greatest pains and considered every possible point,
and it was not until he had done so that he ventured to accept
the responsibility.
As I have frequently told you, it is impossible to understand how
safe escort can be provided outside the city, where, as you have
informed me, much disturbance prevails, when inside the city no
foreign representative can move outside his legation gate
without being deliberately shot at from behind their barricades
by Chinese Imperial troops.
I had hoped that the appointment of so high an official as Jung
Lu would have put a stop to this extraordinary and disgraceful
state of affairs, but even so late as this morning bullets have
been fired into the grounds of this legation by Chinese Imperial
troops.
On the 7th instant the Chinese troops in the street behind the
American legation fired at some people who were walking on the
south bridge under the city wall. For what purpose they fired it
is difficult to say. As it was midday, it could not have been,
as suggested by you, for the purpose of “sounding the evening
drum and morning bell.” However that may be, shots passed over
the bridge and fell among the Chinese soldiers who held the
barricade on the same street behind the German legation, causing
considerable confusion among them.
This incident, which I myself observed, has occurred often, and
would account for the accusation that the legation guards fire
on the troops without provocation.
I note that you consider the firing of several hundred shots into
the legations, which, as you are aware, are inhabited by women
and children as well as by the foreign representatives and their
staffs, as “hardly worth a smile.” I regret that this is an
opinion which I can not share with you.
[Inclosure 47.]
Hon. E. H.
Conger,
Our Respected and Beloved
Minister:
Your very kind note of yesterday reminds us anew of the
appreciation that you have manifested and the interest you have
shown in all the work of American missionaries. Nor can we fail
to recall the constant kindness and attentive care that you have
always accorded us personally. We assure you it shall never be
forgotten.
And we shall remember also the sincere interest you have taken in
the welfare and preservation of Chinese Christians at a time
when, but for the noble stand you took, perhaps even the remnant
would have perished.
[Page 188]
Please accept for Mrs. Conger and yourself our thanks for your
personal interest in all that has concerned us at a time when
the strain on yourselves was peculiarly severe.
With great respect, yours, sincerely,
John Wherry, G. R. Davis, W. F. Walker, F. D.
Gamewell, W. T. Hobart, Charles A. Killie, Geo. W. Verity,
E. G. Tewksbury, Courtney H. Fenn, John Whiting, W. S.
Ament, Chauncey Goodrich, Arthur H. Smith, Gilbert Reid,
Franklin M. Chapin, William B. Stelle, J. H. Ingram, Howard
S. Galt, John Inglis, H. E. King, Charles E. Ewing.
Pekin, Sunday, August 19,
1900.
[Inclosure 48.]
Hon. E. H.
Conger,
Minister of the United
States of America.
Dear Sir: At a meeting of the American
missionaries held this morning at 8.30 the following resolution
was unanimously adopted, and it was further voted that the
resolution be drafted and presented to you:
“The Americans who have been besieged in Pekin desire to express
their hearty appreciation of the courage, fidelity, and
patriotism of the American marines to whom we so largely owe our
salvation.
“By their bravery in holding the wall in the face of overwhelming
numbers and in cooperating in driving the Chinese from a
position of great strength they made all foreigners in Pekin
their debtors and gained for themselves an honorable name among
the heroes of their country.”
For the meeting:
- Arthur H. Smith, Chairman.
- Charles E. Ewing, Secretary.
Pekin, Saturday, August 18,
1900.
[Inclosures 49 and 50 are sketches facing this
page,]