No. 81.
Mr. Cramer to Mr. Evarts.

No. 423.]

Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 405 of the 8th of December last, in which I stated that the political situation here was extremely unsatisfactory to the people; that the united left or peasants’ (anti-governmental) party had a large majority in the lower house of the Rigsdag, while the national liberal (governmental) party had a large majority in the upper house; that the two houses would in all probability be unable to agree on the financial bill; that it appeared to be the intention of the opposition party in the lower house either to compel the present ministry, like two of its predecessors, to resign, and the King to select one from among themselves, or to refuse to pass the financial bill in an acceptable form; that the King had an aversion to selecting a ministry from among that party; that in case that bill failed to become law the executive government would in all probability adopt a provisional financial law, &c., I have now the honor to further inform you that the dreaded constitutional crisis has arrived.

On the 2d of October last the ordinary session of the Rigsdag was opened, and on the 4th instant it was closed, after both houses had failed to agree on a financial law, by order of the King. As a last resort the financial bill was, a few weeks before the adjournment of the Rigsdag, referred to a joint committee composed of fifteen members from each house, sixteen members of which belonged to the governmental party and fourteen to the anti-governmental party. Mutual concessions having been made, it had at one time the appearance as though an acceptable compromise could be arrived at. But just at that moment a member of the opposition party proposed a resolution to the effect that the joint committee declare ft as its sense that a financial law could not be agreed upon unless the ministry resigned. The majority of the committee rejected this resolution, and there being now no longer a chance for a compromise, adopted one recommending to the Rigsdag the adoption of the financial bill in the form in which it had been passed in the upper house; while the minority report recommended the adoption of that bill in the form in which it had originally been passed in the lower house. When this subject was the order of the day in that house, [Page 121] the president of the ministry asked twice for permission to speak thereon, but the speaker simply ignored him, though the constitution gives the ministers the right to speak on all legislative and political questions as often as they think it for the best.

The joint committee having failed to agree upon a compromise, the two houses refused to recede from the positions which they respectively occupied previous to the appointment of that committee. Hence, no financial law was passed for the fiscal year 1877–’78; that of the previous year remaining in force only until the fifteenth of this month, and, therefore, Denmark has now no regular financial law, unless the executive government adopts a provisional one, which, according to the constitution, it has a right to do under certain circumstances. In the event of a provisional financial law being adopted by the executive government, then the Rigsdag must be called together within two months from the date of such a law for the purpose of ratifying it. Should the Rigsdag refuse to sanction it, then the ministers who countersigned it are to be impeached before the Rigsret, by the lower house of the Rigsdag. (How the Rigsret is composed, I have described in my dispatch No. 405, of the 8th of December last.) Should the Rigsret acquit the ministry, this verdict would be a virtual official declaration that the executive government had the right to adopt a provisional financial law whenever the two houses of the Rigsdag could not agree in passing the regular annual financial law. On the other hand, should those ministers be found guilty of having violated the constitution of the kingdom, that decision would be equivalent to a denial of the right of the executive government to adopt a provisional financial law under any circumstances.

It has not yet transpired what the executive government will do in the present crisis. They have, as yet, only seven days in which to decide upon a course of action. According to reports there is a good deal of excitement among the inhabitants of the different provincial districts, though no disturbance of the peace has as yet taken place. The population of Copenhagen is quiet, the majority thereof being on the side of the government.

As to the probable causes or motives of the present constitutional crisis the following may be observed:

1.
The constitution gives the King the sole and absolute right to appoint his ministers. Neither the Rigsdag as a whole, nor any one of its two houses, nor any political party, has a right to give advice or consent, or in any way to interfere in the matter. The constitution is silent on the question whether the ministry should or should not be in harmony with the majority of any one of the two houses of the Rigsdag; hence it does not contemplate a pure parliamentary form of government.
2.
The constitution grants to neither one of the two houses of the Rigsdag a preponderating influence in legislative matters. Both have the same rights and powers, except that the minister of finance is required to submit the financial bill first to the lower house.
3.
It is evident from the course pursued by the united left or opposition party during the past six or seven years, as well as from the tone and purport of the speeches and addresses delivered by their leaders, that they desire, (1) to ignore or curtail the rights and powers of the upper house; and (2) to encroach upon or arrogate to themselves some of the rights and prerogatives of the Crown, in that they, through the financial bill, endeavor to compel the King to appoint a ministry in harmony with their wishes. In other words, they wish to introduce a pure parliamentary form of government, similar to that of England or of Greece, which, however, is not contemplated by the constitution. [Page 122] It is bat natural that both the Grown and the upper house of the Rigsdag should sacredly guard the rights and powers secured to them respectively by the fundamental law of the land. They are determined not to permit the majority of any party in the lower house to dictate to them terms of peace, or virtually to rule the country through its committee of finance. Hence, under these circumstances, the King has, up to the present time, refused to yield to wishes of the peasants’ party in the matter of appointing his ministers, especially since they are said to have sometimes been expressed in a spirit and form not at all in harmony with the spirit of the constitution and the character and prerogatives of the Crown. Besides, it is also said that another reason why the King hesitates to appoint ministers from among that party, is, that it possesses no members sufficiently able and qualified for such positions. Whether this is so or not, I am unable to judge. This judgment appears, however, to be too hasty, if not too disparaging, before an opportunity is given to try the ability and qualification of the leaders of that party in ministerial positions, and it is but natural that they should resent it by making all the opposition they can. Hence, purely personal, if not selfish, motives have had and still have much to do in bringing about the present constitutional crisis.

I have, &c.,

M. J. CRAMER.