No. 325.
Mr. Maynard to Mr. Evarts.
Legation of the United States,
Constantinople, May 31, 1877.
(Received July 9.)
No. 156.]
Sir: The Turco-Russian war has prevailed the
last month, but with little change in the relative attitude of the two
parties. Strategically, so far as we have information here, there has
been but little advance on either side.
In European: Turkey the Danube continues to be the dividing line between
the two armies. The Turks report the loss of two small ironclads upon
the river. Little else seems to have occurred, except occasional
cannonading from the opposite banks of the stream, with, no very serious
results.
At the east of the Black Sea the Turks have captured Soukoum-Kaleh, a
small Russian port in the Caucasus, As a military success, I judge it is
of small importance. Politically, it is believed to have more
significance. A general rising of the Caucasians is reported to have
followed, and the Turks have been busy in forwarding for their use arms
and material of war. The occasion was improved to decorate the Sultan
with the title of Ghazi (the conqueror), a title
given only on the capture of a city from the enemies of the faith. The
Turkish papers of the 17th instant published a fetvah or decision of the Sheikh-ul-Islam awarding this title
to his Imperial Majesty Abdul-Hamid II, basing the award upon the
triumph of the Ottoman arms in, the capture of Sou-koum-Kaleh. The same
evening, during the embarkation of troops sent to re-enforce the
expedition to Soukoum-Kaleh, the governor of the imperial palace went
aboard each steamer and read to them a proclamation from the Sultan
dwelling upon the importance of the mission of deliverance confided to
the force sent to Circassia for the succor of their brethren in the
faith from a cruel and intolerant tyranny. The proclamation, we are
told, was received by the troops with the utmost enthusiasm and shouts
of “Long live the Padishah.” The next day being Friday, His Majesty
attended public worship at the mosque of St. Sophia, where, in the
special prayer for the Sultan, the imaum, in pronouncing his imperial
titles, added that of Ghazi, in conformity with
the fetvah of the Sheikhul-Islam. It would be
difficult to find an instance of a similar military achievement turned
to better account.
Soon afterward, the news got abroad that the Russians had carried
Ardahan, a strong post on the line between the fortresses of Kars and
Batoum, its base of supplies. This produced great popular excitement in
the Moslem population, and a violent demonstration of the softas. The
latter occasioned the proclamation of the state of siege (Inclosure
[Page 584]
No. 4 with dispatch No. 155),
and has been followed by the arrest of many of their number, who have
been sent into exile. Rumors have circulated that Ardahan has been
retaken, but they are not confirmed.
Except the fall of Soukoum Kaleh on the one side and of Ardahan on the
other, neither belligerent appears to have gained much advantage in the
Asiatic field.
When I wrote my dispatch of April 25, 1877, No. 147, I had not seen the
Russian manifesto. It seems to have been prepared as early as April 19,
in the form of a circular to the great powers, addressed by Prince
Gortchakoff to the several ambassadors, and by them delivered on the
24th, simultaneously with the declaration of war and the forward
movement of the Russian armies. A copy, with a translation, is
inclosed.
All the powers, except Great Britain, appear to have accepted it as the
logical result of events during the last two years, especially of the
last six months. Great Britain, equally logical in her own conduct,
meets it with an earnest protest, of which I inclose a copy, bearing
date, it will be seen, the 1st of May, instant, just one week after
receiving the Russian manifesto. I have had occasion more than once in
these dispatches to refer to the want of accord on the part of Great
Britain with the other powers in their Eastern policy; to her hesitation
in joining the consular mission of August, 1875, to the insurgents of
Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and in adhering to the Andrassy note of
December 30,1875, and her refusal to co-operate in the policy of the
so-called Berlin memorandum of May, 1876 (No. 89, August 10 1876);*
to her possibly divided counsels in the conference of December last (No.
113, December 26, 1876, and No. 126, January 30, 1877); to the
cautionary declaration of the Earl of Derby before signing the Protocol
of March 31, 1877 (No. 147, April 25, 1877).
I have found myself unable to resist the conviction that, but for the
apparently antagonistic attitude of Great Britain toward the other
powers, and especially toward Russia, the war would have been averted,
and there would have been a settlement of what is usually called the
Eastern question—a euphemism, perhaps, for the polity to be pursued by
Turkey, with the sanction of the other European powers. Let me not be
understood to intimate any want of good faith or open dealing on the
part of Her Majesty’s Government, or that any acts or declarations had
an ulterior purpose, much less that there was any unavowed agreement
with the Sublime Porte. Far from it. What I wish to express is, that
Turkish statesmen, seeing the constant dissent I have referred to, and
knowing the determination of united England to maintain at all hazards
her manufacturing and commercial supremacy, believed that she would not
be an indifferent spectator to a conflict which, on the one baud by
subjecting Turkey, or any part of it, to the commercial policy of
Russia, should endanger her best and most profitable customer; and on
the other, by giving the great northern power access through the Turkish
waters to the public seas, should create a troublesome rival, not to
speak of imaginary perils to the Indian Empire. This belief encouraged
them to reject the Berlin memorandum, the proposals of the conference,
and the protocol even to the ultimate reason of war, secure beforehand
of a vigorous moral support in Great Britain, and of a timely
intervention, if necessary, to avert a final disaster.
A reply to the Russian manifesto has been published by the Sublime Porte
in the form of a circular addressed by the Sultan to the several
[Page 585]
valis (governors-general) of the provinces, of
which are inclosed translations in French and in English. The tone is
much the same, it will be seen, as that of the reply of his excellency
Safvet Pasha to the protocol of March 31, 1877.
Meanwhile diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte have been resumed
by Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy. On the 17th instant the
Austrian-Lloyd’s steamer from Trieste brought with her passengers their
excellencies Count Corti, the Italian envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary; Count Zichy, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador ) and the
Prince Henry VII Reuss, who succeeds Baron Werther as the ambassador of
Germany. Their reception was very impressive: only less so than that
accorded to the new British ambassador on his arrival a month previous.
Of all the signatory powers to the protocol, France alone has failed, up
to this time, to renew the intercourse suspended at the close of the
conference in January last. This may be due, probably is, to the recent
changes in the French administration. Of course it is not intended to
include Russia in this category. She broke her diplomatic relations
simultaneously with the declaration of war.
I have, &c.,
[Inclosure 1 in No.
156.—Translation.]
the russian manifesto.
[Circular.]
St.
Petersburg, April 7/19,
1877.
M. L’Ambassadeur: The imperial cabinet has
exhausted, since the commencement of the Eastern crisis, all the
means in its power to bring about, with the concurrence of the great
powers of Europe, a lasting pacification of Turkey.
All the propositions successively made to the Porte in consequence of
the understanding established between the cabinets have met with an
invincible resistance on its part.
The protocol signed in London on the 19th/31st March of this year was
the last expression of the collective will of Europe.
The imperial cabinet had suggested it as a supreme effort of
conciliation. It had made known, by the declaration bearing the same
date and accompanying the protocol, the conditions which, if loyally
accepted and performed by the Ottoman Government, might bring about
the re-establishment and consolidation of peace.
The Porte has just answered by a fresh refusal. This eventuality had
not been contemplated by the protocol of London. While it formulated
the views and decisions of Europe, that document had confined itself
to stipulating that in case the great powers were deceived in their
hope of seeing the Porte apply energetically the measures destined
to afford to the condition of the Christian populations the
improvement unanimously called for as indispensable to the
tranquillity of Europe, they reserved to themselves to consider in
common as to the means which they might deem best fitted to secure
the well-being of those populations and the interests of the general
peace.
Thus the cabinets had foreseen the case of the Porte not fulfilling
the promises it might have made, but not that of its rejecting the
demands of Europe.
At the same time the declaration made by Lord Derby at the time of
signing the protocol stated that as the government of Her Britannic
Majesty had consented to the signature of that act only in view of
the interests of the general peace, it was to be understood
beforehand that in the event of the proposed object not being
attained—namely, reciprocal disarmament and peace between Russia and
Turkey—the protocol should be regarded as null and void.
The refusal of the Porte and the reasons on which it is founded leave
no hope of deference on its part to the wishes and counsels of
Europe, and no guarantee for the application of the reforms
suggested for the improvement of the condition of the Christian
populations. They render impossible peace with Montenegro and the
performance
[Page 586]
of the
conditions which might bring about disarmament and pacification. In
these circumstances, every chance is closed for efforts of
conciliation. There remains no alternative but to allow the state of
things to continue which the powers have declared incompatible with
their interests and those of Europe in general, or else to seek to
obtain by coercion what the unanimous efforts of the cabinets have
not succeeded in obtaining from the Porte by persuasion.
Our august master has resolved to undertake this work, which His
Majesty had invited the great powers to pursue in common with him.
He has given his armies the order to cross the frontiers of Turkey.
You will make known this resolution to the government to which you
are accredited.
In assuming this task, our august master fulfills duties imposed upon
him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceful development is
hindered by the permanent disturbances of the East. His imperial
Majesty has the conviction that he responds at the same time to the
sentiments and interests of Europe.
Accept, &c.,
[Inclosure 2 in No.
156.]
england’s reply to russia—lord derby’s
dispatch.
[From the Daily Levant Herald of
May 9,
1877.]
It has been telegraphed that the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty’s foreign
secretary stated a few days ago in the House of Lords that the
British reply to Prince Gortchakoff’s last circular, announcing that
Russia had declared war, had been dispatched and that as soon as he
received telegraphic intimation of the reply having been
communicated to the Russian chancellor, he would lay the dispatch
before Parliament and make it public. This has now been done, and we
are enabled to give the following copy of the original text of this
important document.
The Earl of Derby to
Lord A. Loftus.
Foreign Office, May 1, 1877.
My Lord: I forwarded to your excellency in
my dispatch of the 24th ultimo a copy of Prince Gortchakoff’s
circular-dispatch of the 7-19th ultimo, announcing that the Emperor
of Russia had given orders to his armies to cross the frontiers of
Turkey. Her Majesty’s Government have received this communication
with deep regret. They cannot accept the statements and conclusions
with which Prince Gortchakoff has accompanied it as justifying the
resolution thus taken. The protocol, to which her Majesty’s
Government, at the instance of that of Russia, recently became
parties, required from the Sultan no fresh guarantees for the reform
of his administration. With a view of enabling Russia the better to
abstain from isolated action, it affirmed the interest taken in
common by the powers in the condition of the Christian populations
of Turkey, It went on to declare that the powers would watch
carefully the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government
were carried into effect, and that, should their hopes once more be
disappointed, they reserved to themselves the right to consider in
common the means which they might deem best fitted to secure the
Well-being of the Christian populations and the interest of the
general peace. To these declarations of the intentions of the powers
the consent; of the Porte was not asked or required. The Porte, no
doubt, has thought fit, unfortunately in the opinion of Her
Majesty’s Government, to protest against the expressions in question
as implying an encroachment on the Sultan’s sovereignty and
independence. But while so doing, and while declaring that they
cannot consider the protocol as having any binding character on
Turkey, the Turkish Government have again affirmed their intention
of carrying into execution the reforms already promised. Her
Majesty’s Government cannot, therefore, admit, as is contended by
Prince Gortchakoff, that the answer of the Porte removed all hope of
deference on its part to the wishes and advice of Europe, and all
security for the application of the suggested reforms. Nor are they
of opinion that the terms of the note necessarily precluded the
possibility of the conclusion of peace with Montenegro, or of the
arrangement of mutual disarmament.
Her Majesty’s Government still believe that, with patience and
moderation on both sides, these objects might hot improbably have
been attained. Prince Gortchakoff, however, asserts that all opening
is now closed for attempts at conciliation; that the Emperor has
resolved to undertake the task of obtaining by coercion that which
the
[Page 587]
unanimous efforts of
all the powers have failed to obtain from the Porte by persuasion,
and he expresses His Imperial Majesty’s conviction that this step is
in accordance with the sentiments and’ the interests of Europe. It.
cannot be expected that Her Majesty’s Government should agree in
this view. They have not concealed their feeling that the presence
of large Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey, menacing its
safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a feeling of
apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population,
constituted a material obstacle to internal pacification and reform.
They cannot believe that the entrance of those armies on Turkish
soil will alleviate-the difficulty or improve the condition of the
Christian population throughout the Sultan’s dominions. But the
course on which the Russian Government has entered involves a graver
and more serious consideration. It is in contravention of the
stipulations of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, by which
Russia and the other signatory powers engaged, each on its own part,
to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire. In the conference of London of 1871, at the close of
which the above stipulation, with others, was again confirmed, the
Russian plenipotentiary, in common with those of the other powers,
signed a declaration affirming it to be an essential principle of
the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the
engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless
with the consent of the contracting parties, by means of an amicable
arrangement. In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and
having recourse to arms without further consultation with his
allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the
European concert hitherto maintained, and has, at the same time,
departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his
consent. It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such an
act. Her Majesty’s Government would willingly have refrained from
making any observations in regard to it; but as Prince Gortchakoff
seems to assume, in a declaration addressed to all the governments
of Europe, that Russia is acting in the interest of Great Britain
and that of the other powers, they feel bound to state, in a manner
equally formal and public, that the decision of the Russian
Government is not one which can have their concurrence or
approval.
I am, &c.,
[Inclosure 3 in No. 156]
the berlin memorandum.
Memorandum of a conference between the Emperors of Austria Hungary,
Germany, and Russia, held in Berlin in May, 1876.
[Translation.]
The alarming tidings which come from Turkey are of a nature to impel
the three cabinets to draw closer their intimacy.
The three imperial courts have deemed themselves called upon to
concert amongst themselves measures for averting the dangers of the
situation with the concurrence of the other great Christian
powers.
It appears to them that the existing state of affairs in Turkey
demands a double series of measures. It seems to them of primary
importance that Europe should consider the general means necessary
to guard against the recurrence of events similar to those which
have recently taken place at Salonica, and the repetition of which
is threatened at Smyrna and Constantinople. To effect this the great
powers should, in their opinion, come to an understanding as to the
measures to be taken to insure the safety of their own subjects and
of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, at ail points
where it may be found to be endangered.
It would appear possible to attain this end by a general agreement
concerning dispatch of vessels of war to the menaced points, and by
the adoption of combined instructions to the commanders of those
vessels in cases where circumstances might require armed
co-operation on their part with the object of maintaining order and
tranquillity. Nevertheless this end would be but imperfectly
attained if the primary cause of those disturbances were not removed
by the prompt pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
The great powers have already united in this view upon the initiative
taken in the dispatch of the 30th of December last, with the object
of obtaining an effective amelioration in the condition of the
populations of these countries without interfering with the
political status quo. They demanded of the
Porte a programme of reforms destined to answer this double purpose.
The Porte, deferring to this demand, declared itself firmly resolved
to execute these reforms, and communicated this officially to the
[Page 588]
cabinets. The latter
thereby acquire a moral right, that of watching over the
accomplishment, and an obligation, that of insisting that the
insurgents and refugees should second this work of pacification by
terminating the struggle and returning to their homes.
Nevertheless, this programme of pacification, though it has been
adopted in principle by both parties, has encountered a twofold
obstacle.
The insurgents have declared that past experience forbids them to
trust the promises of the Porte without a positive material European
guarantee.
The Porte, on its side, has declared that as long as the insurgents
were scouring the country in arms, and the refugees did not return
to their homes, it was materially impossible for it to proceed to
the new organization of the country.
In the mean time hostilities have resumed their course. The agitation
engendered by this strife of eight months has extended to other
parts of Turkey. The Mussulman populations have been thereby led to
conclude that the Porte had only apparently deferred to the
diplomatic action of Europe, and that at heart it did not intend
seriously to apply the promised reforms. Thence arose a revival of
religious and political passions, which has contributed to cause the
deplorable events of Salonica and the menacing overexcitement which
manifests itself at other points of European Turkey.
Nor is it doubtful that in its turn this explosion of fanaticism
reacts on men’s minds in Bosnia and Herzegovina as in the
neighboring principalities.
For the Christians in these countries must have been keenly impressed
by the fact of the massacre of the European consuls in open day, in
a peace.ful town, under the eyes of powerless authorities; how then
can they be induced to trust themselves to the goodwill of Turks
irritated by a protracted and sanguinary struggle?
Were this state of affairs to be prolonged the risk would thus be
incurred of seeing that general conflagration kindled which the
mediation of the great powers was precisely intended to avert.
It is most essential, therefore, to establish certain guarantees of a
nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full application of the
measures agreed upon between the powers and the Porte. It is more
than ever urgent to press the government of the Sultan to decide on
setting itself seriously to work to fulfill the engagements it has
contracted toward Europe.
As the first step in this direction the three imperial courts propose
to insist with the Porte, with all the energy that the united voice
of the three powers should possess, on a suspension of arms being
effected for the term of two months. This interval would enable
action to be brought to bear simultaneously on the insurgents and
the refugees, to inspire them with confidence in the vigilant
solicitude of Europe; on the neighboring principalities, to exhort
them not to hinder this attempt at conciliation; and, finally, on
the Ottoman Government, to place it in a position to carry out its
promises. By this means the way might be opened for direct
negotiations between the Porte and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian
delegates, on the basis of the wishes the latter have formulated,
and which have been deemed fit to serve as starting-points for a
discussion.
These points are as follows:
- 1.
- That materials for the reconstruction of dwelling-houses
and churches should be furnished to the returned refugees;
that their subsistence should be assured to them till they
could support themselves by their own labor.
- 2.
- In so far as the distribution of help should appertain to
the Turkish commissioner, he should consult as to the
measures to be taken with the mixed commission mentioned in
the note of the 30th of December, to guarantee the bona fide application of the reforms
and control their execution. This commission should be
presided over by a Herzegovinian Christian, and be composed
of natives faithfully representing the two religions of the
country. They should be elected as soon as the armistice
should have suspended hostilities.
- 3.
- In order to avoid any collision, advice should be given at
Constantinople to concentrate the Turkish troops, at least
until excitement has subsided, on some points to be agreed
upon.
- 4.
- Christians as well as Mussulmans should retain their
arms.
- 5.
- The consuls or delegates of the powers shall keep a watch
over the application of the reforms in general, and on the
steps relative to the repatriation in particular.
If, with the friendly and cordial support of the great powers, and by
the help of an armistice, an arrangement could be concluded on these
bases, and be set in train immediately by the return of the refugees
and the election of the mixed commission, a considerable step would
be made toward pacification.
If, however, the armistice were to expire without the efforts of the
powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the
three imperial courts are of opinion that it would become necessary
to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an
agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear
to be demanded, in the interest of general peace, to check the evil
and prevent its development.
[Page 589]
[Inclosure 4 in No.
156.]
The Earl of Derby to
Lord Odo Russell.
Foreign Office, May 19, 1876.
lord derby’s reply to the berlin
memorandum.
My Lord: Her Majesty’s Government have had
under their consideration the memrandum of which a copy was inclosed
in your dispatch of the 13th instant, containing he proposals of the
Governments of Austria, Germany, and Russia for the pacification of
the Herzegovina and Bosnia.
These proposals had been agreed upon by Count Andrásy, Prince
Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakoff, at a meeting at Berlin, and your
excellency was requested to communicate them to Her Majesty’s
Government, with the hope that Her Majesty’s Government would accede
to them, and express their opinion at once upon the telegraphic
summary furnished by your excellency.
I informed your excellency on the 15th instant that it would be
necessary for me to consult my colleagues, and that I could not give
any reply until after the proposals of the three governments had
been considered by the cabinet.
I have now to state to your excellency that Her Majesty’s Government
regret to find themselves unable to co-operate in the policy which
the three governments have invited them to pursue. Her Majesty’s
Government appreciate the advantage of concerted action by the
powers in all that relates to the questions arising out of the
insurrection, but they cannot consent to join in proposals which
they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the
pacification which all the powers desire to see attained.
The proposals contained in the memorandum are directed to pressing
upon the Porte the establishment of an armistice for two months,
with a view to direct negotiations between the Porte and the
delegates of the insurgents on the basis of the wishes which the
latter have expressed, and which have been thought fit to serve as
points of departure for discussion.
In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government that they
would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an
armistice, without knowing whether the military situation admitted
of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish
Government, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater
efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent
prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of
the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the
Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against
the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from
Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their
position, and recruiting their forces, and obtaining arms and
supplies. The mere fact of the insurrection remaining unsuppressed
would be likely to give it additional vitality, and the result of an
armistice might, therefore, be to lead to a rejection of any demands
which the Porte might fairly be expected to concede, and thus hinder
rather than advance the prospects of pacification.
At the same time Her Majesty’s Government would not advise the Porte
against acceding to an armistice should the Turkish Government
consider that the political and military position admitted of it,
and its result would be likely to be beneficial,, although, in view
of the objections which I have mentioned, and others of a similar
character which will readily occur to your excellency, Her Majesty’s
Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte,
still less in insisting upon its acceptance.
In my dispatch of the 15th instant I have informed your excellency of
some of the objections which I stated to Count Münster had occurred
to me in regard to the five points which were proposed as a basis
for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents. A further
consideration of the proposals has not led to any modification of
the opinion I then expressed.
Her Majesty’s Government doubt whether the Porte has the means of
providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the
insurgents, or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees. If
Her Majesty’s Government are rightly informed, the cost would be
very heavy, and the Porte has not the requisite funds at its
disposal.
The distribution of relief by such a commission as is contemplated
would be little better than a system of indiscriminate alms-giving.
It would probably be beyond the power of the Porte to adopt, and, if
adopted, would prove utterly demoralizing to any country.
Her Majesty’s Government do not mean to say that the Porte would not
be wise in affording any practical facilities and inducements for
the return of the population who have quitted or been driven from
their homes owing to the insurrection, but they do not consider that
they can urge upon the Porte to undertake engagements the observance
of which would be beyond its power.
[Page 590]
The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be
delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the
insurgents are to retain their arms.
The consular supervision would reduce the authority of the Sultan to
a nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be
impossible.
Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able
to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed,
which Her Majesty’s Government scarcely believe possible, the
intimation with which the memorandum closes would render any such
negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not be supposed
that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification from the
Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued
after the armistice the powers would intervene further.
Regarded in this light, the proposal of an armistice seems to Her
Majesty’s Government to be illusory.
There is another point not referred to in your excellency’s
telegraphic summary, but to which it is necessary for me to advert,
viz, the proposal in the third paragraph of the memorandum that the
powers should agree upon the measures to be taken by their
respective naval forces for the safety of foreigners and of the
Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire at Salonica and other
places where it might be threatened.
Her Majesty’s Government have already ordered that Her Majesty’s ship
Swiftsure should proceed to Salonica, and that Admiral Drummond,
with three other vessels of war, should go to Besika Bay, where he
will be in ready communication with Her Majesty’s embassy, and an
additional vessel of small size has been placed in attendance at
Constantinople at Sir H. Elliot’s request. They have heard that
other powers have reinforced their squadrons in Turkish waters, and
that there is a considerable naval force assembled at Salonica.
Her Majesty’s Government do not doubt that the measures thus taken
will have had a good effect in affording confidence to the subjects
of Great Britain and other powers at Salonica and elsewhere; and
they will readily give instructions to Admiral Drummond, and the
captains of Her Majesty’s ships under his orders, to give any
protection and assistance which may be necessary for the
preservation of the lives and property of foreign subjects, should
they unhappily be in immediate danger, either in concert with the
commanding officers of the ships of the other powers or, in the
absence of any such ships, on their own responsibility. Her
Majesty’s Government do not, however, at present apprehend any
necessity for such measures, and they are of opinion that care
should be taken that the naval forces of foreign powers are not
employed in any manner contrary to the treaty-rights of the Porte or
subversive of the Sultan’s authority.
Your excellency is authorized to read this dispatch to Prince
Bismarck, and to leave a copy with his excellency, should he desire
it.
I am, &c.,
[Inclosure 5 in No.
156.—Translation.]
the address of his majesty the sultan on the
declaration of war.
* * * * * * *
The Russian Government has broken its relations with and declared war
against us. From all sides the armies have invaded our frontier.
Relying upon the aid and favor of God, the dispenser of victory in
just causes, and upon the spiritual assistance of the Prophet, we
see ourselves obliged to resort to arms.
As all our subjects very well know, the Russians, ever cherishing a
spirit of ambition and of covetousness toward our states, have never
ceased watching for an occasion to attack us.
The insurrection which broke out two years ago in Herzegovina, the
fruit of the pernicious seed which they there sowed, served them as
an instrument for kindling the flame of revolt among the Bulgarian
inhabitants of the vilayets of the Danube and Adrianople, and
likewise in Servia and Montenegro. Wholly creating these troubles
among us, they have sought by calumnious accusations to render
public opinion hostile to us. It is a matter of public notoriety
that, animated with the most peaceful sentiments, we have never
declined to listen to the counsels of the friendly powers.
But our enemy makes it appear the purpose he follows is nothing but
the annihilation of our independence, our rights, and of our country
itself, and he cannot be satisfied so long as he has not attained
it. Finally, to-day he attacks us, contrary to right and with no
legitimate motive.
The Supreme Judge, who protects right and justice, let us hope, will
accord us victory and safety.
[Page 591]
By reason of this aggression of the enemy our state is placed in a
difficult situation, which, as history attests, cannot be compared
to any of the crises through which, until the present time, the
country has passed.
Consequently, in my character as khalif and sovereign, I appeal to
the union and the moral and material accord of all the children of
the country, who, in the interest of their common right, of which,
in this country, they enjoy full liberty, are in duty bound to place
themselves on their guard against this enemy of liberty, who has
smothered the language, the faith, and the religion of so many
peoples who to-day groan under his oppression.
Since my accession to the throne my sole and principal care has been
the liberty and prosperity of all the Osmanlis, and the preservation
of our rights and our independence. The constitution that I have
promulgated with this end is the incontestable proof of this. By way
of retaliation I only demand of you fidelity and loyalty to your
duty as subjects, and your concord and union for the preservation of
the rights and the independence of the country.
Consequently, taking the example of your brother soldiers, who
labored with courage and bravery, even to the sacrifice of their
life, to safely guard the rights and honor of the Osmanlis against
the aggression of the enemy, and believing that in everything your
Sovereign is with you, it is incumbent upon you to be united and
ready for sacrifices for the safety of the land, to never forget
that you are all children of the same country, and to defend the
wealth, the life, and the honor of your compatriots as you would
defend your own property, life, and honor.
I ought to add, further, that the greatest honor in the world is for
a man to love his country and to fulfill the duties which devolve
upon him by reason of this love.
You will show to all that you can march in the steps of your fathers
and your ancestors when the safety of the rights and the
independence of the common country is concerned, and I trust you
will be proud of each drop of blood our enemy, contrary to all
right, compels us to spill for the preservation of our honor.
On the other hand, our enemy, pretending that the Mussulmans have
certain bad intentions against their fellow-citizens professing
other religions, puts forward the pretense of taking these citizens
under his exclusive protection by declaring the imperial government
responsible for every prejudicial act of the latter.
I am convinced that all faithful subjects, continuing to live
together in perfect concord as brothers and compatriots will give a
formal denial to this false idea.
Although at war with the power who has wished to bring reproach upon
bur rights and independence, our relations with the other friendly
powers have suffered no alteration.
I recommend to you, then, the people of’ these powers who may come
into our states as travelers or as merchants. / You will give your
attention to it that nothing the least prejudicial shall happen to
them, and that everywhere they may enjoy the most perfect
security.
You are requested to publish these presents to all mutessarifs and
caïmacams of the sandjaks and cazas, to the mudirs and functionaries
of the province, and to the whole population placed under your
jurisdiction, and act in accordance.
Given in the year of grace 1294, the 18th of
Rebi-ul-akhir. (May 1, 1877.)
