No. 112.
Mr. Davis
to Mr. Fish.
Berlin, February 26, 1877. (Received March 14.)
Sir: Accompanying this dispatch I send, in a separate parcel, copies of two recent English blue books on Turkish affairs. Should you have received them from other sources no harm can come from having duplicates. So far as these documents give new light to the public I am pleased to see that they justify the confidential information which I have from time to time been able to send you.
Lord Salisbury appears to have gone to Constantinople with detailed instructions, indicating in advance what he was to endeavor to obtain, and what he was not to concede. The powers invited to the conference had consented to treat on the basis of (1) the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey; (2) non-acquisition of exclusive advantages by any power; (3) maintenance of the status quo as to Servia and Montenegro; (4) local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be granted by the Porte in a protocol signed by all the representatives. Lord Derby explained at length the nature of the institutions to be granted for the exercise of autonomy in Servia and Montenegro, and added that something must be done for that part of Bulgaria which is south of the Balkan range. It is evident, however, that his ideas on this point were not as definite as they were respecting the other districts. He was positive on but one point, that the guarantees for the future well-being of the province were to be found only in the promises of the Porte in the protocol. “Her Majesty’s government,” he said, “cannot countenance the introduction into the conference of proposals, however plausible or well-intentioned, which would bring foreign armies into Turkish territory.”
Hampered by such instructions, Lord Salisbury-made his well-known tour through the different capitals before arriving in Constantinople. So far as this book gives glimpses into the history of his journey, it confirms the information which I have already sent to the Department.
Disinterested readers of these papers must say that Lord Salisbury [Page 181] labored with intelligence and zeal to secure a practical result; but that his instructions and the course of his government at home made it impossible. The negotiations had been nominally relegated to Constantinople; but Lord Derby and even Lord Beaconsfield were holding interviews with Turkish representatives in London, which could not but damage the efforts of Lord Salisbury. What, for instance, could be more fatal to the demands of the conference than the assurance in advance that no attempt would be made to enforce them should they be refused? It also appears that Sir Henry Elliott and Lord Salisbury were not always at one. The dispatch of the former of the 10th of December last, printed on page 59 of No. 2, reads like an arraignment of the conference and a justification of Turkey in advance of her refusal.
It is plain that the conference was doomed to failure from the beginning. The manner in which the Turks put the extinguisher on it must have been galling to Lord Salisbury. He has recorded, in strong language, his opinion that Turkey has no body of men fitted to administer a constitutional government. He says they have no enlightened aristocracy, no governing class, no organized democracy; the absolute will of the Sultan and the laws of the Koran are the only recognized authorities which bind society and state together. When Mid-hat Pasha conferred the power of self-government on such a population and cited the provisions of a constitution as an answer to the demands of the conference, it sounded more like joke than earnest. It served its purpose, however; it broke up the conference. Since England was pledged in advance to do nothing to enforce the demands of her representative, it resolved the apparent unity of Europe on the Oriental question into its original repulsion.
I confess I am unable to see what England wants. She has twice had it in her power to put an end to these troubles. When the Andrássy note was presented, had England said, “My enormous interests in India forbid me to quarrel with the principal Mussulman power; I shall use my great influence to induce the Turk to do justice to his Christian subjects, but I will be party to nothing derogatory to his sovereignty, and if it is attacked I am his ally”—had this been said, the Oriental question would have been settled on that basis. On the other hand, had Lord Salisbury been allowed to say to the Turk, “If you refuse what the conference demands, England will take part in forcing you to grant it,” in my judgment the question would have been equally quieted. But this great power, which is the one most interested in a peaceful solution, and which is still, whatever its enemies may say, a powerful factor in European combinations, is torn by party struggles and has had no policy. Had the elder Pitt been alive England would have found a policy.
The future cannot be foreshadowed with confidence. My own judgment has been, and still is, that there will be war between Russia and Turkey in the course of the summer. But others, who are as well informed as I am, think otherwise. The London Times, for instance, which is supposed to have the best of information, reasons peace out of the Emperor’s speech at the opening of the Reichstag, while I can only read war between the lines. Events are as uncertain as they were in America, in the winter of 1860–1861, but the signs which point to them are as many and significant as they were then.
Turkey itself is in a critical condition. Our intelligence represents anarchy as not far off, and as kept away by force. The masses of Turks are ready for war, and are convinced that they are more than a match for the Russians. Negotiations for peace are going on with Servia and Montenegro, but the Turks are quite willing to cross swords with Russia.
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[Page 182]I most sincerely trust that my fears will speedily prove to be entirely unfounded, and still more, that should war unfortunately break out in the East, it will not extend further into Europe, where there is so much material ready for it.
I have, &c.,