No. 555.
Mr. Adee
to Mr. Fish.
Madrid , March 4, 1874. (Received March 27.)
Sir: The prolonged crisis of the past six weeks or more has reached a temporary halting-place in the investment of Marshal Serrano with, practically, absolute powers as chief of the state. A decree, adopted in cabinet council on the 26th ultimo, and published in the official gazette on the 27th, separates, the functions of the President of the executive power from those of the president of the council, and clothes the ex-regent with attributions even more extended than those he possessed during the early stages of the revolutionary period.
But a few days had passed after the events of the 3d of January, when it became apparent that the cabinet, although united in the main purpose of overcoming the factions in arms in favor of the traditional monarchy, was divided on matters of governmental procedure. The published manifestations of the new government were seen to lack that perfect harmony which might be supposed to mark the accords of men avowedly joined in defense of the conquests of the revolution. These divergencies first arose with respect to legalizing the status of a situation not directly descended from a prior legality but rather built upon its ruins. The first expression of the purposes of the government, as seen in the circulars of the minister of the interior and in the manifesto to the nation, seemed to assume that by tacit acquiescence in the new order of things the country had accepted it without reserve, and that an appeal to the popular will would be not merely supererogatory but productive of fresh conflicts and embarrassing issues. These two publications agreed in relegating the minor questions of form and procedure to an ordinary legislature to be chosen at some future time when the country and the colonies should enjoy peace, and the constitution of 1869, modified in a republican sense and released from its enforced suspension, should again become the supreme code of the land. Next appeared the celebrated memorandum of the minister for foreign affairs. In this notable state paper a new political phase came into view. It was asserted in no doubtful terms that the renunciation of the crown by the late King had left a void which remained to be filled under the existing constitution, although by whom and how did not appear. Its general tenor regarded the republican experiments of the past year as merely passing disturbances, barren of results, and serving only as warnings for the future.
From this time the diverging tendencies in the cabinet became marked. The need of obtaining some form of popular ratification of the situation created by the garrison of Madrid on the morning of the 3d of January, was advanced with increasing boldness and opposed with equal persistence. On the one hand it was contended that an enduring legality remained to be established; on the other it was proclaimed that the republic was already the government of the country, and that nothing was left to do save to arrange mere matters of detail.
At this stage of the question, a bomb was dropped into the camp in the form of a proposition for a plebiscite. This was first broached by the organ of Admiral Topete, “El Gobierno,” which was promptly fined for a violation of the somewhat stringent press regulations in force. The discussion was, however, initiated, and could not be stayed; a crisis was definitely set on foot. The project was received with benevolence [Page 872] by a fraction of the republican party, following, it was rumored, the leadership of Castelar. It was proposed that two questions should be presented jointly for the vote of the people: the acceptance of the republic as the national form of government, and the elevation of Marshal Serrano to the chief magistracy, following the example, set in the neighboring republic, of Marshal MacMahon. The moderate republican alliance was expected to insure the success of the scheme, and it was even hinted that the acknowledged leader of that party might be persuaded to organize the first ministry under the new legality. The retirement of the conservative element of the present cabinet was predicted as a certainty. The federal republicans, as was to be expected, opposed the scheme. A plebiscite, they said, was an innovation in Spain. It detracted still more from the prestige of the Cortes—the traditional supreme power under a long line of Spanish monarchs—already shaken by the events of the 23d of April and the 3d of January. And the experience of the measure in France had shown its untrustworthiness as a means of obtaining a genuine popular verdict. Its result was a foregone conclusion; the usual ratification of the statu quo by the masses in favor of tranquillity at any price. As the question was likely to be put, its defeat rejected the republic, and its acceptance set a monarchist in supreme power. The abstention of the entire federal element was therefore counseled. The discussion was, beside, inaugurated at a most inopportune moment. The Carlists, emboldened by their partial successes of Monte Jurra and Puenta la Keina, in which the army under General Moriones had not been able to accomplish the strategic movements it undertook, concentrated their forces in the Basque provinces, and redoubled their attack on Bilbao. The situation of that city was critical in the extreme; its supplies were practically cut off, its strongest outpost, Portugalete, had fallen, and the besiegers brought their approaches nearer day by day, till their guns were able to command the town itself. Moriones, abandoning his old line of operations, had shifted his forces by sea to the west of the beleagured capital, and the rival armies stood face to face almost under its walls. A great battle was imminent, and much depended on its issue. The attention of the nation was fixed on the Cantabrian coast, where its fate might be decided any day. It was in no humor for entering upon a heated canvass. The actual government, so far as it represented anything, represented liberal Spain arrayed against traditionalism. A diversion now, however well founded in principle, might weaken the resistance to the common enemy. It was therefore given out that no real motive for a crisis existed, that no immediate appeal to the country was contemplated, and that the cabinet was a unit as to the expediency of conferring the supreme magistracy on Marshal Serrano, but the only points on which perfect harmony did not prevail were the title, attributions, and salary of the chief of the state. Ulterior questions would be postponed until the siege of Bilbao was raised.
A period of anxious suspense followed. All eyes were turned to the north. A fearful tempest, with deluging rains, swept over the Biscayan coast. The operations of the army were paralyzed. The transmission of supplies and men was stopped. The vessels of the fleet sought refuge in the nearest harbors. Communications with the forces in the field were interrupted. The wires were prostrated by the storm, or cut by roving bands of marauders. In the absence of trustworthy news, the wildest rumors gained credence. The bourse showed the feverish spirit of the day by its rapid fluctuations.
The storm at last ceased, and the forces under General Moriones [Page 873] began to move. Then came reports that the struggle had begun. Hundreds of the wounded were arriving at Santander. The Carlists positions were being carried one by one. If the heights of Avano could be won, Portugalete would be retaken and Bilbao saved. At this point, however, the national troops met with a reverse, and after desperate fighting were forced to fall back to the positions they held on the first day, near Somarrostro. This was speedily magnified by the alarmists into a disastrous defeat. The bourse fell, and Spanish three per cents touched 14.15, the lowest price yet quoted since the revolution of 1868. General Moriones urgently called for six battalions of fresh troops. Every train for the north was laden with re-enforcements. Marshal Serrano and Admiral Topete determined to put themselves in person at the head of the land and sea forces. This brought to a climax the lingering cabinet crisis, which now bid fair to become chronic. The deus ex machina of the situation, General Pa via, interposed his influence, and, as a compromise, constitutional issues respecting name and powers were left open by the retention of the title borne by the chief executive since the renunciation of Amadeo, supreme power was given to Serrano by a decree in council, and the vexed question of the forthcoming presidency of the ministry was postponed by intrusting the office provisionally to General Zavala, the minister of war. The decree was published on the 27th ultimo, and on the same day the president and the minister of marine set out for the Basque Provinces.
An analysis of the several articles of the constitution referred to in the preamble and decree in question will show the indeterminate character of the solution reached. They relate to the functions and powers of a king. Article 35 provides that the executive authority shall reside in the sovereign, and be exercised through his ministers. Title 4 (articles 67 to 76) defines the powers of the monarch. His responsibility devolves on his ministers. He may declare war and conclude peace. If the constitutional guarantees be suspended by reason of public disorders, as they are now, he is absolute until peace be restored. And article 86 provides that his decrees and orders shall be countersigned by the responsible minister. The decree of February 26 confers all these powers upon Marshal Serrano. No limitation is assigned to the duration of his term of office. Even the seventy-sixth article, which directs the emoluments of the king to be fixed at the commencement of each reign, has been followed in the present instance, and it is announced that a decree will soon be promulgated granting an income of one hundred thousand dollars annually to the chief of the state. It is not surprising that this solution should be claimed by the most extreme partisans as in accordance with their doctrines. The moderate republicans see in it the renewed affirmation of the republic, while the constitutional monarchists accept it as a return to first principles, under a merely transitory change of name. The vague intimation found in the preamble that the country may be consulted at a fitting time, while standing as an acknowledgment that the legality of the act still awaits the national sanction, does not show the manner in which it is to be obtained. Nor is it evident in what way the suggested reform of the constitution, in a republican sense, is to be accomplished, whether by decree of a self-constituted executive, by summoning anew the historical Constituent Cortes of Spain, or by direct legislation in an ordinary parliament. In short, it may not inaptly be said of the present arrangement, as was said of the authority assumed by the Prince President of the French Republic of 1848, by Mr. Jerningham, the British chargé [Page 874] d’affaires in Paris, that “if not absolutely perfect, it is at least perfectly absolute.”
Meanwhile the gravity of the situation in the north remains unchanged, or is, perhaps, even greater than before. Spain has been well-nigh stripped of troops to re-inforce the army of operations in Vizcaya. The sending of men to Cuba has been suspended, and it is even proposed to take a thousand Oarlist prisoners from the Cuban service and reship them to Spain for exchange. A fresh storm has delayed military movements on the one hand, while on the other the forces of the pretender, some twenty-five thousand strong, have had ample time to increase their already strong defenses. They still hold most of Aragon and Catalonia. Guerrilla bands roam almost without hinderance in the east. Santes is operating with a formidable column in Guadalajara, at some eighty miles distance from Madrid. Besides the army besieging Bilbao, Don Carlos can show a muster-roll of thirty thousand men in the rest of the peninsula. It seems, however, that the main issue is to be fought out before the, heights of Somarrostro and Avano, and in the vicinity of Portugalete. The government of the 3d of January is staking all on the cast. If it loses now, its future is critical to the utmost, and if it wins, the question of a definite organization of a national government on bases of unquestionable and lasting legality remains as a source of perplexity, and perhaps of peril.
I am, &c,