No. 51.
Mr. Shannon
to Mr. Fish.
United
States Legation,
Rio de
Janeiro, January 23, 1874.
(Received Feb. 23.)
No. 148.]
Sir: Inasmuch as the reported arming of the island
of Martin Garcia, by the Argentines, was referred to by the Viscount de
Caravellas in our conference of the 2d instant as a direct violation of
treaty stipulations, and notably of an article in the treaty of 1853 between
the United States and the Argentine Confederation; and inasmuch as it is
more than likely (if the reported arming proved to be a fact) that the
nations which were parties to the treaties of San Jose de Flores (France,
England, and the United States) will be requested to take some action in the
matter, I have thought it well to collate the evidence showing what has been
the action of Brazil herself upon this subject under like circumstances in
the past, (for the fortifying and arming of this island has already occurred
several times before and been made the subject of special diplomatic
negotiations,) as well as what has been the interpretation heretofore given
by her to those treaty stipulations now declared to be violated.
The island of Martin Garcia is situated opposite the city of Buenos Ay res,
in the River Plate, and within cannon-shot of the Oriental shore and
territory.
Its true ownership is still a disputed question between the Argentine
Confederation and Uruguay, although the former holds possession, and it is
claimed and occupied as Argentine territory. It may more strictly, perhaps,
be regarded as a part of the province of Buenos Ayres, which has always held
possession of it whenever that province was separated from the
Confederation; and indeed it was while Buenos Ayres was so separated from
the Argentine Confederation, and holding possession of the island, that the
San Jose de Flores treaties of 1853, and the Brazilian treaty of 1856, were
negotiated with the latter government.
* Inclosures 1,
3, and 4 are translations of such parts of the several treaties as relate to
the island of Martin Garcia; treaty of 1851, between Brazil and Uruguay;
treaty of 1853, between the United States and the Argentine Confederation;
and treaty of 1856, between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation.
Inclosures 5 and 6 are translations of so much of the reports of the
Brazilian minister for foreign affairs, for 1860 and 1864, giving accounts
of the negotiations and discussions which arose from the arming of the
island in 1858 and 1862.
On both occasions Brazil was appealed to by the governments of Uruguay and
the Argentine Confederation to interfere by force, if need be, to secure the
neutralization of the island, they claiming that, by terms of Article XVIII
of the treaties of 1851 and 1856, she was not only empowered but obliged to
do so.
The Brazilian government, however, declined to go beyond the employment of
good offices to secure the disarmament of the island, declaring that the
terms of Article XVIII did not authorize her to make use of force, and that,
in fact, those treaty stipulations amounted to little more than a
recommendation for some future action in the matter.
[Page 76]
The report of the minister for foreign affairs of Brazil, for 1864, contains
the following:
The armament of this island has neither been prevented nor permitted.
There was only one voice, one accord, (agreement,) between the
contracting parties to obtain from that one which should be in
possession of the island the consent to its neutralization in time
of war.
* * * * * * *
It (Brazil) did not demand, however, nor could it demand (exigir)
from that government (Buenos Ayres) the disarming of the island, the
conditions of which are still to be regulated, by common agreement,
between the Riverine States and the powers which signed the treaties
of July 10, 1853.
* * * * * * *
The government of Buenos Ayres appears to have always claimed the right to
occupy and arm the island of Martin Garcia, as though it were any other part
of Argentine territory, though asserting at the same time that this was done
solely as a measure of defense, and not with any view of embarrassing the
free navigation of rivers.
I am, &c.,
[Inclosure 1 in No.
148.—Translation.]
Treaty of commerce and navigation between Brazil and
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, signed at Bio de Janeiro
October 12, 1851.
Art. XVIII. The high contracting parties,
recognizing that the island of Martin Garcia can, by its position, serve
to embarrass and impede the free navigation of the confluents of the
river Plate, in which all the riverine states are interested, likewise
recognize the convenience of the neutrality of that island in time of
war, whether said war be carried on between the Platine States or
between one of them and any other power, and this for the common good as
well as a guarantee of the navigation of said rivers; and they therefore
agree:
- 1st.
- In opposing, by every means in their power, that the
sovereignty of the island of Martin Garcia shall pass from the
possession of one of the Platine States interested in its free
navigation.
- 2d.
- In soliciting the concurrence of the other Riverine States, in
order to obtain from that one to which the possession and
sovereignty of the island belong, or may hereafter belong, that
it shall be made a matter of obligation not to use the island to
embarrass the free navigation by other Riverine States; to
consent to its neutrality in time of war, as well as to the
formation of establishments which may be necessary for the
security of the interior navigation of all the Riverine
States.
* * * * * * *
[Inclosure 2 in No.
148.—Translation.]
Foot-note on page 324 of the
third volume of the work of Antonio Pereira Pinto, entitled
“Apontamentos Para o Direito International,” said note referring to
the Brazilian interpretation of Article XVIII, translated in the
preceding inclosure.
The dispositions of this article, although repeated in the treaty of
March, 1856, with the Argentine Republic, and in those treaties entered
into at San José de Flores in July, 1853, between that republic, France,
England, and the United States, have not been observed on the part of
Buenos Ayres. In 1859 that city, being separated from the rest of the
confederation, and engaged in a struggle with it, proceeded to arm the
island of Martin Garcia. In 1862, when the rupture of relations occurred
between Uruguay and the Argentine Republic, the arming again commenced.
On both occasions complaints were addressed to the imperial government,
whose interference was solicited to secure the fulfillment of the
stipulations set forth in existing treaties, but Brazil did no more than
lend the intervention of her good offices, and it is affirmed in the
report of 1864 in* regard to this matter that, by
the stipulations above cited, the arming of that island was neither
prevented nor permitted, inasmuch as there was but one
[Page 77]
voice—one agreement—between the parties to
obtain from the state which should come into possession of the island
the consent to its neutrality in time of war. If this be so, then the
clause of this article (referring to the interior navigation) is an
improper one to figure in an agreement treating of a political and
commercial interest of so much magnitude as the non-interruption of free
navigation of rivers. It should have been set forth in a manner at once
clear, well defined, and obligatory.
[Inclosure 3 in No. 148.]
Extract from the treaty for the free navigation of
the rivers Parana and Uruguay, between the United States and the
Argentine Confederation, concluded July 10, 1853, at San José de Flores.*
* * * * * * *
Art. V. The high contracting parties,
considering that the island of Martin Garcia may, from its position,
embarrass and impede the free navigation of the confluents of the river
Plate, agree to use their influence to prevent the possession of the
said island from being retained or held by any state of the river Plate,
or its confluents, which shall not have given its adhesion to the
principle of their free navigation.
* * * * * * *
[Inclosure 4 in No. 148.]
Translation of Art. XVIII of the treaty of
friendship, commerce, and navigation between Brazil and the
Argentine Republic, signed at Parana March 7, 1856.
* * * * * * *
Art. XVIII. The high contracting parties,
recognizing that the island of Martin Garcia may, by its position,
embarrass and impede the free navigation of the confluents of the river
Plate, in which are interested all the Riverine States, as well as the
signers of the treaties of July 10, 1853, likewise recognize the
convenience of the neutrality of that island in time of war, whether
said-war be carried on between the Platiue States, or between one of
them and any other power, and this for the common good as well as a
guarantee of the navigation of said rivers; and they therefore agree:
- 1st.
- In opposing, by all means, that the possession of the island
of Martin Gracia shall cease to belong to one of the Platine
States interested in the free navigation of the river.
- 2d.
- In seeking to obtain from that state having possession of the
island an obligation not to use it for the purpose of preventing
the free navigation of the rivers by other Riverine States, and
the signers of the treaties of July 10, 1853; and to obtain,
also, its consent to the neutrality of the island in time of
war, as well as the formation of establishments necessary to the
security of the interior navigation by all the Riverine States
and the nations embraced in the treaties of July 10,
1853.
* * * * * * *
[Inclosure 5 in No. 148.]
Translation of such parts of the report of the
Brazilian minister for foreign affairs for 1860 as relates to negotiations concerning the
neutralization of the island of Martin Garcia, page 20.
Since the island of Martin Garcia may, by its position, serve to
embarrass and impede the free navigation of the confluents of the Plate,
it became the object of treaty stipulations between the Empire and the
Oriental Republic of Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation.
Those stipulations form a part of conventional law established by the
treaties of October 12, 1851, and March 7, 1856, and are set forth in
Article XVIII of each one of them.
The government of Buenos Ayres—which was in possession of Martin Garcia
when hostilities commenced between that province and the government of
the confederation, established at Paraná, hostilities which have happily
just come to an end, (in
[Page 78]
1859,)—fortified and armed that island with the evident intention of
using it as a means of defense.
Referring to the above-mentioned stipulations and attaching to them an
importance which they did not have, the Oriental and Argentine
governments—and the latter more explicitly—urged that His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor should insist upon the disarmament, of the island,
and that to accomplish it, force even should be employed, if the protest
were unheeded.
The correspondence in regard to this matter appears in the notes of the
Oriental minister of July 1 and August 9, of the Argentine chargé
d’affaires of July 4 and August 9 and September 13, and of the imperial
government of September 12.
The question which was raised merits the most serious attention. It was
clear that the arming of this island would draw hostilities to that
point, and so might embarrass the free navigation of the rivers in which
Brazil was interested; and this being the first discussion which had
arisen relative to the application of the above-mentioned treaty
stipulations, it was important that no precedent should be established
contrary to its true interpretation.
The imperial government studied the question conscientiously and
impartially; and, being persuaded that it was not authorized to make use
of force, it resolved to use persuasive means to convince the government
of Buenos Ayres of the advantages of the neutralization of the island,
thus avoiding any complication which might result from its armament, not
only to the government of Buenos Ayres itself, but also to neutral
nations, whose duty it is to protect the interests and commerce of their
subjects.
That commission was intrusted to Señhor Pereira Pinto, who, with this
object in view, as well as that of obtaining assurances which would
tranquilize the Oriental government, as regards the attacks which it
then feared, set out from this capital (Rio de Janeiro) for his post of
duty on the 2d of August of last year, (1859.)
From his communications the imperial government learned with the greatest
satisfaction that although the government of Buenos Ayres, fearing the
armament of the island by the confederation, and wishing to avoid
hostilities at that point, had resolved itself to arm that island as a
measure solely of defense, nevertheless it was quite disposed to
renounce that measure if it could have the guarantee that after such
disarmament and neutralization on its part the same would be religiously
observed by the Argentine government, Uruguay at the same time
preserving her neutrality, as she had promised and as was incumbent upon
her.
This disposition of the government of Buenos Ayres was seasonably
communicated to the Argentine and Oriental legations; and the imperial
government took occasion to express the hope that the government of the
confederation would not refuse to furnish the desired guarantee.
The events which occurred in Montevideo at the time of the simultaneous
presence of the Argentine and Buenos Ayres squadrons paralyzed those
negotiations, and finally put an end to them shortly afterward.
The Argentine legations in Montevideo and in this capital, (Rio de
Janeiro,) and the government of the confederation itself, in giving to
the proceeding of the minister resident and the consul-general of the
empire in Montevideo and Buenos Ayres an interpretation which was
justified neither by their intentions nor by their acts, had complained
of these, pretending that the island of Martin Garcia, an integral part
of the Argentine territory, had been made the object of negotiation
without either the consent or hearing of the national government, and
that the withdrawal of its squadron from the port of Montevideo had been
offered as a condition to the neutralization of the same island.
The documents annexed in their proper place explain the question. A brief
statement will be sufficient here.
At the solicitations of the governments themselves of the confederation
and Uruguay, the commission of Pereira Pinto had been formed. At the
same time that those solicitations were urged here, the arming of Martin
Garcia was going forward, and the Argentine war-vessels in Montevideo
were preparing for the conflict. The armament of the island proved
difficult, and so its neutralization was practically effected. Thus the
passage of the ships was facilitated.
If the imperial government had not feared being unjust in its
appreciation of the facts, it might have considered those solicitations
in relation not to the transit of merchant-vessels, but to the Argentine
war-ships. It wished, however, to be just, and so, attending to the
general interests of navigation, it counseled the neutralization of the
island.
Giving, however, that counsel, which amounted to the abandonment of a
means of defense, it could not fail to attend to the just demand of a
guarantee which should substitute it, and expressed the hope that it
would be conceded.
Events were precipitated, and the Argentine ships, then confined to the
waters limited by the island, made use of the Oriental ports as the base
of their military operations, and committed hostilities in Buenos Ayres.
From this sprung the resolution that the government of that province
(Buenos Ayres) took, of ordering its squadron to
[Page 79]
the port of Montevideo, and the intimations there
made, on the 24th of August, by the officer in command.
These events, all foreign to the will and action of the two agents of
Brazil, made their positions difficult, endangering the issue of the
commission intrusted to one, and creating conflicts in the territory
where the other was accredited.
Senhor Pereira Pinto, learning what had occurred in Montevideo, and
considering the assurances which the government of Buenos Ayres had
given of its pacific intentions in regard to the Oriental State, judged
it proper to have an understanding at once with the minister for foreign
affairs, and on that occasion he was informed of the resolution which
had been taken to order the squadron to return to that port (Montevideo)
for the purpose of making fresh intimations.
In that conference he did all in his power to prevent hostilities being
carried on in the port of Montevideo and its neighborhood, and only
succeeded in obtaining a modification of the instructions given to the
commander of the squadron.
At the same time he referred to the neutralization of the island, which
was the business with which he had been charged, simultaneously with
that of manifestations to be made in favor of the Oriental state. The
result was the note which the minister of foreign affairs (of Buenos
Ayres) sent him on the 27th of August, imposing certain conditions
preliminary to the neutralization.
The consul-general of Brazil, however, did not compromit himself in
regard to the two squadrons, as appears in the note passed to the
government of Buenos Ayres, under date of the 3d of September.
It being necessary that the Brazilian minister in Montevideo should be
informed at once of the resolution to which the government of Buenos
Ayres had come, Senhor Pereira Pinto decided to go to that capital; and
so he did, not only for the object mentioned, but also to make such
representations as might prevent the Oriental government from giving to
the other (Buenos Ayres) just motives of complaint in the observance of
its neutrality.
The agreement of the 31st of August (1859) dissipated the conflict which
was feared, and secured advantage for neutral interest which might have
been prejudiced.
The neutralization of the island, however, was not effected; but peace
now being concluded by virtue of the agreement of the 10th November, it
is to be hoped that a practical re-union of Buenos Ayres with the other
provinces of the confederation will soon be brought about, when all
further doubts in regard to that object will have been removed.
[Inclosure 6 in No. 148.]
Translation of certain parts of the report of the
Brazilian minister for foreign affairs for 1864, relating to the island of Martin Garcia, page 6.
Principles and understanding of the conditions
under which the island of Martin Garcia should be held.
The reclamation was based upon the dispositions of the Articles XVIII of
the treaties of the 12th October, 1851, and of the 7th of March, 1856,
between the three states.
In the first of these, the high contracting parties recognize that the
said island could embarrass and impede the free navigation of the
confluents of the river Plate, in which are interested all the Riverine
States, and that it was desirable to preserve the neutrality of that
island in time of war, whether carried on between the Platine States, or
between, one of them and any other power, and this for the common good,
as wellas the guarantee of the navigation of the said rivers.
The same guarantee was extended (tor muse
entensiva) by the treaties of San Jose de Mores, of 10th of
July, 1853, to France, England, and the United States.
The stipulations to which I have just alluded had for their object,
without prejudicing the question of dominion and sovereignty, which was
still to be settled exclusively between the Platine States, to secure,
so far as it was possible to do so, the neutralization of the island of
Martin Garcia and prevent it from being occupied by any one of them,
thus impeding the navigation of that river and of its confluents,
already declared free by the most solemn treaties.
The armament of this island has neither been prevented nor permitted;
there was only one voice and one agreement between the contracting
parties, to obtain from that one which should be in possession of the
island the consent to its neutralization in time of war.
This subject was discussed for the first time formally in 1859, when the
province of Buenos Ayres, at variance with the Argentine Confederation
and the republic of Uruguay, armed and fortified the island of Martin
Garcia, with the manifest intention of making it the base of its
military operations.
The governments of the Confederation and Uruguay, giving to this fact an
international importance which it did not have, demanded of the imperial
government that it
[Page 80]
should
interfere for the disarmament of the island, and that it should employ
even force if her protest was not heeded.
While the imperial government could not judge itself authorized, by
virtue of existing treaties, to oblige Buenos Ayres to disarm and
disoccupy Martin Garcia, since the obligation she had contracted by
those international acts did not go so far, (pois que a tanto naõ se
elevaváo os effeitos dos * * * * * ,) nevertheless, duly appreciating
its importance, and recoguizing that the said armament might draw to
that point hostilities which could endanger the navigation and commerce
of neutrals, she sought by all persuasive means to convince the
government of Buenos Ayres of the advantages of its neutralization.
But this negotiation had no result. Then followed the convention of peace
of November 11, 1859. The Argentine Republic was re-organized, and
maintained the right to occupy and arm the island without any other
limitation than (sem nenhum outro correctivo mais to que * * *) to make
it entirely inoffensive to the free navigation of the rivers Uruguay and
Parana.
In the opinion of the minister of foreign affairs of Uruguay, the
position which has been lately taken by the Argentine government amounts
to a standing threat against that republic, having for its natural
effect to weaken the efforts which the legal government was making to
suppress the revolution, and indirectly to render to the rebels powerful
aid to the prejudice of its sovereignty and independence.
Taking into consideration the reclamation directed by that minister to
the imperial legation in Montevideo, the imperial government did not
hesitate to conform once in ore with the wishes of the Oriental
government, soliciting explanations from the government of the Argentine
Republic in regard to the matter.
It did not demand, however, nor could it demand (exigir) from that
government the disarming of the island, the conditions of which were
still to be regulated by common agreement between the Riverine States
and the powers which signed the treaties of July 10, 1853.
In the interest of peace, and to prevent complications which could result
from the armament to the Argentine government itself, the imperial
government urged the propriety of removing this further element of
discord from the conflicts unhappily so frequent in the Plate.
The intervention, by its good orifices, of His Imperial Majesty’s
government in this instance seems to have been successful, resulting in
the assurance given by the minister of foreign relations of the
Argentine Republic in the conferences which the Brazilian minister in
Buenos Ayres had with his excellency, that it was not the intention of
his government to make any attempts against the sovereignty and
independence of the neighboring state, nor obstruct free navigation and
foreign commerce by the coercive measures which had been adopted to
obtain from that state reparation for attacks made upon the Argentine
nation, a matter still awaiting a friendly solution.
These measures, in the meanwhile, have not had the consequences which the
government of Uruguay so much feared; the island of Martin Garcia in
fact remains unarmed.
