Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.
Sir: Your despatches No. 147 to 150, both inclusive, have been received, and their contents respectively noted.
In my prior despatches I have informed you fully of my suggestions to the government here as respects the propriety of withdrawing the concession of belligerent rights granted to the south, and of my purpose to wait the development of a few days before mooting the question further. Your despatch No. 149, subsequently received, and an unexpected interview with Mr. Thouvenel, under favorable circumstances, induced me to suggest it again.
I had a long conference with him on the 21st instant, and am fully satisfied that his previous answer given me on this question was upon advisement.
Immediately upon my entering his office, he said he had just received news from the United States. That the day preceding the secretary of their legation at Washington had arrived here, and they had a long talk about our affairs. He referred to our late successes, and the present position of our armies. He said he had never doubted the superior strength of the north, nor of its ability to overcome the south; but the question was, how were we to govern them afterwards? That under our form of government [Page 342] the assent of the people seemed to be essential. Putting his finger upon a map, and pointing to the central parts of the southern cotton States, he said, that when beaten they would retire there; that it was a vast country, and consequently very difficult to foresee the future. I then recalled to him my former suggestion as to a withdrawal of the concession of belligerent rights as an act of justice to us, a friendly power, and a certain means of hastening the forthcoming of cotton to France. I pointed out to him on the large map received from your department the mode in which the insurrectionists were hemmed in without a port or outlet to the sea, with their cities taken, New Orleans and the Mississippi river in our possession, their feeble fleet in those waters destroyed, and with no ships or commerce anywhere. He said these things were true, and the concession of belligerent rights was therefore a nullity—mere waste paper; that it had been granted origially because it was supposed there would be an external as well as an internal war between the parties, and it would therefore be an essential to the commerce of France; that the concession was for a purpose external, not internal; but he repeated substantially what he had said on a prior occasion, that it would not be a handsome thing in a great government at once, upon the south being worsted, to withdraw a concession which had been made to them in their day of supposed strength; that, aside from all political reasons, he felt that such a proceeding would not be exactly worthy of France; or, in common parlance, if I understood him aright, the thing would not look well. Besides, he said again, they could do nothing upon this subject without England. That they had acted together, and although there had been no treaty to that effect, yet France considered herself bound by this understanding. The answers to these suggestions seemed very obvious, and I, of course, used them. I told him that so far from this concession being regarded as of no importance by the insurrectionists, their resolutions to destroy their cotton, and not to plant another crop, were predicated altogether upon the hope that, in that event, necessity would yet drive these governments into alliance with them; that so long as this concession stood it was a hand extended, encouraging them to hope for more; that its prompt withdrawal at this time would end the rebellion at once. I further stated that this concession of belligerent rights was made in derogation of the sovereign powers of a friendly state, and under a mistaken view of facts, and it was but just to us that, upon the true state of the case appearing, it should be promptly withdrawn; that the acknowledgment by a foreign power of another flag within our sovereignty and jurisdiction was (aside from any practical effects) a matter which, of necessity, touched the pride and wounded the sensibilities of our people; that we first appealed to France to set this matter right, because we believed that France had wished us well. As respects England, with whom he said France must act, I told him that we could scarcely hope, in view of facts stated in your recent despatches, that she would be willing to retrace her steps; that whatever might be the strictly official conduct of that government, we could scarcely forbear to see that it wilfully closed its eyes to matters which were constantly being carried on in its ports. He said, in reply, he did not think we could justly charge anything of this kind upon France or her public men. Mr. Thouvenel made no other answer to my remarks as to contraband goods going from here to the south than as heretofore stated. When, however, I told him of the subscriptions of £40,000 and £50,000 in Liverpool, and read to him a portion of your despatch No. 146, in which it is stated that you have notice that five steamers have been purchased, fitted, armed, and supplied with material of war in England to prosecute a naval war against us, which could be looked upon as nothing less than a piratical invasion of our country, he seemed, I thought, somewhat incredulous. He [Page 343] said it was very strange, and that nothing of that kind, as I understood him, could be justified. I submitted to him whether it would not be well for France, under the circumstances, to signalize her aversion to the designs of such conspirators. He said he would speak to Lord Cowley on the subject. I have thus given you the substance of another conference upon these matters. I do not think these general conversations amount to much, except as showing the general drift of mind and purpose of the government. They are too loose in their nature to be otherwise regarded. Inasmuch as I had learned that Mr. Adams, in the exercise of the discretion which was left to him, had submitted your recent long despatch giving a summary of our military position, in connexion with the map which accompanied it, to the British government, I have done the same here.
With you, I feel the great importance of a withdrawal by these powers of this concession of belligerent rights; but, as I have written you from the beginning, I am confident that it will not be done in France except in concert with England. This will remain true so long as the present cordial relations between these powers shall continue to exist. As you have access at Washington to the representatives of both, and may bring them into conference at your pleasure, cannot you obtain some suggestions from them favorable to such course of action? With aid from Mr. Mercier and Lord Lyons something may be done. Without such aid I fear it is not at present possible to accomplish anything in that direction.
I am, sir, your very obedient servant,
His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.