Mr. Dayton to Mr.
Seward.
No. 151.]
Paris,
May 26, 1862.
Sir: I beg to enclose you the translation of a
brief extract from a recent article in the Constitutionnel. You are aware that this paper, if not
semiofficial, is often used to convey to the public mind of France the
views of leading men in the government. That portion, particularly, of
this article, which is in brackets, expresses very clearly views and
opinions which I am quite sure are held by more than one of the present
ministers, and I think by the Emperor. It seems impossible to make them
understand that the interior of the southern country is penetrable by
its navigable rivers, and upon and near which is the bulk of its
population; that an army there surrounded, as they would be, and cut off
from supplies, could not exist; and if it could, that the disposition
and habits of the people would not lead them to a long stay in large
numbers in the sparsely settled and remote districts of the interior. It
is this wide space which constantly staggers the faith of the statesmen
of France in our ability to govern the insurgents even if we conquer
their armies in the field. This objection, as I have told Mr. Thouvenel,
was one about which our own statesmen had no doubt, and it seemed to me
eminently a question for home consideration. I have no doubt, however,
that the supposed uncertainty of the future, arising from the above
cause, has its influence, and weighty influence, in determining these
governments not now to disturb belligerent rights.
Will you permit me, in this connexion, to suggest, that it seems to me
quite important that your attempt to obtain from England and France a
withdrawal of this concession to the insurgents, should not become
public
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except in the event of
assured success. A knowledge of the denial of the application would very much encourage the rebels in their
hopes, As the matter now stands I do not see that this concession
affords serious pretext to the leaders of the rebellion to encourage
their followers to look for more; especially after the tone of Mr.
Yancey’s address to the south.
Mr. Thouvenel informs me that the consuls of France, in southern ports,
report to him that great dissatisfaction exists there with the conduct
of this government; so great, indeed, that they have threatened to
confiscate the property of Frenchmen and send them out of the country.
These governments having stopped short of direct intervention or
recognition, have so much disappointed the hopes of the rebels that they
are rather disposed to ignore the value of that which has, in fact, been
done for them.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
His Excellency William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, &c., &c.,
&c.
(From our own correspondent.)
Paris,
Friday, May 23, 7 a.m.
The Constitutionnel devotes its first three
columns to a consideration of the actual state of Affairs in
America. The article, which is in very prominent type, is signed M.
Paulin Limayrac. It does not deny that the capture of New Orleans is
a great victory for the north, but adds:
[“What does this victory prove? Does it prove that the conquest of
the south by force of arms is henceforth possible? Does it change
the nature of things? Does it cancel distances? And, in the hearts
of men determined to make a desperate resistance, will it engender
submission to the victor? Cast a glance upon the map of that immense
country, and then tell us whether, after as before the capture of
New Orleans, the north, advancing deep into the south, will not meet
with the same insurmountable obstacles that England had to encounter
at the time of the war of independence—distances, climate,
impossibility of procuring provisions, and an energetic people
defending their homes? Such is, in fact, now the actual state of the
question. The south defends its firesides. The most skilful
paradoxes will not succeed in changing opinion upon this point, and
the truth conveyed in the recent words of Mr. Gladstone: ‘The north
is fighting for supremacy; the south is fighting for its
independence.’ * * *
“Nearly the whole of the Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
banks of the Mississippi are in the power of the federals.] Yet,
considering everything, the confederation of the south has rather
progressed than fallen off since the 4th of March, 1861, if we
estimate only the power of the States in square miles. It is
scarcely enclosed within its limits, and has under its flag the
greater portion of the States which were neutral on the accession of
Mr. Lincoln. Moreover, the army commanded by General Beauregard, far
from being dispersed or weakened, is increasing, gaining strength,
and preparing for proximate eventualities, according to plans which
certainly exist, although they have not transpired. Thus the dénouement by war is further off than ever,
and those who advise the north to fight to the last without mercy or
consideration, those who urge it to establish its sway on sanguinary
ruins and devastation, are not aware of the sad future they would
prepare for the whole of America if their counsels were followed. We
entertain other sentiments and other ideas. We never wished to see
one of the belligerents crush the other. Inspired by that wise and
generous
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policy which, at
the commencement of the war, offered its mediation, we never desired
that, under the pretext of emancipating 4,000,000 of negroes,
slavery should be imposed on 6,000,000 of whites. Certainly, like
our adversaries, at least as much as they do, we aspire to the
emancipation of the slaves, but we wish for that emancipation by the
progress of ideas and by the conciliation of interests, not by ruin
and massacre!
“The occupation of New Orleans has not modified our sentiments and
our ideas, no more than it has modified the nature of the struggle
and advanced things in America.”
