Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.
Sir: Your several despatches from No. 138 to No. 146, both inclusive, have been received.
Despatch No. 138, received on the 7th instant, gives a summary of our military position for the purpose of enabling me to satisfy Mr. Thouvenel that the government of France should assume as a fact the certain failure of the insurrection, and that its commercial interests demand a withdrawal of the concession of belligerent rights to the insurrectionists.
I am waiting in daily expectation of hearing what Mr. Adams has done in England upon this question. Without this knowledge I do not feel that it would be wise or prudent to urge the point further at the present moment.
My despatch of March 29 (No. 131) gives you the substance of a conversation with Mr. Thouvenel upon this point, which is subsequent in date to that with the Emperor, to which your despatch refers. The question of the propriety of revoking this concession of belligerent rights has been presented to this government so distinctly and earnestly that I am quite sure the answer of Mr. Thovenel, given in that despatch, was upon full advisement. Without a still further change for the better in the condition of things at home, or some encouraging information from Mr. Adams, I hesitate to urge the point further at present. It might be considered as savoring of importunity, or, at all events, as wanting in that diplomatic forbearance which this government would have a right to expect. This remark applies only to my further and immediate action upon this question; not at all to [Page 341] your despatch. At the time that despatch was written you were yet ignorant of my last conversation with Mr. Thouvenel. The misfortune is that, acting upon previous instructions, I have, in this respect, anticipated your wishes. But the course of events has already greatly added to the strength of our position. Each day adds a new argument to the strength of our claim upon these governments for a revocation of that unwise concession. If, in addition to the taking of New Orleans, our armies at Yorktown and Corinth should be successful, there would scarcely remain a plausible excuse with which to evade our demand. It can hardly be that so good a government as that of France will long continue a wrong which commenced in a wholly mistaken view of the policy and power of the United States. But in the present condition of things—our armies yet facing each other in the field, and the denouement daily expected—the French government will probably wait the result.
I shall avail myself of the contents of your despatch at an early day, and hope, in the meantime, that coming events may even add to its force.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.
P. S.—Since writing the above I have received a communication from Mr. Adams, which informs me that the British government had “no intention to vary the policy” adopted heretofore; and he states, further, that after having read your late despatch upon this question, “the answer was that the great ports were not yet in our possession, and the issue appeared yet uncertain.”
Under these circumstances I shall wait the development of a few days more at least before addressing myself again upon this point to the French government.
D.