Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

292. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Carlucci to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, November 10, 1988

SUBJECT

• Report to the President on Responses to Soviet ABM Treaty Violations—(U)

(S) The attached report has been prepared by the Department of Defense in response to the direction by the President in National Security Decision Directive 312,² that the “Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an options paper which presents the range of proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation.” Comments from the Department of State, Department of Energy, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are appended to the report at TAB A.³

(S) The report provides a range of programmatic and policy options, none of which is mutually exclusive, which the Department of Defense has developed for consideration as possible responses to the Krasnoyarsk violation. Each of the options has been assessed on the basis of evaluation criteria identified in the report. None of the options satisfies all of these criteria; in fact, all options have drawbacks which must be considered. It is difficult to construct responses that provide direct and immediate leverage on the Soviet Union to correct its violations. Cost, political and programmatic constraints must be taken into account in any review of the options. In the context of our overall military posture, there is only limited military utility to any of the options provided. Except for the strategic options, the feasibility of the responses may be called into question because of current political and economic constraints. The strategic offensive options provide marginal enhancements but at costs that will be difficult to accommodate in current and anticipated budgets. In addition, the execution of certain options could be viewed as disproportionate to the Krasnoyarsk radar by itself.

(S) With respect to the programmatic options, the Department of Defense cannot support reprogramming from current programs or accounts. Thus, new funding above the line must be achieved through either a supplemental appropriation or specific legislative authorization for responses to noncompliance with arms control agreements. Given the small likelihood of receiving such funds, I believe it imperative to examine the policy options very closely. The options offered in this report do not represent an exhaustive list of those that could be considered. The Department of Defense will continue to examine other possible responses, and will provide additional options which may be developed.

(S) It must be noted, the attached report places the Krasnoyarsk radar in the context of possible Soviet preparations for a territorial defense. The Krasnoyarsk radar, of course, does not in and of itself pose as severe a threat as would a territorial defense. If a Soviet territorial ABM defense is developed, the report’s proposed options would fail to counter such a defense and would likely require a national commitment an order of magnitude greater.

(S) The President has already taken a most fitting political response by notifying the Soviet Union that the United States will not conclude any future arms control agreements in the START and Defense and Space areas until the Krasnoyarsk violation is resolved. Further responses, if required, should build on that action. The Department of Defense further believes that increased funding for the completion of the full strategic modernization program, modernized conventional forces, and vigorous SDI research provides the most viable military options and the most appropriate hedge against future Soviet threats.

Frank Carlucci

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, November 9, 1988

RESPONSES TO SOVIET ABM TREATY VIOLATIONS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

INTRODUCTION

(S) This report responds to the direction by the President in NSDD 312 that the “Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an options paper which presents the range of proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation.”

(U) The specific options are detailed in Part II of this report. Part I provides the context in which the Department developed those options: the U.S. Government position on the nature and significance of the Krasnoyarsk violation; and the factors used to evaluate options. The discussion of the Krasnoyarsk violation in Part I is an executive summary; more detail is provided in the Annex to this Report.

Part I

The Krasnoyarsk Violation

(U) The President has repeatedly emphasized the absolute importance to the United States of strict compliance with arms control agreements, and the unacceptability of any dual-standard of compliance. In several reports to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance, he has stated that:

“In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.”

While the U.S. Government cannot accept or condone any violation of any arms control agreement, we are particularly concerned at Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty and possible preparations for a prohibited territorial defense against ballistic missiles. The significance of such a defense for U.S. and Allied security has been repeatedly noted by the President:

“This would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its capability.”

(S) A key element of a territorial ABM defense could be provided by the large phased-array radar (LPAR) at Krasnoyarsk. In his instructions to the U.S. delegation to the ABM Treaty Review Conference (NSDD 312), the President made the following basic points about the Krasnoyarsk violation:

— The Large Phased Array Radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty.

— In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled.

— The U.S. has observed the current slowdown of construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation.

— The continued existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the viability of the ABM Treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START and Defense and Space areas.

— The Krasnoyarsk radar violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

— If the Soviet Union is not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, following the Review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty.

— In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.

(U) Large phased-array radars have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense against ballistic missiles. The only permitted functions for an LPAR with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, the United States judges that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking.

(S/NF/WN) In addition to the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar, eight legal new LPARs outside of Moscow have been identified; three are already operational. At least one additional LPAR may be constructed. Each of the nine new Soviet LPARs has, or will have, at a minimum, an early warning detection and tracking capability. All U.S. intelligence agencies agree that the LPARs have the technical potential to provide target-tracking data or support of a widespread ABM system. Agencies differ on whether the Soviets would deploy a widespread ABM system that relied on these radars for battle management support. DIA believes that all nine of these LPARs will be suitable for supporting a widespread ABM defense.

(S/NF/WN) U.S. concerns about the Krasnoyarsk LPAR are further heightened by the broad range of other Soviet ABM and ABM- related activities which could allow them to take advantage of the modern LPAR infrastructure to deploy a territorial ABM defense with little or no prior warning to the United States. The Soviets have been developing and testing the rapidly deployable ABM–X–3 system for about two decades. Initial ABM sites using the ABM–X–3 could be deployed within about two months of ground breaking. The Soviet Union may also be engaged in giving militarily significant ABM capability to its large, and widely deployed surface-to-air missile force. At least one of the Soviet ABM activities in addition to the Krasnoyarsk radar—the deployment of Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars at Gomel—clearly violates the ABM Treaty. Others potentially violate the Treaty. The President has determined that the aggregate of the Soviet Union’s ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

(S) The United States has repeatedly raised with the Soviet Union the issue of its non-compliance with the ABM Treaty over several years in a variety of fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), ministerial meetings, and most recently in the ABM Treaty Review Conference of August 1988 and the experts meeting of 31 October–2 November 1988.⁵ However, the Soviets have not corrected the Krasnoyarsk or Gomel violations or taken any actions which redress our concerns regarding their possible preparation of a territorial defense.

Response to Soviet Violations

(S) The U.S. response to the Krasnoyarsk violation should be designed to persuade the USSR to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar without delay and without preconditions. Moreover, an appropriate U.S. response to the Krasnoyarsk violation should send a clear signal regarding the unacceptability of the overall apparent Soviet preparations for a territorial defense.

(S) The U.S. refusal to conclude a START or Defense and Space Agreement until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled is a first, and essential, response. The impact of a Soviet territorial defense on the retaliatory capability of our current forces would be severe; the effect on START-constrained forces would be even more damaging.

(S) This report presents additional options, in both programmatic and policy areas, which the Department of Defense has developed for responding to the Krasnoyarsk violation. The programmatic options cover both strategic offensive and strategic defensive programs; each requires additional funding from the Congress beyond that provided in the FY1989 Defense Appropriations, through either a supplemental appropriation or specific legislative authorization of responses to non-compliance with arms control agreements.

(U) The costing estimates presented for the options are macro-level and not budget quality. They are suitable for assessments of the feasibility of options but should not be used out of the context of this report to define the precise cost of a specific program. Projection of programmatic expenses up to 10 years in the future, often relating to future weapons systems, cannot be precise. All funding estimates in this report are expressed in 1988 dollars.

Evaluation Factors

(S) The Department of Defense evaluated options according to the following factors: proportionality; linkage; consistency with NST; compliance with existing U.S. arms control agreements; timeliness; reversibility; cost; military effectiveness; technical benefit; growth potential; political acceptability; leverage; and whether the option represents a new initiative. A brief description of each of these factors follows.

○ Proportionality: Is the response option similar in magnitude to the Soviet violation?

○ Linkage: Is there a logical connection and relationship between Soviet non-compliance and the proposed U.S. response?

○ Consistency with NST: Is the response option consistent with agreed elements in START? Is the option supportive of the objectives established by the President for NST?

○ Consistency with Existing Arms Control Agreements: Is the response option consistent with existing arms control agreements?

○ Timeliness: Can the response option be initiated and effected within a reasonable timeframe in order to underscore U.S. determination to respond to the Soviet violation?

○ Reversibility: Could the response option be halted and/or undone should the decision be made to take such action? If the response option is part of an existing or anticipated U.S. strategic modernization program initiative, could it be halted or endangered by Soviet actions to correct their non-compliance with the ABM Treaty?

○ Cost: What is the total cost of the response option? What is the breakdown of the cost over fiscal years and/or by divisible portions?

○ Military Effectiveness: What impact would the response option, if military in nature, have on the strategic offensive and defensive capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union?

○ Technological Benefit: What tangible technological benefit would the response option have for U.S. research and development programs, proposed or existing military systems?

○ Growth Potential: Could the response option be augmented or modified should it be necessary to increase the level of response?

○ Political Acceptability: What is the expected nature and source of support or opposition to the response option, in both the United States and Allied countries? Would the response option be affected by Congressionally-mandated arms control provisions?

○ Leverage: Is the response option likely to help bring about the desired result—inducing the USSR to correct its noncompliant activity?

○ New Initiative: Is the response a new measure specifically tailored to offset the Soviet violation?

(S) Each of the options presented in Part II of this report differ significantly with respect to the evaluation factors. None fully satisfies all of the factors. At the same time, none of the options are mutually exclusive.

(S) The Department of Defense considered, but chose not to forward, several policy and programmatic options in addition those presented in this Report. Among those were: postpone retirement of two Poseidon SSBNs from FY 1989 to FY 1990; undistributed increase in the SDI budget; and delay in the NST negotiations. The option to delay the Poseidon retirements was rejected because it would have little operational value, since the boats involved would run out of fuel in May 1989 and September 1989, respectively.

(S) Finally, it is important to note that the options described in Part II of this Report do not represent an exhaustive list of possible U.S. responses. Instead, the list is designed to encompass a full range of programmatic and policy options which the Department of Defense believes the United States could pursue, based on an analysis of the several evaluation factors.

ABM Treaty Considerations

(S) Some of the options presented in this report are fully consistent with the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty; some would require exercising our legal rights under the broad interpretation; and some would eventually require actions which would be inconsistent with our ABM Treaty obligations if they were not proportionate responses to a Soviet violation. The options in the last category include: SDI system experiment; deployment of a two-site Limited Protection System; refusal to attend a second session of the SCC during 1988; and a unilateral decision that space-based sensors run free.

(U) International law would permit the United States to respond to the Soviet treaty violation with an action which would otherwise be inconsistent with our treaty obligations, provided the response is “necessary to terminate the violation, or prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation” and is “not out of proportion to the violation and the injury suffered.” (See Restatement [Third] of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 905 [1986].) With regard to necessity, according to the Restatement, exercise of such an option would require a determination that “genuine negotiation” that “offers some promise of resolving the matter” is not available. It is unclear whether such a legally permitted proportionate response would require suspension of a treaty obligation (which would be reciprocal in its effect). It would not require declaration by the U.S. of a Soviet material breach.

(S) Furthermore, proportionality under international law does not require that a response which would otherwise be inconsistent with our treaty obligations be confined to the precise scope and scale of the violation. In short, the United States could undertake a response that is of a lesser nature than the Soviet violation, or we could trump the Soviet violation with an arguably greater response—all within our legal rights, provided the response is not out of proportion to the violation or the injury suffered. It should be designed to induce a return to compliance.

(S) With respect to the obligation under domestic law to observe the provisions of the ABM Treaty, it appears that a proportionate response which would otherwise be inconsistent with the Treaty would lie within the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs. However, responses which entailed actions outside the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty would require relief from existing legislation which restricts SDI development and testing to that presented in the 1988 Report to the Congress on the SDI Program.

(S) Finally, none of the options presented—except for the refusal to hold a second SCC session in 1988—would entail an immediate implementation of the broad interpretation or of our legal right to undertake a proportionate response which would otherwise be inconsistent with our ABM Treaty obligations. It would be two years before the SDI system experiment could take place, and even longer before the United States could test ABM-capable space-based sensors, or deploy a two-site Limited Protection System.

PART II

PROGRAM OPTIONS

1. Retain 1–3 Poseidon SSBNs vice early retirement;

2. Advanced penetration aids program;

3. Deployment of 50 additional Minuteman III ICBMs;

4. Retention of nuclear B–52G squadrons;

5. SDI system experiment;

6. Accelerate sensors segment of SDI;

7. Deploy a limited protection system (single site);

8. Deploy a limited protection system (multiple site);

POLICY OPTIONS

9. Refuse to attend a second session of the SCC;

10. Unilateral decision that space-based sensors run free;

11. Reduced restrictions on accelerated SDI.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper, which describes and evaluates the program and policy options, as well as the paper’s Annex.]

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–097, NSDD 312. Secret; Noforn; Wnintel.
2. See Document 272.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Secret; Noforn; Wnintel. Brackets, except those indicating omission statements, are in the original.
5. See Documents 277 and 290.