Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

290. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 31, 1988, 2110Z

12030. Department Please Pass to NSC for Linhard, OSD for Ron Lehman, JCS for J–5 and DDIN, ACDA for Fite (NSC/OSD/JCS Deliver Between 0800–1800 EST). Subject: KRAS: Summary Report of Krasnoyarsk Experts Meeting, October 31, 1988.

1. This is KRAS–002. Secret—Entire text.

SUMMARY

2. At the first meeting of U.S.-Soviet experts, Burns reiterated the U.S. position and criteria on Krasnoyarsk, pointed out that the U.S. reserves the right under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses, and stated that the U.S. group is in Geneva to listen and clarify Soviet proposals regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar and expects the Soviet side to be forthcoming with complete technical information.

3. Karpov began the Soviet presentation by turning the floor over to Sidorov. Sidorov stated that there are six features which he claimed prevented the Krasnoyarsk radar from performing early warning functions (see para 7). Sidorov estimated that at least three years would be required to modify the radar to perform early warning functions and that a new radar would have to be built if it were to perform ABM functions. (Vasil’yev later corrected Sidorov stating that it would take three to four years to renew and complete the construction.) Sidorov then asserted that U.S. participation in an international space center could prevent such modifications from being made. Burns questioned the requirement to link Krasnoyarsk to an international space center in order to resolve U.S. concerns and the time periods that the Soviets had quoted. Several Soviets defended the linkage between the international space center and resolving U.S. concerns.

4. Karpov suggested working groups begin meeting to discuss the issues of how U.S. concerns could be resolved through technical means and what the purposes of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be in an international space center. When Burns responded that he had heard little today that would suggest working groups, Karpov agreed to Burns’ proposal that Tuesday’s² meetings be limited to two full-size experts group meetings with the first to begin at 1000 hours.

5. In a fifteen-minute post-meeting session between Burns and Karpov, Karpov stressed that his experts were instructed to respond comprehensively to U.S. questions. Burns replied that the Soviet presentation thus far touched only at the most uninteresting end of the spectrum of Soviet suggested solutions.

OPENING U.S. REMARKS

6. In lieu of tabling a formal opening statement, Burns used the following talking points:

— We are here today in response to a proposal of the Soviet Union to convene an ad hoc group of experts to listen to the proposed actions the Soviet side is prepared to take to meet our concerns regarding the Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR) deployed in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk. The United States regards this meeting as an ad hoc group and not as an extension of the NST, the ABM treaty review conference, or the SCC. We are prepared to listen to the proposals of the Soviet side and to clarify Soviet positions so as to ensure that the United States has complete technical information regarding these proposals. We are not prepared to negotiate such proposals. We believe that the meeting should not exceed three days.

— The United States position regarding the Large Phased-Array Radar in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is well known to the Soviet side. However, I would like to reiterate that position to make sure that there is no misunderstanding. We believe that the deployment of the Krasnoyarsk radar in this location and with its orientation is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. We believe that, in order for this violation to be corrected, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The continued existence of this radar calls into question the viability of the ABM treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms control agreements in the start or Defense and Space areas.

— The Krasnoyarsk violation continues to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved. The United States reserves all its rights under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses if the violations of the ABM treaty are not corrected. This meeting of experts is without prejudice to that position.

— Any satisfactory solution:

— must reestablish the lead time acceptable to the United States that was the purpose of the LPAR provisions of the ABM Treaty;

— must verifiably remove all treaty-prohibited radar capability;

— should add no new obligations, requirements, or definitions to the ABM Treaty such as on-site inspections; and

— should not prejudice the sides’ positions in the Defense and Space Negotiations.

— the United States believes that these criteria for correction of this violation can only be met by dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar and destruction of the transmitter and receiver buildings, including their foundations. However, the United States is here to hear the ideas of the Soviet side. We expect to receive complete technical information regarding the Soviet proposals on the Krasnoyarsk radar, including:

— exactly what kind of technical solution the Soviet side is prepared to carry out and why the Soviet side believes this solution might offer the basis for resolution of the violation, specifically, what actions the Soviet side is willing to take in regard to the receiver and transmitter it plans to build at Krasnoyarsk;

— when the Soviet side would begin and how long it would take to complete the action;

— what radar capabilities would remain; and

— how long it would take the Soviets to reconvert the radar to a prohibited radar once the Soviet modifications were completed.

— we are ready to listen.

OPENING SOVIET REMARKS

7. Karpov stated that he too preferred not to present a formal statement and reiterated previous Soviet linkage between the ABM Treaty and fifty percent reductions in offensive strategic arms. Karpov then turned to Sidorov to outline the Soviet proposals. Sidorov claimed that Krasnoyarsk was a unique facility which could be used for scientific research. He listed six features which he said would not allow Krasnoyarsk to be used as an early warning facility.

— He claimed the Krasnoyarsk radar was not designed to process large amounts of data in real-time and did not contain specialized computer equipment or specialized algorithms. It would take two to three years to carry out work to provide early warning capability in this area. As an additional matter to help remove U.S. concerns Krasnoyarsk could be equipped with U.S. computer components which could not perform real-time early warning (EW) functions.

— He stated that EW radars normally operated in an environment of deliberate interference. The computers at Krasnoyarsk could not do that; again it would take two to three years to perform modifications which would allow early warning capability.

— He asserted that Krasnoyarsk used types of signals characteristic of Spacetrack radars. He proposed the sides could agree on radar signals for specific Spacetrack purposes.

— He said the Krasnoyarsk radar lacked a shelter against EMP.

— He further stated that the radar did not have an autonomous power source and added that neither this nor the EMP problem could be overcome without building an entirely new radar.

— He then asserted that there was an absence of a real-time data interface which would be required for an early warning system and suggested that the sides could agree on an interface system.

8. He concluded that all the above features make the radar unsuitable for early warning purposes and that it would take at least three years to modify it to become an early warning radar.

U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSION

9. In the discussion that followed, Burns commented that he did not see a linkage between an international space center and the Krasnoyarsk radar, that would affect compliance with the ABM Treaty, yet the Soviets seem to make them inseparable. He asked whether the time periods discussed were cumulative or whether the work could be done concurrently. He questioned whether the Soviet side had said it would take two to three years for that EW radar to be modified to operate in the ABM mode. He asked for an estimate of how long it would take to complete the Krasnoyarsk radar from its current status.

10. Karpov responded that it would take both mechanical and physical, as well as computer software, modifications. However, it could not be converted to an ABM radar, only to an early warning radar. He then added that a new radar would have to be built if it were to have an ABM capability.

11. Sidorov added that Krasnoyarsk was unsuited for ABM functions because it operated in the meter band and would not be able to operate in an environment of nuclear explosions. He stated that in answer to Burns question the characteristics of Krasnoyarsk were linked to the international space center because its functions in that center would allow the U.S. to see how it operates. In response to how long it would take to modify the radar he stated that it would require modification to external structures then changes to primary and secondary processing and protection against interference. He stated their figures were estimates and they did not know exactly how much time would be involved. Their estimate was three years to complete the work at Krasnoyarsk. That time period would get longer as a result of the continued suspension of construction.

12. Vasil’yev corrected Sidorov stating that it would take three or four years to renew and complete the construction. He also stated that the two ideas of Krasnoyarsk capability and an international space center were linked closely and that the proposal to establish such a center was of great interest to Soviet scientists. He pointed out that western European nations had found this type of space research was very expensive and had established a special body to perform such studies. He suggested that experts could discuss the importance and interests of scientists in such efforts and that the optimization of the Krasnoyarsk configuration could change the radars data processing and signal features. He stated that this could remove U.S. concerns.

13. Kondrat’yev remarked that the ABM Treaty limited the building of radars only if they were built for early warning, there were no restrictions on other types of radars. He continued that the U.S. started on the false assumption that there was an ABM Treaty violation that needed correction. Such a misunderstanding could be resolved only through joint and not unilateral actions.

14. Burns stated that the sides should meet again tomorrow. He reminded Karpov of the political as well as the scientific context of the meeting. He noted that the hands of the clock were moving.

15. Karpov suggested that two working groups meet either before or after the next day’s meeting. He suggested one could discuss what could be done by technical means to resolve the U.S. concern. A second group could discuss what the purposes of the radar would be in an international space center.

16. Burns said he would consider this suggestion and he and Karpov agreed to have a full experts meeting at 1000 hours on November 1. Burns also agreed to meet privately with Karpov after the meeting was adjourned.

BURNS-KARPOV ONE-ON-ONE POST MEETING

17. In a fifteen minute one-on-one, Karpov began by stressing that his experts had been carefully selected, were fully knowledgeable about Krasnoyarsk and its radar construction, and were directed to respond comprehensively to any questions the U.S. side might raise. Karpov added that he “did not mind” if the U.S. side used a questioning technique to elicit information. Burns stated that he was unhappy that the Soviet presentation thus far considered only the most uninteresting end of the spectrum of Soviet suggested solutions to the Krasnoyarsk violation. If we are to make progress, Burns added, then the Soviet side must offer real solutions on Tuesday that go to the heart of the issue. Karpov suggested that experts’ subgroups would be useful. Burns argued that, thus far, we had little for them to address and added that given the short time available, the general sessions seemed to be adequate.

18. Karpov stated that he had to return to Moscow on Thursday, but he could leave experts behind if necessary. Burns indicated that three days should be enough.

19. Karpov asked if the D&S Negotiating Group would be able to specify a return date in January; he indicated that he was aware that the group, as well as start, would take a break in negotiations in mid-November. Burns responded that he did not know about a resumption date; he assumed the president-elect would be consulted on such an issue.

20. Karpov invited Burns to lunch on Tuesday, 1 November and Burns accepted. They then agreed to meet in two full group sessions on Tuesday, with the first meeting to begin at 1000 hours.

21. Meeting Date: October 31, 1988

Time: 1600–1727 hours

Place: Soviet Mission

22. Participants:

U.S.

• Gen Burns
• LTC Ankley
• Mr. Castillo
• Mr. Schneider
• Mr. Pifer
• Mr. Teele
• Mr. McCormick
• LtCol Pitts
• Mr. Tyrrell
• Mr. Trimpin
• Mr. Brown
• Mr. Wittwer
• Mr. Koncher
• Mr. Wollan
• Mr. Holt
• Mr. Krimer (int)

USSR

• Amb. Karpov
• Mr. Kuklev
• Mr. Vasil’yev
• Mr. Yepifantsev
• Mr. Kondrat’yev
• Mr. Sidorov
• Mr. Uspenskiy
• Mr. Chulitskiy
• Mr. Gor’kovskiy
• Mr. Trepelkov (int)

23. The next experts meeting is scheduled for 1000 hours on Tuesday, November 1, 1988, at the U.S. Mission.

Burns

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880965–0736. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.
2. November 1.