Office of the Historian

293. Memorandum of Conversation1

New York, December 7, 1988, 1:40–3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • The President’s Luncheon with Chairman Gorbachev (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

  • US

    • The President
    • The Vice President
    • Secretary of State George P. Shultz
    • Kenneth Duberstein, Chief of Staff to the President
    • Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    • Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs
    • Ambassador Jack Matlock
    • Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Notetaker)
    • Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
    • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

  • USSR

    • Chairman M.S. Gorbachev
    • Aleksandr Yakovlev
    • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
    • Anatoliy Chernayev
    • Anatoliy Dobrynin
    • Yuriy Dubinin
    • Viktor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)
    • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Notetaker)
    • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
[Page 1069]

President Reagan warned Chairman Gorbachev that they would again be facing five waves of newsmen and photographers. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not pertaining to Krasnoyarsk.]

The President noted that there were still major differences between us. The radar at Krasnoyarsk, for instance, was unresolved and remained a serious concern. We also need to keep on working in Geneva for an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied that he thought he had put an end to the Krasnoyarsk problem. The installation had been transferred from the military to the scientists. This had been done to make life easier for the next President. Secretary Shultz has already spent so much time on this problem that the Soviet side had decided to turn the matter over to the scientists. (S)

Secretary Shultz said he had listened to the portion of Gorbachev’s address concerning Krasnoyarsk and noted that the word Gorbachev had used had been translated as “dismantle.” (S)

Chairman Gorbachev replied with a smile that he bet the Secretary had written that down. He said he could confirm the translation. It was another victory for the Secretary. The important thing was to make life easier for the next President. (S)

The Vice President interjected that there were other areas he could use some help on, if that was what the Soviets had in mind. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev responded jocularly that the Vice President was probably now thinking of what else he could ask for. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested helping end the US budget deficit. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev said the Soviets could not solve the US budget deficit. The US could not solve the Soviet deficit. But working together, we could help each other with both deficits. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion not pertaining to Krasnoyarsk.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor’s Island. Secret. The meeting took place in the Commandant’s Residence at Governor’s Island. Drafted by Ledsky and Simons. Stevens sent the memorandum of conversation to Levitsky under a January 9, 1989, memorandum, indicating that it was a “revised” and “reformatted” draft of the President’s luncheon with Gorbachev, which is the version printed here. (Ibid.) The complete memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 181. Documents pertaining to the December 1988 New York meeting between Reagan, Gorbachev, and Bush, as well as Shevardnadze and Shultz, are in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 178–182.↩