Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

272. National Security Decision Directive 312¹

Washington, August 8, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF THE 1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY (S)

Introduction. This directive provides guidance concerning: (1) the conduct of the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty and (2) assessment of the responses available to the U.S. Government should the Soviet Union not agree at the Review Conference to correct its violations of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Objectives. The U.S. Delegation should (1) satisfy the legal obligations under Article XIV of the Treaty in conducting the third five-year Review; (2) document the U.S. position on principal outstanding compliance issues but refrain from entering into negotiations concerning these outstanding issues; (3) state unilaterally that Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially the Krasnoyarsk radar, call into question the viability of the Treaty; and (4) avoid undercutting the U.S. position in the Defense and Space negotiations and avoid accepting new prohibitions or constraints beyond those currently in the ABM Treaty. (S)

Krasnoyarsk Radar Violation. Consistent with the above objectives, the U.S. Delegation should make the following points to the Soviet Delegation in the appropriate manner in the course of the Review Conference:

— The basis for U.S. concerns regarding Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, the totality of which suggests the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. (S)

— The Large Phased Array Radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. (S)

— In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The U.S. is prepared to outline the Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. (S)

— The U.S. has observed the current slowdown of construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation. (S)

— The continued existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the viability of the ABM Treaty and makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. (S)

— The Krasnoyarsk radar violation will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved. (S)

— If the Soviet Union is not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, following the Review, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty. (S)

— In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future. (The Delegation, however, should not speculate on the details of any potential responses or the timing of such a declaration at the Review Conference.) (S)

— Specifically ask the Soviet Delegation what actions the Soviet Union will take to resolve promptly the Krasnoyarsk violation. (S)

— (If the Soviets do not agree to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable fashion, then:)

— Accept no joint statement or communique;

— Issue a unilateral statement criticizing the Soviets for their Krasnoyarsk violation based on the points above, making additional points as appropriate based upon Soviet statements made during the Review; and,

— State that nothing in the Review or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty. (S)

— (If the Soviet side agrees to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar on terms acceptable to the United States, then:)

— Accede to Soviet desires for a joint statement on condition that it reflect the details of the Soviet agreement to verifiably dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar; and,

— State that the U.S. is prepared to work with the Soviet side to eliminate, by their resolution, as many ABM compliance agenda items as possible, perhaps by convening a fall session of the Special Consultative Commission (SCC). (S)

Gomel Activities.

— The Delegation should reiterate the USG finding regarding activities at Gomel and state that nothing observed during the December 1987 visit to that site by U.S. officials changed that finding. (S)

— It should reiterate the position stated at the Moscow Summit calling on the Soviet Union to resolve the Gomel issue. (S)

— It should present the actions the Soviets should take to correct the Gomel violation that would be acceptable to the U.S., drawing upon previous guidance provided to agencies. (S)

Implementation. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Burns will head a special delegation to conduct the ABM Treaty Review. The Delegation will consist of appropriate senior members of the Departments of State and Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The U.S. SCC Commissioner and the U.S. Negotiator at the Defense and Space Talks will also be a part of the delegation. (S)

A special ABM Treaty Review Steering Group chaired by the NSC Staff will support the Delegation. The Steering Group will finalize and provide for my approval the instructions to the Delegation and the plenary statements to be tabled during the Review. Should additional plenary statements be required during the Review, they will be prepared by the Delegation drawing upon this guidance and the instructions to the Delegation. If the Soviets raise an issue not addressed in the U.S. plenary statements or in the guidance and instructions provided, the Delegation will clear its proposed responses with Washington. (S)

Responses to Soviet Violations. The Department of Defense should undertake immediately, with the involvement of other agencies as appropriate, to develop an options paper which presents the range of proportionate options available should the Soviet Union resume construction at Krasnoyarsk or otherwise refuse to correct this violation. A plan for involving Congress in this process should be submitted for my review during the first three weeks of the study. (S)

Promising individual options should be presented as soon as each analysis is completed. For programmatic responses, the options should be described in sufficient detail so that should I decide to execute one of the options, implementation steps could begin without further study. I want to be in position to take a decision on the appropriate U.S. response quickly should the Soviets decide to resume work on the Krasnoyarsk radar. (S)

All work should be completed fully coordinated with other appropriate agencies, and submitted for my review no later than November 1, 1988, so that I can have the full benefit of this work soon after the end of the Soviet moratorium and before forwarding the administration’s December 1, 1988 report to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements at the end of this calendar year. (S)

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–097, NSDD 312. Secret. Powell distributed the NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Meese, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of an August 8 memorandum: “The President has approved the instructions for use at the third five-year ABM Treaty Review Conference as presented in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD–312).” (Ibid.)