277. Editorial Note
On August 24, 1988, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency General William F. Burns met with Chief of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Viktor Karpov to discuss the upcoming review of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Robert Linhard of the National Security Council staff relayed Burns’s account of the meeting to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Colin Powell in an electronic message on [Page 1008] August 24, 12:40 p.m.: “We have Bill Burns calling in after each session in Geneva so that we stay ahead of the action there. Call today related the following: Bill had lunch (one-on-one) with Viktor Karpov. Karpov suggested that, in the interest of avoiding deteriorating relations, the Soviets are prepared to deal with the K-radar [Krasnoyarsk radar]. They recognize that it is in the wrong location. They would be prepared to eliminate all but its Spacetrack functions (e.g., by electronic or physical baffles to constrain the angle of the radar beam) and permit unilateral OSI to confirm this. To go further will be difficult in Moscow; given the expense involved, they want to use the facility if possible. When Bill did not bite, Viktor went further to note that, to avoid any worsening of US/USSR relations, they may have to take the first step and destroy the radar. If the situation is resolved to US satisfaction, they would expect some phrase in the joint statement issued after the ABM Treaty Review to express mutual satisfaction with the ABM Treaty. When pressed on what that meant, Viktor dropped the subject. Viktor did add that, of course, if K-radar worked, the Soviets would dismantle Gomel. Viktor also added that Shevardnadze wants something to come out of this ABM Treaty review session that ‘he and Shultz can build upon’ in September. We will have to wait and see what all this means. Bill is handling this well. He did not bite (or show much interest) in anything short of total destruction of K-radar. His is not asking for any added guidance at this point; recommends we listen to what the Soviets have to say over the next few days. I agree. He did debrief his delegation on the conversation, so we may face a leak or two over the next few days. Bill says that, so far, the dozen or so U.S. ‘experts’ in Geneva are behaving like ‘little ladies and gentlemen’ with each other. Tomorrow (Thursday) will be the first official plenary session. Both sides will bash each other ‘for the record’ and get this behind us. Following the plenary, Bill will have a 3-on-3 session (Burns+Cooper and Ellis) with Karpov and two other Godless Commies to be named later. There is a social event Friday evening. Max arrives in Geneva on Monday. He (Max) and Bill will have dinner with Viktor and Obukov on Tuesday. So far, so good.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81686) The Mission in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Burns’s meeting with Karpov in telegram 9445, August 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880747–0565)
In an August 25 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: “The 1st plenary and post-plenary sessions went down today. Only one surprise. The Soviets ‘expressed concern’ about a new radar at VARDO, Norway, that ‘came on the air’ in 1987 and which produces ‘emissions close to the ABM radars tested at Kwajalein’ in the Pacific. We are trying to run down what this radar is. STATE/EUR called the del to tell them not to refer to it in reporting, as it is sensitive. We still haven’t [Page 1009] run this to ground. When we get data on the radar later today, we will add to this update. All other discussions went as expected. No further movement of feelers on the K-radar issue.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration) The Mission in Geneva transmitted a summary report of the first plenary in telegram 9487 from Geneva, August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880752–0289) The Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the post-plenary “3-on-3” session between U.S. and Soviet officials in telegram 9515 from Geneva, August 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880755–0910)
In an August 27 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: “Bill called me from Geneva today to debrief on his lunch with Viktor. He laid it on pretty heavy that we needed to resolve the K-radar via acceptable means now, not in the future. Karpov ran the expected gambits of alternative approaches (modify the radar, etc.), but Bill gave no slack. Bill also made it clear that there will be no statement of satisfaction with the ABM Treaty, in fact, there will be no Joint Statement at all after the review if the K-radar is not resolved. Finally, he told Karpov that the clock is ticking on the review, and that it was time that we start seeing some of the Soviet flexibility on this issue in the formal presentations. Karpov said that he would have to talk to Shevardnadze, and would do so. He also said that it is important that if the USSR moves, the US not ‘rub its nose in it’ in response. He also said that Karpov hinted that this could be worked out on Tuesday evening (when Max arrives for dinner). Bill said that he told Karpov that that would be unacceptable, and the Soviets need to start playing cards on Monday at the latest. I intend to call Max and make it clear to him that he needs to make it clear to the Soviets at the onset and in unambiguous terms that he is not there to ‘close the deal’ on the ABM Treaty Review. I will try to get to Max today. He leaves Sunday for Geneva. This is a Max generated trip, to have dinner with Karpov and Obukov (Burns also invited). The delegation will take Sunday off.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81802) Reference is to Sunday, August 28. The Mission in Geneva transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Burns’s meeting with Karpov in telegram 9552 from Geneva, August 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880759–0032)
In an August 30 electronic message, Linhard wrote Powell: “Per our phone conversation, I did talk to Bill Burns this morning after his lunch with Karpov. Karpov made the following points.—He has no instructions from Moscow authorizing a destruction of K-radar.—He proposed some language for a joint statement that expressed satisfaction with ABM Treaty and looked to the future.—(After Burns rejected this), [Page 1010] he said there is a faction in Kremlin that is strongly opposed to the destruction of the radar.—He said that he could informally offer an idea discussed before he left Moscow in the Kremlin, that being that the US and USSR jointly man and operate the K-radar as a joint venture in deep space tracking. Burns said that he would report the idea, but that the US position is that this violation must be corrected by being taken down. Burns asked for guidance on how to handle this, saying he needed it by 1300 today (Wash time), prior to his dinner tonight with Karpov. Burns recommended that we simply say that the proposal is not acceptable for the purposes of the ABM Treaty Review (will require further study and could be discussed at Shultz-Shevardnadze). For the review, it cannot end satisfactorily without a firm commitment to take the K-radar down. Therefore, the US proposes the Wednesday be the last day of the review, and that each side will issue its statement (but no joint statement). He would also tell Karpov on the side that we will study the Soviet idea. Having done this, Bill would end the review on Wednesday. He would not have a press conference in Geneva, but simply issue the US statement that has been worked. We would have no White House statement at this time, but would have a Q&A package available to handle questions. We have turned the action over to the ABM Treaty Review backstopping group for action prior to 1300 today. We intend that I will pass instructions to Bill Burns at 1300. We will follow-up with an instructions cable later today. We will also generate press guidance against the Sovs leaking. The current thinking is that we should make it clear that the informal proposal is not acceptable. It does not provide the ‘lead time protection’ necessary and originally provided by the treaty. We will move in this direction. Therefore, based on the rationale we discussed, intend to tell Burns to ‘just say no!’ and not imply that we are studying or interested in this ‘informal’ proposal. Burns’s basic points would be:—he has reported Karpov’s informal idea to Washington;—the US has looked at variations on this idea in the past, and it is unacceptable because it does not restore the lead time protection that the ABM Treaty intended by prohibiting such radars;—the K-radar must come down to restore that protection and correct the violation;—the review cannot end satisfactorily (e.g., joint statement expressing mutual view that treaty is working) without Soviet commitment to a resolution of K-radar and Gomel (e.g., to take the radars down);—review should end Wednesday. Judyt Mandel will ensure that the West Coast has a copy of the statement that Burns will release in Geneva tomorrow and any additional press material we produce today to handle contingencies.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81879) Reference is to Wednesday, August 31. No other record of Linhard’s telephone conversation was found. The Mission in Geneva transmitted an assessment of the ABM [Page 1011] Treaty Review in telegram 9620, August 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880765–0277)
In an August 31 electronic message William Heiser of the National Security Council staff wrote Powell: “The ABM Treaty Review Conference was concluded today without Soviet agreement to correct its Treaty violations at Krasnoyarsk and Gomel. General Burns released to the press in Geneva the Washington-approved US unilateral statement, a copy of which has been given to our press office.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 81952) Telegram 9698 from the Mission in Geneva, August 31, transmitted the text of the unilateral statement, which began: “The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third review of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions of that treaty. The review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August 31, 1988. The U.S. delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. During the review, the United States emphasized the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the viability of the treaty. Throughout the review conference, the Soviet Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy, Electronic Telegrams, D880770–0417)