229. Editorial Note
On March 13, 1987, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze wrote Secretary of State George Shultz a memorandum describing a meeting earlier that day with physicist Sidney Drell, who described “a conversation he had had with [Roald] Sagdeev who is head of the Soviet space program. Sagdeev had said that the ABM Treaty had been based upon radars, interceptor missiles and launchers. Science had progressed beyond that technology. It is now necessary to agree between us on the analogous components applicable to today’s technologies. He suggested that the full array of sensors, including optical, infrared, ultraviolet, and electromagnetic sensors, should be substituted for the concept of radars, that space stations should be included in the concept of launchers, and that directed energy weapons should be included in the concept of interceptors.” In the same conversation, “Drell went on to say that in any case, he thought the debate about narrow versus broader interpretation was senseless. It was his considered view that the Treaty under neither interpretation would, during the next decade, stand in the way of the SDI work that needed to be done. He explained that by decade he didn’t mean exactly 10 years, but he did mean approximately that time period. I noted that that was not the word my friends in the SDI program and the Pentagon were giving me; they tell me that realistic tests against an object put into space by a Delta rocket were necessary for their research program to move forward. Drell said this is incorrect. He said that under current technology the front end guidance package of the interceptor weighed some 20 pounds, requiring an interceptor package of 250 to 500 pounds. In order to make that type of system useable, one has to get the weight of the guidance package down by an order of magnitude, say to 2 pounds. This requires an enormous amount of laboratory work to reduce the weight of the focal plane and other parts of the guidance package. Drell said this work did not require space tests against an object in intercontinental trajectory until the very end of the development process. He said the testing of interceptors of intermediate weight and capability were for the purpose of impressing people in the Pentagon and in the Congress; they were not necessary for the research program itself.” A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw Nitze’s memorandum. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987)
In a March 25 memorandum, Nitze wrote Shultz: “The information from the Pentagon generally, and SDIO in particular, has been unsatisfactory, and in recent days has trickled to zero. This is most pronounced in the aftermath of General Abrahamson’s visit with Mrs. Thatcher and the questions that were raised in the reports of that visit—particularly [Page 840] your questions. We have asked General Abrahamson, his Acting Chief Scientist, Dr. Mense, or his deputy, Gordon Smith, to discuss with us the tests which they would recommend under the broad interpretation, and which would not be permitted under the narrow interpretation. We asked also for an explanation of the rationale under which these tests would be permitted under the broad interpretation. Although General Abrahamson gave me a briefing on ‘sampling’ of activities under NSDD 261, they have refused to discuss details of this subject with me or with the people on my staff. They have also refused to provide information on which I could base the answers to your questions asking clarification of what General Abrahamson is reported to have told Mrs. Thatcher.” (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987) Shultz’s questions were not found. In telegram 5670 from London, March 16, the Embassy transmitted a memorandum of conversation of Abrahamson’s March 14 meeting with Thatcher at her country home in Chequers. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
In a March 26 memorandum to Shultz, Nitze described a meeting of the Modified Senior Arms Control Group earlier that day: “Hank Cooper described the Soviet approach to a Defense/Space Agreement in the following terms. Soviet Overall Position on Testing in Space. The Agreement distinguishes between permitted systems and components, and banned systems and components. Those defined in Article II are permitted but can only be deployed pursuant to Article III and tested in conformity with Article IV. All other systems and components are prohibited. They are defined in Article V. Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems and components based upon other physical principles (OPP); it cannot authorize the creation of prohibited components. As a gracious concession from this doctrine, the Soviets say they are willing to grant permission for laboratory research of components and elements based upon OPP but that all testing of components and elements in space must be banned. It was agreed that Cooper would get us a written statement of the Soviet position on these points. Important Definitions. There was an extended discussion of what is meant by ‘non-deployment’ and what is meant by the lapse of such a non-deployment period. Fred Ikle insisted after the end of the non-deployment period any and all deployments of ABM systems would be permitted; in other words, the ABM Treaty would expire without necessity for the U.S. to file a notice of intent to withdraw. I said that that was not my understanding; I thought a ten-year non-deployment period merely meant a return after ten years to adherence to all the provisions and rights included in the Treaty and which existed prior to the commencement of the period of non-deployment. This issue is to be further considered by all the agencies. It was suggested that we need to clarify what is meant by the words ‘in space.’ The Soviets have suggested that space [Page 841] begins at 100 kilometers above the earth’s surface; it was suggested we might wish a higher figure. Tactical Issues. It was said that the Soviets are likely to propose that you and Shevardnadze deal with the brackets in the joint working papers. If he does so, how should we react? I suggested that we not refuse to so do; we should attempt to get them to agree to our language, even if they then claim to have made many more concessions than we. We are making our Defense and Space position contingent on their concurrent agreement to START reductions. They are trying to break this linkage. All agreed that we should maintain it.” A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw Nitze’s memorandum. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987)
On March 31 and April 3, Nitze and Shultz participated in National Security Planning Group principals meetings in the White House Situation Room for discussions of the Strategic Defense Initiative, competing interpretations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and the upcoming Moscow Ministerial. The National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11 a.m. until 12:08 p.m. on April 7. Minutes of these meetings are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Documents 185, 186, and 188.