Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

185. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Principals Meeting¹

Washington, March 31, 1987, 5–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary of State Meeting on Moscow Trip—Arms Control (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President’s Office
• Mr. Donald Gregg

• State

  • Secretary George Shultz
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • Mr. Richard Perle

• CIA

  • Mr. Robert Gates

• OMB

  • Mr. James Miller

• JCS

  • Admiral William Crowe
  • General John Moellering

• ACDA

  • Mr. Kenneth Adelman

• White House

  • Mr. Howard Baker
  • Mr. Kenneth Duberstein
  • Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
  • General Colin Powell
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Captain Linton Brooks

Minutes

The meeting opened at 5:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. Mr. Carlucci, referring to the material distributed in advance,² stated that he would not drone on on what was in the letter but move immediately into dialogue. He noted that we have heard from Ken Adelman and Ed Rowny on the proposed draft (which was prepared by the Department of State) but we have not heard from the Department of Defense or the JCS. (Note: Talking Points at Tab B³ were prepared for Mr. Carlucci and reviewed by him prior to the meeting, but not used.) In the absence of Secretary Weinberger, delayed by another meeting, Mr. Carlucci asked Assistant Secretary Perle to open the discussion. The following discussion (not verbatim) ensued: (U)

Perle: There are two issues, ABM Treaty interpretation and the question of sublimits. We are worried that if we discuss permitted and prohibited activities we get something other than the ABM Treaty. This will produce a set of constraints which will affect us differently than the Soviets. There will not be comparable restraints. (S)

Carlucci: Are you referring to the recommendation to push discussion of permitted and prohibited activities into the five year ABM Treaty review? (S)

Perle: Yes, we should not do this discussion at all. The ABM Treaty review will be coincident with Defense and Space Negotiations. The form doesn’t matter; the idea of discussing permitted and prohibited activities is bad. We can’t ignore verification. Discussing permitted and prohibited activities will end up with the Soviets having an SDI and we not having an SDI. (S)

Weinberger (who had just arrived): I agree completely. We cannot discuss permitted and prohibited activities. Saying that we will do so will inevitably lead to negotiations. (S)

Carlucci (cutting off Weinberger): The DOD position is clear. You do not want to discuss this in any form. (S)

Weinberger: That is correct. (S)

Shultz: The purpose of the idea in the letter was to kick the can. We did not want to prejudge whether we would discuss permitted or prohibited activities. We don’t know if discussing permitted and prohibited activities is bad—we have not been allowed access to the relevant material—but we will get hurt on the Hill if we continue not to discuss it. (S)

Weinberger: State has full access starting five minutes after this meeting if you want it. We don’t know enough to discuss permitted and prohibited activities. Keeping alive the idea that we are willing to talk on this subject will just hurt us. (S)

Carlucci: Why does this have to come up in Moscow? Do you need new instructions on this subject George? (S)

Shultz: We’ll go to Moscow and discuss INF. Beyond that the President wants 50% reductions. In going to Moscow he’ll want me to bring back those reductions. Working with Ron Lehman we have developed a new approach. If we are to bring that approach about, we need a legitimate response to questions about defense. Offenses and defenses are related and we’ve said so. We need to engage the Soviets in discussing that relationship. Some types of defense will proliferate offenses. We have to be able to discuss this. To go with nothing to say is not sensible. (S)

Carlucci: But Ron’s formulation is nondeployment. (S)

Shultz: There are two elements: nondeployment/non-withdrawal and pushing the subject of permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty off for awhile. (S)

Carlucci: As I see it there are three issues: (1) the timing of 50% reductions, (2) nondeployment and, (3) interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Shultz: A fourth is sublimits. (S)

Carlucci: But the working group [Note: Arms Control Support Group] is working this. We should push that discussion off here. I would like to deal with the three that I mentioned. (S)

Shultz: The idea of the letter was a way of not addressing interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (S)

Carlucci: But Defense doesn’t agree. Can’t we drop this from Moscow and let them discuss it in Geneva. (S)

Adelman: It seems to me there is a lot of emotion here, but less disagreement than it appears. The first issue: do we talk? Of course we do. We did it in Reykjavik and Vienna. The second issue: do we change from the broad interpretation? No one wants to do that. The third issue: where do we talk? They won’t accept the answer on the Hill that we aren’t going to discuss this in Defense and Space. Thus we can’t push this out of Geneva. (S)

Weinberger: But it makes a difference what we discuss. It’s OK to repeat our past position but nothing more. (S)

Rowny: I support discussion in the ABM Treaty review. I suggest we hold the review in October and use that to put the issue behind us. We can then move to the broad interpretation. (S)

Carlucci: There’s no need to cross that bridge now. (S)

Shultz: But it will come up in the ABM Treaty review. So we’re not giving anything up by making that explicit now. We’re just blowing smoke. (S)

Carlucci: But what do you gain by putting it in the Treaty review if we can’t change our position?

Lehman: We need to watch where we stand on the Hill. The proposal is to put aside obstacles to getting agreement in Geneva. One obstacle is reductions beyond 50%, another is permitted and prohibited activities. Our NST focus is on 50% reductions and nondeployment. We are discussing permitted and prohibited activities in Geneva already. (S)

Weinberger: We should not be doing that. I’d like to know on what authority we are having such discussions. (S)

Carlucci: They talk, we listen. We are not going to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. (S)

Weinberger: But why even list areas of differences? (S)

Carlucci: We must get beyond this issue. Let’s turn to 50% reductions. We all agree our primarily focus is 50% reductions. What is a reasonable timeframe to get the 50%? (S)

Crowe: We have problems with 1991. Originally we said we could support five year reductions if we got adequate funding for Strategic Modernization, if we had the full five years to do it, and if we got extra spending for the B–1. We didn’t get those things. In our view, the longer the better, in terms of reductions. We would prefer 1996. 1991 is becoming harder every day. We can’t certify the military sufficiency of such reductions (Weinberger interrupts: “We agree with that.”) We can play with 1996 and shave a year or two. (S)

Carlucci: Does 1996 give you a problem George? (S)

Shultz: I work for the President. He wants radical reductions and soon. You’ll still have 6,000 warheads when the reductions are over. That’s more than in 1972 and more than in 1980. (S)

Carlucci: We all work for the President, George. (S)

Weinberger: But we can’t abandon military sufficiency. We need to achieve reductions in a reasonable period. (S)

Shultz: You’ll still have 6,000 left and 4,800 ballistic. (S)

Crowe: But there are substantial differences in the target bases. We just don’t see how we can get there. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets don’t care about 1991. They would prefer longer. If we agree on 50% reductions we can negotiate a time. This is not a big deal. (S)

Carlucci: Do you agree [to Mr. Gates]? (S)

Gates: The Soviets will have problems with 1991. (S)

Shultz: 1991 came out of the discussions on the July 25 letter.⁴ Cap wanted to keep a five year period ending in 1991 to avoid extending any restrictions on Defense and Space. Five years came out of our Defense and Space offer and START became locked into the same period. This was not thought through. (S)

Crowe: The first time 50% in five years came up was at Reykjavik. (S)

Shultz: We are loosening our position from Reykjavik. Why could we not talk in terms of five years from the date of signing? I’d like to keep the phrase “five years” in. (S)

Carlucci: One of the criticisms of Reykjavik was lack of military analysis. We have that now. (S)

Crowe: We had always looked at 50% for ten years not five. The first time five years was looked at was post-Reykjavik. (S)

Perle: Why not appear to be flexible and agree to the Soviet interest in a longer period of reductions? (S)

Baker: Which is more difficult, the Soviet or the U.S. problem with reductions? (S)

Crowe: There is a fundamental asymmetry in the target base which makes it easier for them. They have fewer targets and more weapons. But the Soviets will have problems in five years; they are an inflexible system. (S)

Rowny: The Soviets will not want to change the start timing. Public won’t care about the timing. (S)

Lehman: We can portray this as helping the Soviets; making a gesture to help them accept sublimits. The idea was to get reductions done and locked in prior to a SDI deployment decision. That way our SDI decision would not be held hostage to the Soviet pace of reductions. For this reason there is a down side to 1996. (S)

Weinberger: There’s a worst danger if we can’t get forces to cover half the target base. There’s no way to do this in five years. We can’t certify the military sufficiency in five years. We need to go to ten years. (S)

Adelman: You’re saying we need more money to do this in five years (Crowe agrees). Congress will expect us to be saving money from 50% reductions (Miller agrees). If we say it will cost more it will hurt us. (S)

Shultz: We must make it clear that this program is a program to spend more money. We need more money to get the reductions we want. (S)

Baker: I think, as a political matter, you have a better chance of enhanced funding if you get visible progress in arms control. (Shultz agrees; Weinberger says we’ll never get the money.) (S)

Shultz: I suggest Bob [Linhard] and Ron [Lehman] play around with options for START instructions. They should look at sublimits and timing. The more confining the sublimits are, the harder they are to implement quickly. We should work around the amount of time and try to see if different times give positions that are helpful. (S)

Carlucci: Yes, we can do that. But it’s risky for the President to get too far beyond the JCS on this matter. (S)

Crowe: If we move quickly the ATB will not be ready. So we will have to buy more B–1Bs. Takes four years from ordering to delivery. I would try to do it, but we may not be able to. (S)

Baker: Let me give you a political assessment. We have to get away from confrontation with the Congress or we will lose $22 billion. There is no way to do that except by an arms control agreement, or at least a ray of hope of one. That is the only formula for a bipartisan foreign policy. Thus there is some chance of more funding if we get that ray of hope. (S)

Weinberger: OK, but we must have military sufficiency. In five years you will need more money; in ten years we can work the political problem. (S)

Baker: We need an options paper for the President. For the letter I think we should say as little as possible. (S)

Carlucci: OK, we can throw this into the working group. We need to keep the sublimits and to keep close to the JCS position. (S)

Baker: I would like the relative costs of reductions over ten years versus five years. (S)

Carlucci: We can’t work all options. Do we need more options George? (S)

Shultz: No, we just need to try to get into position to do something in Moscow. I want to avoid just sitting there like a bump on a log. We are not likely to make progress but we want to be ready. Remember they are going to have problems. Their SS–20s are going to be gone too. Consider their problems. (S)

Carlucci: Yes, but the SS–24/25s will cover SS–20 targets. (S)

Weinberger: Yes; there will still be a hundred [SS–20s] in Asia. (S)

Perle: We should recall that the START timing will turn out to be the SDI timing. (S)

Carlucci: Yes we need to look at the question of nondeployment. Must it be coterminous with the START reductions. (S)

Weinberger: No. I don’t like nondeployment but if it helps I am willing. We should not make an agreement beyond 1994. I.e., we will agree not to deploy as long as we can’t deploy, but not beyond. We should not have to ask anyone for permission to deploy. (S)

Perle: It will be difficult to ask to deploy before the period of reductions end. (S)

Carlucci: [To Weinberger] You still like the idea of a treaty which novates the ABM Treaty. (S)

Baker: Why not just a nondeployment promise? (S)

Weinberger: We want to specify that we will be able to deploy. No one should be able to stop deployment. (S)

Shultz: Someone can stop deployment. (S)

Weinberger: Yes, Congress. (S)

Crowe: The draft says that we won’t deploy “ABM systems”. This gives us problems. We need to be able to deploy the BSTS system [Boost Surveillance and Tracking System, a satellite system which will, among other things, replace the current early warning DSP satellites]. (S)

Adelman: The out is Ed Rowny’s formula “not to deploy not currently permitted by the ABM Treaty”. (S)

Crowe: I’m not sure that’s a way out. (Shultz interrupts to ask what BSTS is.) We need BSTS to replace DSP. The Air Force decided to be clever and put the DSP follow-on into the SDI program. It existed before SDI and we need it for warning. Now we put it into SDI when SDI got going. (S)

Nitze: The Soviets have suggested it’s OK to deploy such a system provided it’s not tested in conjunction with a kill mechanism. (S)

Crowe: OK, I just want to make sure that we can deploy. (S)

Weinberger: But this gets us way closer to discussion of permitted and prohibited activities. (S)

Lehman: Max [Kampelman] would like to shift to weapons in space, not systems in space. This would build on the February 1986 Gorbachev statement. (S)

Carlucci: How about just saying “defensive weapons” in space? (S)

Rowny: I agree. The Soviets are already pregnant on this whole issue. They are doing a great deal in space with military application, including things like their expedition to Mars. (S)

Perle: We have to take care. This is a terribly important issue. We are not doing it justice. We need to be very careful. Gorbachev’s real problem is that he wants to kill SDI. The distinction between sensors and weapons is a dangerous one. (S)

Carlucci: But we have to protect BSTS. (S)

Weinberger: We need to watch that we don’t alter deployment timing. Verification of any new restrictions is difficult. We are giving in to their agenda. (S)

Shultz: Does the distinction between nondeployment and non-withdrawal help us? If we say non-withdrawal, we don’t have the problem of saying what not to deploy. We won’t deploy. Maybe we should go back to the July formula of five years of non-withdrawal and two years of nondeployment, followed by freedom to deploy. (S)

Carlucci: Does that help solve the problem? (S)

Crowe: I’m not certain. (S)

Perle: BSTS isn’t a part of SDI, but it may be a part of it in the future. (S)

Carlucci: We need the capabilities. (S)

Adelman: One good idea is to avoid new language. I like Rowny’s formulation. The down side is that there has to be caveats to allow us to withdraw under certain circumstances, but they are all in our position now. The Hill will react badly if we change from non-withdrawal to nondeployment. It will be a signal we don’t want to stay in the ABM Treaty. That will be a bad signal to send. (S)

Rowny: The Hill knows that BSTS is in SDI. We need to find a way to protect BSTS. (S)

Adelman: If we have new language we have to explain it. Nondeployment is new language; non-withdrawal is old. (S)

Carlucci: Need to summarize. We will focus on START with some kind of new timeframe for 50% reductions. We will not look at zero ballistic missiles. On the 50% reductions, the JCS say ten years is best. We will look at that timeframe and see if it gives us any flexibility beyond sublimits. We can assume that in a longer timeframe there should less problem for the Soviets to go to our proposed sublimits. (S)

Crowe (Interjecting): Applying sublimits to SLBMs gives us real problems. (S)

Carlucci (Continuing): Non-withdrawal coupled with some form of nondeployment restrictions is OK. Termination need not be coterminous with START, but political pressure will drive the time to about 1994. Discussion of permitted and prohibited activities will come up in the ABM Treaty review and in Defense and Space. I don’t see any advantage to saying so however. George, is there any need to make this point now? (S)

Shultz: It’s something to say. (S)

Carlucci: But it raises a flicker of hope that we will really do something. (S)

Lehman: There is a reason to get discussion out of NST. There is always pressure to negotiate in that forum. (S)

Weinberger: We are under no pressure. (S)

Carlucci: Yes we are. We’re under pressure, but this may not relieve that pressure; instead it could raise pressure and raise hopes as well. (S)

Weinberger: It will as long as you have an idiot at the SCC who is unable to read his instructions. (S)

Shultz: We are going to a serious meeting with serious people. Reductions are important. We need to make serious proposals and not back off from them. (S)

Carlucci: I think we have a serious proposal. Our proposal is not to discuss permitted and prohibited activities. You want to temporize; that’s OK but we must not raise false hopes while we’re temporizing. (S)

Lehman: In Moscow and in NST we say here’s our proposal. What do we say when they ask us about permitted/prohibited activities? There will be a lot of pressure. We are not proposing putting this into the SCC, but into a separate ABM Treaty review. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets will not press. They understand that if they want the gains of an arms reduction agreement they will have to deal with this Administration and that means accepting SDI. (S)

Carlucci: That depends on what you believe the Soviets’ agenda is. If it is to reach agreement, you are correct. If it is to kill SDI, you are wrong. (S)

Shultz: Well we will try to give them something like non-withdrawal. If they raise other issues in Moscow we will repeat our position. (S)

Carlucci: The President said we were not going to negotiate permitted and prohibited activities. The question is how to temporize. If they raise this, what do we say? (S)

Shultz: We say we are conducting our program in conformance with the ABM Treaty. We just repeat what we said before. (S)

Adelman: Does all this mean that zero ballistic missiles is dead? (S)

Carlucci: Yes, but how we handle it outside this room is very delicate. (S)

Shultz: We still have on the table our ten year proposal tied to zero ballistic missiles. (S)

Baker: The President wants to eliminate ballistic missiles. We must be careful. (S)

Shultz: The President thinks nuclear weapons are immoral and uncivilized. He wants negotiations to eliminate them all. (S)

Linhard: The Catholic Bishops say we are walking away from Reykjavik. We are saying no, the Soviets walked away. They turned it down, we moved on to something new. It is important that we not appear to be walking away in the President’s vision. (S)

Nitze: The new deal does not look like a step forward. It may look like a negative move. (S)

Shultz: Fifty percent in five years is alright but the beginning date is shifted. (S)

Weinberger: Reykjavik came right off the wall. Won’t have military sufficiency in five years. (S)

Carlucci: We have no problems with ten years. (S)

Perle: We should portray walking back zero ballistic missiles as a major concession to the Soviets. We should not just set it aside. (S)

Baker: The President won’t set it aside. He would see it as a radical departure from his position. (S)

Carlucci: Zero ballistic missiles is a desireable future goal in conjunction with conventional reductions and SDI. I suggest we throw this issue to Bob Linhard and his group and ask for an answer by Friday.⁵ We have a meeting with the President scheduled for next Tuesday.⁶ (S)

Shultz: I also need instructions on START, INF, CW, nuclear testing, conventional forces, etc. (S)

Weinberger: I would like to talk venue. There is no way to hold a serious meeting in Moscow. We need to shift it to Geneva. Odom [LTG William Odom, Director, National Security Agency] has made it clear that we cannot be secure in Moscow. (S)

Shultz: NSA says we can do it. We need instructions clear enough to let us discuss things seriously even if we are likely to be intercepted. We may need to fly cables to Helsinki for transmission to California and have the plane wait in Helsinki for an answer. (S)

Weinberger: Why not go to Geneva? (S)

Shultz: There is a home and home tradition for these sessions. It is my turn to go there. There is no reason to break tradition. (S)

Weinberger: But we have no secure enclosure. (S)

Gates: [less than 2 lines not declassified] (S)

Carlucci: We have a separate group working this issue. George, all issues are working. We can meet with the President on Tuesday and can meet ourselves sooner if needed. [Subsequently it was decided to hold another session on April 1, 1987.] (S)

Carlucci then closed the meeting asking the participants to keep the discussions private. (S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0150A 03/31/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.
2. Tab A, which included the “meeting agenda and associated materials,” was not attached.
3. Tab B was not attached.
4. See Document 138.
5. April 3.
6. April 7.