Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

186. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Principals Meeting¹

Washington, April 3, 1987, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• Arms Control—Shultz Meeting in Moscow (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary George Shultz
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • Mr. Richard Perle

• CIA

  • Mr. Robert Gates

• OMB

  • Mr. James Miller

• JCS

  • Admiral William Crowe
  • General John Moellering

• ACDA

  • Mr. Kenneth Adelman

• White House

  • Mr. Howard Baker
  • Mr. Frank Carlucci
  • General Colin Powell
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Captain Linton Brooks

Minutes

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room. Mr. Carlucci began the agenda and framed the first issue for discussion using the talking points attached at Tab B.² [Note: Other than for this opening session, the talking points were not used directly.] (U)

After this introduction, the following discussion ensued (not verbatim): (U)

Carlucci: I propose to take these issues one at a time. The first issue is should the 50% START reductions be completed by 1994 or 1996. (S)

Crowe: We prefer a fixed time period from ratification, not a fixed date. We can live with 7 years. (S)

Weinberger: One driver is availability of bombers pre-ATB. Seven years lets us work the ATB gap. (S)

Crowe: If we do things earlier we’ll need the B1B. (S)

Carlucci: Seven years from 1988 is 1995. (S)

Weinberger: This ought to be driven by military sufficiency. (S)

Carlucci: I agree; that’s why I called on the JCS first. (S)

Adelman: This will not be an issue in Moscow and does not need to be in the letter. We should not spend time on this now but deal with it in the negotiations. Let them set the date. (S)

Weinberger: This is a fundamental issue. Mustn’t shunt aside. (S)

Carlucci: But we have agreement, don’t we George? (S)

Shultz: OK. If they don’t want five years, make them pay for it. Reykjavik was a good position. This proposal was initially made in 1982; five years from 1982 is now. (S)

Carlucci: Did you agree with seven years? (S)

Shultz: No. I don’t agree. I want the five year concept. Five years is better. We can’t get an agreement before 1988. We are reducing to 1980 levels. Posturing to go in 5 years helps us. But sublimits are much more important. Let’s try to get off this confrontation with the Congress. (S)

Weinberger: Five years from 1986 is hard; seven is better. (S)

Adelman: The Soviets don’t expect to complete the reductions in 5 years. (S)

Shultz: I don’t know why you say that, but if it’s true we ought to get something for it. We called for reductions in 1982 of 50 percent in ten years. Ten years from 1982 is five years from now. (S)

Crowe: We never have done analysis against a fixed date. It has always been in terms of a fixed period after agreement. (S)

Carlucci: We are arguing over something where we are in fundamental agreement. (S)

Shultz: No, I support five years. It’s a good position. We want deep reductions soon. If we move from five years we ought to make them pay for it. Sublimits, however, are much more important than the time issue. (S)

Weinberger: Time is important because we want to maintain effective deterrence. As we come down in weapons our requirements must come down in parallel. We can’t deny ourselves military sufficiency. (S)

Shultz: But you are moving as fast as you can on moderization. (S)

Crowe: Yes, but look at yesterday; House Armed Services Committee made drastic reductions. (S)

Shultz: Confrontation with the Congress isn’t working. It’s time to try a different approach like getting some arms control agreements. (S)

Gates: The Soviets will have a technical problem with drawing down in five years because of their ability to dismantle without impacting on other programs. That will be a consideration for their military; I’m not sure about the political leadership. (S)

Carlucci: We’ll put these alternatives to the President: The JCS favor seven years and George favors five. (S)

Perle: We should avoid putting a date in the letter. (S)

Baker: I agree. Why do we need to tell him a date? (S)

Adelman: I agree. Why should the President get involved in this at all? Why do we need to bring it to the President? (S)

Baker: We must have a decision, but we don’t have to put it in the letter. (S)

Carlucci: I’d like to move now to the Defense and Space area. I understand agencies are coming together. [general undertone of puzzlement] (S)

Linhard: [Reviews agency positions as set forth in Tab B,³ noting that agencies differ over issue of non-deployment versus non-withdrawal] (S)

Shultz: I prefer non-withdrawal. Our July 25 letter⁴ was a non-withdrawal offer; we shouldn’t go back on that. (S)

Weinberger: At the end of this period, everybody must be able to deploy. Nondeployment is much better than non-withdrawal to ensure that we can. (S)

Shultz: We have the position on the table of non-withdrawal. As we get ready for negotiations we must not harden our position. That’s what this would do. One approach is five years non-withdrawal, followed by two years of negotiations during which we would promise not to deploy. We proposed this in writing to Gorbachev less than a year ago. Walking back from it is a mistake. We put these views forward in Reykjavik. Of the options in the paper [Tab B], I think 1C is pretty interesting. Non-withdrawal for five years after entry into force or 1994 is good. But the proposal mixes the time periods. We should review our proposal. Three year nondeployment is good, but maybe it should come after 1994. (S)

Weinberger: If all we are doing is putting forward proposals developed last year under a flawed process, we don’t need to meet. We now have a procedure where people’s ideas get forwarded and reviewed, unlike last year. We must approach this subject afresh. (S)

Adelman: We need to keep it simple. We should agree to nondeployment in return for the right to deploy. It’s important to use words we have used before. What we should say is nondeployment of systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1996. (S)

Rowny: I see merit in 1994. We tell them let’s talk about it from 1991 on, then we have the right to deploy. My understanding is that space systems won’t be available before 1996 anyway. (S)

Weinberger: We don’t need anyone’s permission to deploy. We have the right on six months notice. We should not bargain for that. (S)

Adelman: Capitol Hill won’t give you the green light without some form of arms control agreement. (S)

[Several simultaneous comments on what three years of negotiations after 1991 would mean. See Tab B.] (S)

Weinberger: We want an automatic thing. We want to avoid requiring a decision still to be made. The best formula is nondeployment through 1994, then deploy. We want the best provision we can get. 1994 lifts the bar, it doesn’t mandate deployment. (S)

Perle: I have a much more fundamental problem. We may not be able to make a decision three years prior to deployment. We might put ourselves in a push to make a decision we won’t be ready for. We need the broad interpretation to be ready by 1991. Under this non-withdrawal/negotiate plan we will have to signal deployment before we are ready. (S)

Nitze: We have to consult. We have to have a position we can sustain. (S)

Carlucci: You aren’t suggesting that we negotiate the broad versus narrow interpretation, are you? (S)

Nitze: Sooner or later we must. (S)

Lehman: Richard’s [Perle] problem only exists for five years. Thereafter the negotiations would take care of it. (S)

Weinberger: Our push should be deployment. Paul says it can’t sell, but I don’t think that’s right. We must not preempt ourselves for fear of problems with the Congress or the Allies. (S)

Shultz: Nondeployment has problems. What exactly is it we will nondeploy? (S)

Rowny: After the ABM Treaty review we can go to the broad interpretation. You can’t stay with a narrow interpretation until 1991. (S)

Shultz: We have a process going with Congress trying to get a broad interpretation that can be funded. It is very difficult. Paul’s [Nitze] consultations with the SASC after the speech went well. It’s a slow process. (S)

Rowny: We can sell it. (S)

Carlucci: You’re saying nondeployment is more attractive than non-withdrawal. (S)

Nitze: Yes, for Wilson [Senator Pete Wilson], et al. (S)

Adelman: Non-withdrawal and nondeployment aren’t really different practically. (S)

Weinberger: That’s only true if we have the broad interpretation. (S)

Adelman: Gorbachev will like nondeployment. (S)

Weinberger: This is a new agreement. The only limits should be nondeployment. (S)

Carlucci: That’s not the concept. (S)

Shultz: If we have nondeployment we could withdraw from the ABM Treaty for tests. Non-withdrawal is more restrictive. Thus I like a period of non-withdrawal followed by a period of nondeployment. I don’t have any details on the program except what I read that General Abrahamson told Maggie [Prime Minister Thatcher]. Abrahamson won’t talk to us. (S)

Weinberger: What good is non-withdrawal? (S)

Linhard: Do you believe you will have the political will to withdraw for tests? If you do, nondeployment is better; if not non-withdrawal is the same. (S)

Shultz: I heard the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is not in the security interest of the United States. (S)

Carlucci: I want to draw this to resolution. We need to address Richard Perle’s point. Why have this three year period of negotiations? Is anyone for it? (S)

Shultz: It’s part of our past proposal. The flaw in the thinking on MAD is the lack of the offense/defense regime. The Soviets reject sharing, so this is another way to try and devise a stable offense/defense regime. (S)

Carlucci: The President still likes sharing. Why not say the President still supports it and wants to discuss it in the three year period? (S)

Weinberger: Sharing is on the table, we should not walk back from it. (S)

Perle: If we must have a period prior to deployment, it must not be triggered by a decision to deploy. (S)

Carlucci: I didn’t say that. We would have discussions on sharing in the transition. (S)

Perle: The right to deploy exists. [Remainder of comment garbled.] (S)

Weinberger: This approach is better. (S)

Shultz: Keep things simple. (S)

Baker: Sharing technology is key to the President’s vision. (S)

Carlucci: Thus during this three year period we would have ongoing discussions which could include sharing. (S)

Crowe: I want to flag BSTS [Boost Surveillance and Tracking System—a satellite based detection system]. Sensors are a real problem in a nondeployment scheme. (S)

Rowny: We need to have a date by which we will go to the broad interpretation. I spoke to the Republican Steering Committee, fourteen of them. They are ready to wait provided we have a firm date. We will have consensus. (S)

Carlucci: As I see it we have come to two positions. The first is nondeployment through 1994, novation of the ABM Treaty, an automatic right to deploy, and no period of negotiation but a period of discussion before deployment. That I take to be the Defense position. The second position is State’s. What is your position, George? (S)

Shultz: I don’t know. I’ll think it over and let you know before the end of the day. (S)

Carlucci: Last I heard it was five year non-withdrawal. (S)

Adelman: There’s a third position. Nondeploy systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1996. (S)

Carlucci: If the President takes the DOD option we have to address what exactly we are promising not to deploy. (S)

Weinberger: Advanced defensive systems. (S)

Adelman: We should place a real premium on using old words. (S)

Crowe: Can we get language that permits sensors? (S)

Rowny: Akhromeyev told Poindexter in Reykjavik sensors were permitted. They don’t want to limit sensors. This won’t be a problem. (S)

Crowe: Then it’s OK to say advanced defensive systems if Ed is right. (S)

Linhard: We can work this language. (S)

Rowny: Akhromeyev also wants to discuss this subject with Admiral Crowe. (S)

Carlucci: We have two other issues. On the notion of a predictability package, I understand no one objects. (S)

Shultz: What does this mean? (S)

Linhard: [Explains predictability package drawing on description in Tab B. Stresses it would be something like an exchange of Arms Control Impact Statements.] (S)

Perle: We should make sure this sounds like Mrs. Thatcher’s so she gets the political credit. (S)

Carlucci: I agree. Then we all are in agreement. The second issue is Ken’s proposal not to test weapons from space against targets on earth. (S)

Crowe: What good is such a restriction? (S)

Adelman: Such tests are a problem with Gorbachev. There is no ongoing program to do such tests in the United States so we are giving away nothing. (S)

Weinberger: We may need to test against targets on earth due to restrictions against testing in space. We ought not to give up any flexibility now. (S)

Adelman: In two years I’ve not met anyone who wants to do such tests. In any case it’s repealable, it would not be a binding commitment. (S)

Crowe: Once you put something like this in, Congress will never let us get out of it. (S)

Perle: The issue with the Soviets is weapons of mass destruction. (S)

Weinberger: This could be in the back of our briefcase. We could agree at a critical point. Certainly don’t want to do so now. (S)

Nitze: The Soviets haven’t made arguments like this in months. (S)

Carlucci: We have enough for an options paper for the President. (S)

Shultz: I’m worried about the status of other issues. (S)

Linhard: On CW we have a paper from the IG [Interagency Group]. On testing we expect a paper shortly. All issues are working. (S)

Adelman: What is the subject of Tuesday’s⁵ meeting? (S)

Carlucci: To define the options for the President. (S)

Adelman: On what subjects? (S)

Carlucci: Primarily the subjects we have discussed today. (S)

Mr. Carlucci then closed the meeting at approximately 12:20 p.m. (U)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0150 04/03/1987. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.
2. The talking points, attached but not printed, are at Tab A.
3. Tab B, a paper prepared by the Arms Control Support Group, was not attached.
4. See Document 138.
5. April 7.